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 PREFACE 
In this monograph several aspects of externalities in cities are analyzed using 
extensions of a standard residential land use model.  Topics covered are optimal and 
market city sizes, local public goods, traffic congestion, externalities between different 
types of households, and the growth of a system of cities. 
The monograph grew out of the Ph.D. dissertation I submitted to Cornell 
University in 1977, which contained several original contributions to theoretical urban 
economics.  I have made an effort to integrate recent theoretical development, and 
have added appendices on the envelope property and on optimal control theory to make 
the exposition self-contained. 
Although the monograph is written primarily for researchers in the profession, it 
is designed to be accessible for graduate students who have finished a first year 
graduate microeconomics course.  Mathematically oriented undergraduate students 
should be able to understand the materials after careful reading of the appendices on the 
envelope property and on optimal control theory. 
I am grateful to the members of my dissertation committee, Walter Isard, who 
served as chairman. Henry Y. Wan Jr., and Richard E. Schuler, for their comments, 
criticisms, and suggestions.  I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Robert M. 
Solow who acted as my adviser while the dissertation was being written and made 
possible an extremely fruitful year at the Department of Economics, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. My interest in this field was initially stimulated by his earlier 
works on theoretical urban economics.  I also benefited greatly from his comments on 
an earlier draft. 
I started doing research on some of the topics in this monograph when I was still a 
student at the University of Tokyo. I am grateful to Koichi Hamada, Takashi Negishi, 
Yasuhiko Oishi, Yukihide Okano, and Isao Orishimo for their guidance and 
suggestions. 
I am indebted to Richard Arnott, who read an earlier version of the first five 
chapters and offered me many valuable comments, and to Masahisa Fujita, who gave 
me useful comments on the first two chapters. 
I owe an enormous intellectual debt to many other people who have worked on 
urban economics, but I do not list them here.  Acknowledgement of prior contributions 
are gathered in the Notes at the end of each chapter. 
David Robinson provided editorial assistance. His contribution goes, however, 
beyond the usual editorial work.  He made a great contribution to making the 
manuscript readable, and, being an aspiring economist himself, spotted many errors in 
earlier versions. 
I would like to thank May McKee and Hilary Wilson for the excellent job they did 
typing the camera-ready copy of the manuscript.  May typed Chapters I and II; Hilary, 
Chapters III and IV; Virginia Tabak, most of Appendices; and I typed the rest of the 
book. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cities are concentrations of people, and the essence of urban life is the presence, 
for better and for worse, of many other people. It could be argued that the essence of 
urban economics is therefore the analysis of externalities.  Traffic congestion, 
discrimination, pollution, and public services all involve externalities, and all are 
important matters of public policy.  To design better policies, the implications of 
externalities within a decentralized market system must be understood 
The kind of interactions most often analyzed in economics are transactions of 
ordinary private goods which are bought and sold by individuals at a market price.  
This type of interaction always involves flows in two directions: a payment is made 
whenever a good is transferred.  This book is concerned with interactions of a different 
kind - with externalities and public goods, in particular. 
Externalities arise when an agent does not compensate others for the effect of his 
actions.  Smokers who do not, for example, pay for cleaning windows, or for the 
damage they may do to others' health, or for the discomfort they may cause, produce a 
variety of externalities.  Urban life, in fact, is filled with examples of externalities, 
some of which we consider in this book: firms often prefer to locate in larger cities 
because of the presence of other firms; individuals sometimes choose to avoid certain 
neighbourhoods because of the presence of certain ethnic groups; commuters find their 
travel costs increased because others choose to travel at the same time. 
Public goods are goods that are consumed jointly by many individuals.  A 
private good has the property that consumption is exclusive: if an individual eats an 
apple, nobody else can eat the apple.  In the case of a public good, such as national 
defense, consumption of the good by one individual does not prevent others from 
consuming the good at the same time.  As it turns out, it is difficult to achieve an 
efficient supply of a public good through the market, and most public goods are 
provided by the government. 
There are different degrees of publicness in different public goods.  At one 
extreme is the pure public good which is consumed by all individuals in the economy 
simultaneously and which it is impossible to prevent anyone consuming once it is 
supplied.  The classic example is national defense.  Most public goods are not pure in 
this sense, however.  In this book we consider public goods which are jointly 
consumed but only by those who live closer to the place of supply. Parks, street 
lighting, or sidewalks are typical of such local public goods. 
With the exception of Chapter VI, the book is concerned with the normative 
aspect of externalities and public goods, or with what should be done if there are 
externalities or public goods.  There are two major issues in normative analysis:  
efficiency and equity.  The aspect of efficiency is usually represented by the concept of 
Pareto optimality.  An allocation is called Pareto optimal if nobody can be made better 
off without making somebody else worse off.  Pareto optimality ignores distributional 
equity, however: the allocation with only one individual obtaining all the wealth and the 
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rest of the population starving to death may well be Pareto optimal.  Although the 
problem of equity is extremely important, Chapter VI is the only chapter that deals with 
the problem of income distribution, and our analysis there is descriptive rather than 
normative. 
For the sake of simplicity, we usually restrict our analysis to the case in which all 
households obtain the same utility level, and then examine the optimum at which the 
common utility level is maximized.  Using this procedure, the income distribution is 
necessarily the one that yields equal utilities. Since we are interested in the properties of 
an efficient allocation in general, and not the properties of this particular income 
distribution, it is fortunate that many of the results in the equal-utility case either apply 
directly to more general cases, or approximate the results in the general case at a Pareto 
optimum. 
The book therefore deals primarily with the efficiency aspect of externalities and 
public goods.  The best starting point for the analysis of efficiency is the Fundamental 
Theorem of Welfare Economics.  The Theorem examines the optimality of competitive 
equilibrium, where competitive equilibrium is, roughly speaking, the allocation at 
which supply equals demand for all goods, with all agents taking prices as given.  
Assuming that all goods are private goods and that no externalities exist, it has been 
shown that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal under some mild regularity 
conditions, and that under the additional assumption of convex preferences and a 
convex production possibility set a Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved as a 
competitive equilibrium.  Thus in the sense of Pareto, competitive equilibrium is 
optimal.  This result, however, breaks down if there are externalities or public goods. 
In making decisions, individuals who generate externalities do not take into 
account the external effect on others.  Their decisions therefore must be corrected to 
include the external effects.  Introducing a Pigouvian tax/subsidy is one way of 
modifying individual decisions in order to achieve an efficient allocation.  When, for 
example, there is traffic congestion producing an externality among travelers, a 
Pigouvian tax on congestion can be imposed.  An efficient allocation results if the tax 
each traveler pays is equal to the marginal cost she imposes on others by traveling.  
The problem with the Pigouvian tax/subsidy is that it usually requires very high 
administrative costs.  Chapter II considers the case of a special kind of Marshallian 
externality, and explores the possibility of internalizing the externality through the 
ownership of land. 
Schemes for making agents pay all the costs they impose on others are sometimes 
too costly.  Policy makers may then want to achieve the best allocation possible when 
relative prices are distorted by an unpriced externality.  This is the second best 
problem.  The second best problem turns out to be much more complicated than the 
first best.  In Chapter V, we examine an example of a second best problem - deciding 
how much road to build when congestion tolls cannot be levied. 
A public good is supplied efficiently if the marginal cost is equal to the sum of the 
marginal benefits received by all individuals who consume the good.  It is, however, 
extremely difficult for the supplier of the public good to know how much people 
benefit.  In Chapter III, we examine whether it is possible to devise a competitive 
system that achieves an efficient allocation of local public goods. 
We analyze externalities and local public goods within extensions of a standard 
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residential-land-use model.  The basic features of our cities are as follows.  A city is 
built on a flat featureless plain.  All residents in the city work in the central business 
district (CBD) at the center.  People in our model travel only between their homes and 
the CBD.  Travel is equally costly in all directions, so that the only spatial 
characteristic of any location that matters is the distance from the city center.  We can 
therefore treat the city as if it were one-dimensional. 
The city may be closed, in which case the population of the city is fixed; or open, 
in which case migration into and out of the city is allowed.  We often consider the 
extreme case of an open city which is small compared with the rest of the world, so that 
the utility level of the residents is fixed from outside.  We also consider an economy 
consisting of many cities. 
We consistently assume that commuting costs are the only transportation costs 
incurred in the economy.  This assumption is a reasonable first approximation, since 
transporting human beings is much more costly than transporting most commodities.  
The way transportation costs are introduced marks the boundary between conventional 
location theory and the approach based on residential land use which was called the new 
urban economics by Mills and MacKinnon (1973).  In location theory, there are no 
commuting costs, nor even workers, but transporting goods is costly. 
One of the advantages of our approach is that we can assume without being 
logically inconsistent that producers are perfectly competitive, since if there are no 
transportation costs for products, they compete each other directly in the world market.  
In location theory a producer has monopoly power in the market area surrounding his 
factory because more distant producers have higher transportation costs.  Competition 
occurs only at the boundary between different producers, and if a producer raises the 
price of the product, his market area becomes smaller but, in contrast to what happens 
in the case of perfect competition, demand for his product does not fall to zero.  Since 
we avoid the complications arising from the monopolistic element, we can introduce 
other complications, such as externalities, without making the analysis intractable. 
It is not our purpose to elaborate a comprehensive theory of urban externalities.  
Rather, we isolate each particular kind of externality in a very simple model, and focus 
on its special properties.  We often concentrate on polar cases to obtain clear-cut 
results.  In those cases the results should not be taken too literally: they simply 
illustrate the directions of basic forces which operate in more general cases. 
This strategy reflects our belief that the only way to understand a very complex 
real world is to construct simple imaginary world, each of which includes one, or a few, 
important aspects of the real world, and to study their workings.  Once we understand 
the simple models, they can be made more complicated by combining them or by 
introducing more realistic elements, and eventually we may understand all the important 
aspects of the real world.  This view was eloquently expressed by R.M. Solow (1973) : 
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Simplifying assumptions are not an excrescence on model-building; they 
are its essence.  Lewis Carroll once remarked that a map on the scale of 
one-to-one would serve no purpose.  And the philosopher of science 
Russell Hanson noted that if you progressed from a five-inch balsa wood 
model of a Spitfire airplane to a 15-inch model without moving parts, to a 
half-scale model, to a full-size entirely accurate one, you would end up not 
with a model of a Spitfire but with a Spitfire.  He then remarked that if 
you equipped the Spitfire with illuminated tubing in red, blue and green to 
illustrate the fuel, ignition and hydraulic systems, it would again be a kind 
of model but mainly by virtue of its differences from the real thing. 
Our analysis is confined to the economic aspect of cities. Sociological and political 
aspects enter our analysis only as an environment which is taken as given.  Narrowing 
our scope allows us to use some of the more powerful tools from the economist's tool 
kit.  We hope that the precision we gain justifies the generality we lose. 
As in standard economic theory, we assume that rational individuals act according 
to consistent preferences which can be represented by a well-behaved utility function.  
Although we do not believe that all people behave rationally all the time, it is clearly a 
better assumption than that people are always fools, for example, or that every decision 
is made by flipping a coin.  The limits of the assumption, however, must be borne in 
mind. 
The organization of this book is as follows.  In Chapter I, we formulate a simple 
residential land use model which serves as the basis for later developments.  The 
model captures the trade-off between commuting costs and lot size in the simplest 
possible form.  In order to compensate for a rise in commuting costs, the lot size must 
increase with distance from the center, which is made possible by a fall in land rent.  
We introduce the concepts of a closed city and a small open city, and analyze both 
competitive equilibria and optimal allocations. 
We develop a model of an economy consisting of many cities in Chapter II, and 
analyze the optimum and market city sizes.  Two cases are considered: one is the case 
of scale economy internal to a firm and the other is the Marshallian externality case 
with scale economy external to a firm but internal to a city. 
Local public goods are introduced in Chapter III.  We examine how the optimal 
supply of local public goods is achieved in a decentralized market system. 
Traffic congestion and land use for transportation are introduced in Chapter IV.  
The optimal allocation requires that congestion tolls be levied and that roads are built to 
equate the marginal saving in transportation costs from widening the road with the land 
rent.  Because of huge administrative costs, however, it is usually impossible to levy 
the optimal congestion tolls.  In the absence of congestion tolls, the investment 
criterion of roads must also be modified.  In Chapter IV we compare the optimal 
allocation with the market equilibrium where congestion tolls are not levied and roads 
are built according to the usual benefit-cost criterion.  Since the usual benefit-cost 
criterion of comparing the saving in transportation costs with land rent is misleading 
when congestion tolls are not levied, we, in Chapter V, explore the second best 
allocation in which roads are built optimally under the constraint that congestion tolls 
are impossible. 
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In Chapter VI externalities between different types of individuals are introduced.  
Assuming that one type, called discriminators, suffers external diseconomy from the 
presence of the other type, called nondiscriminators, in their neighbourhood.  We 
examine what kind of spatial pattern emerges given the externality.  Using the model 
we analyze the possibility of a so-called cumulative decay process of a city. 
Capital accumulation is introduced in Chapter VII and optimal growth of a system 
of identical cities is analyzed.  The major question asked in the chapter is whether the 
city size increases in the process of capital accumulation. 
There are four appendices after the main text.  Appendix I analyzes a problem 
that arises in Chapter I.  In Chapter I, it is found that households receive different 
utility levels at the Benthamite optimum.  We will explore the reason why utility levels 
are different even though the Benthamite social welfare function is egalitarian.  
Appendix II extends the analysis of local public goods in Chapter III to a more general 
model.  Appendices III and IV develop two useful mathematical tools.  In Appendix 
III, the Envelope Theorem is explained and properties of the indirect utility function and 
the expenditure function are derived as applications of the Theorem.  Appendix IV 
gives a brief review of optimal control theory, which is used extensively in this book. 
It is probably useful to note here that equations from preceding chapters are 
referred to by adding the chapter number: for example, Equation (2.1) in Chapter I is 
called Equation (I.2.1) in other chapters. 
 
REFERENCES 
Mills, E.S. and J. MacKinnon, (1973), "Notes on the New Urban Economics," The Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science 4, 593-601. 
Solow, R.S., (1973), "Rejoinder to 'A Comment on Some Uses of Mathematical Models 
in Urban Economics'," Urban Studies 10, 267. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE BASIC MODEL 
 
The simple residential land use model developed in this chapter will be used later 
to analyze urban externalities.  It is helpful, however, to examine competitive 
equilibrium and optimal allocation in the basic model first, as we do in sections 1 and 2 
respectively. 
The size and form of a city are at least partially determined by the market 
decisions of households which buy or rent housing.  The decisions involve hundreds of 
factors such as the size of a lot, the size of a house, distance to the workplace, 
neighbourhood characteristics, the quality of the schools, the property tax rate and so 
on.  Although all of these factors are important, in this chapter we concentrate on one 
of the most important: the trade-off between accessibility and lot size.  Our households 
are constantly asking "shall we live in a town-house near work or on a larger lot in the 
suburbs?". 
To avoid unnecessary complications, we make the following assumptions:  
(a) In our city the central business district (CBD) is the only center.  All city 
residents work in the CBD and commute from the surrounding residential area.  
This assumption does not, as it turns out, affect the residential pattern: the 
qualitative results are essentially the same in a multi-centered model.1 
(b) All households are identical.  They have the same preferences and the same 
number of workers.  For simplicity, we assume that each household has one 
worker.  All the workers are assumed to have the same skill.  These 
assumptions are important in deriving some of the results.  The assumption of 
the same skill can be easily relaxed, but it is difficult to obtain clear-cut results 
in a model with different preferences unless the difference in preferences is of 
a particularly simple nature. 
(c) The only transportation costs incurred are the costs of commuting to the CBD, 
either to work or to shop.  The value of commuting time is constant for any 
amount of commuting time and the same for all households.  Time costs are 
included in the pecuniary costs of transportation.  These assumptions are 
easily relaxed.2 
(d) An individual may reside at only one location.  This assumption eliminates, 
for example, households with an apartment in the city and a house in the 
suburbs.  The actual number of such households is so small that they can 
safely be ignored.  As will be seen in Appendix I on equality and the 
                                                 
1 However, it is not easy to determine the number, locations and sizes of centers.  Once they are 
determined, the residential patterns are obtained in essentially the same way as in a monocentric model. 
2 Henderson (1977), for example, uses a model with time costs. 
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Benthamite function, this assumption introduces nonconvexity, and is a major 
departure from the standard neoclassical theory. 
(e) Housing capital can be instanteously adjusted.  Although housing is in reality 
a durable good, we assume that all the characteristics of houses such as the size 
of a lot and the size of a house can be changed instantaneously.  Ours is, 
therefore, a city at the imaginary long-run stationary state, in which the 
capital-land ratio is always perfectly adjusted.  Analysis is simplified by this 
assumption, yet many of the results obtained in the simple polar case carry 
over to more complex cases.  Even if different results are obtained, it serves 
as a useful reference point and illustrates the basic mechanism.  Furthermore, 
the comparative static results of long-run equilibria suggest the direction of 
change of an urban economy to policy changes. 
If we further assume that the relative prices of housing capital (buildings) and 
other consumer goods do not change, then by Hicks' Aggregation Theorem 
houses can be treated as part of the consumer good.3  The assumption allows 
us to concentrate on the amount of land used for housing. 
(f) Transportation requires no land input.  We also assume away traffic 
congestion so that commuting costs are simply a function of the distance from 
the CBD.  This assumption will be relaxed in Chapters IV and V. 
(g) There are no externalities and no public goods.  This assumption will also be 
relaxed in later chapters.  Externalities among producers will be examined in 
Chapter II; local public goods in Chapter III; traffic congestion in Chapters IV 
and V; and externalities between different types of individuals in Chapter VI. 
1.  Market Cities 
In this section we analyze competitive equilibrium of a city.  The equilibrium 
spatial structure is examined in subsection 1.1.  It is assumed that all residents receive 
the same income.  Because everyone is assumed to have the same utility function, the 
utility level must be the same everywhere in the city.  Land rent, thus, declines with 
distance from the CBD to offset an increase in commuting costs.  As the relative price 
of land falls, consumption of land increases while consumption of the consumer good 
decreases.  It follows that population density declines with distance from the center, as 
observed in most cities in the world.  Furthermore, if the commuting cost is a linear or 
concave function of distance, the rent function must be a convex function of distance. 
We consider different income classes in subsection 1.2 although we continue to 
assume that households are identical in all other respects: all households have the same 
preferences and transportation costs.  Under these assumptions, richer households live 
farther from the center than poorer households if land is a normal good.  This result 
follows from the fact that richer households have a flatter rent curve at the boundary.  
The rent must fall with distance from the center in order to offset an increase in 
commuting costs, but the required fall is smaller for richer households since under the 
normality assumption they consume more land, and therefore benefit more from the 
same fall in rent. 
                                                 
3 See Hicks (1946, pp. 312-313). 
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In subsections 1.1 and 1.2, the utility levels and the incomes of residents are left 
undetermined.  Two ways of determining these variables are introduced in subsections 
1.3 and 1.4.  The more popular formulation is that of a closed city, which assumes that 
the population of a city is given.  This type of model may be interpreted as dealing 
with a time period long enough to attain an equilibrium within a city, but too short to 
allow migration between cities.  Since it takes a long time to change the housing stock, 
this interpretation is somewhat schizophrenic. 
It is more consistent to interpret the closed city model as the long-run stationary 
equilibrium of a closed homogeneous economy with given population, a given number 
of identical cities and an insignificant rural sector.  The population of a single city is 
then given by simple division. 
As a natural extension of this interpretation, we can take the number of cities as a 
variable.  A non-urban sector such as an agricultural sector can also be introduced so 
that migration between urban and nonurban sectors can be analyzed.  These extensions 
are considered in the next chapter on city sizes. 
In subsection 1.4 we examine a small "open" city, where openness means that 
migration of households and transportation of products between cities are costless and 
otherwise unrestricted.  In an open city, commodity prices and the utility level of 
residents are equal to those in the rest of the economy.  When an open city is small 
compared with the entire economy, any change in allocation within the city will spread 
over the whole economy and local prices and utility level will not be affected 
significantly.  Prices and the utility level may, therefore, be taken as given for the city. 
This model is appropriate when the long-run allocation of a city is the focus.  A 
city administrator, for example, may want to adopt this model to analyze the long-run 
effects of his policies.  The model may also be applied to cities in developing countries 
with surplus labour, or to cities in a small country which allows free migration. 
In both open and closed cities we have to distinguish between the 
"absentee-landlord" case, in which land is owned by absentee landlords who spend 
their incomes outside the city, and the case of "public ownership".  In our treatment of 
public ownership a city government rents the land from agricultural landowners at the 
agricultural rent and sublets it to households at the market rent, using the net revenue to 
subsidize city residents equally. 
1.1.  The Spatial Structure of a Residential City 
Consider a city in a featureless agricultural plain.  To simplify exposition, we 
assume that production does not require space, so that the CBD is just a point.4  The 
residential zone extends to distance x  from the CBD.  The analysis may be applied 
to any shape, but it is often easiest to imagine dealing with a circular city.  In any ring 
between radius x and , there are dxx + dxx)(θ  units of land available, out of which 
 units are used for housing.  The structural component of housing is included 
in the composite consumer good.  At the edge of the residential zone the residential 
dxxLH )(
                                                 
4 It is not difficult to introduce land use for urban production.  See Appendix II for this extension in the 
context of local public goods. 
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rent must be equal to the rural rent. 
One person from each household commutes to the CBD.  The commuting costs, 
, for a household at a radius x, are assumed to be an increasing function of distance 
from the center: 
)(xt
  0(' >t  .  (1.1) )x
Consumption of the composite consumer good, which includes buildings, and 
consumption of land for housing are denoted by  and  respectively.  
Transporting the consumer good is 
)(xz )(xh
 
Figure 1.  The residential zone 
 
costless.  All households have the same quasi-concave utility function, 
   .   (1.2) ),( hzuu =
We assume that the utility function is appropriately differentiable, although it is not 
necessary for all the results that follow. 
The budget constraint for a household at x is 
 ,    (1.3) )()()()()( xhxRxzxtyxI +=−≡
where  and  are respectively the income net of the commuting costs, the 
gross income, and the residential land rent.  The rent function, , provides the rent 
for a unit area of land at any given radius.  The gross income is assumed to be the 
same for every household.  How the income level is determined will be specified later.  
Note that the consumer good is taken as the numeraire. 
,),( yxI )(xR
)(xR
A household maximizes the utility function, (1.2), subject to the budget constraint, 
(1.3).  The first order condition for this maximization problem is 
 
 )(xR
u
u
z
h
= , ?1.4? 
 
where subscripts h and z denote partial derivatives with respect to h and z.  This is the 
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familiar condition that the price ratio and the marginal rate of substitution are equal.  
From this first order condition and the budget constraint, demands for the consumer 
good and land can be written as functions of the net income, , and land 
rent, : 
)()( xtyxI −≡
)(xR
 ,       (1.5) ))(),((ˆ)( xRxIzxz =
     (1.6) .))(),((ˆ)( xRxIhxh =
Since these functions describe the levels of demand obtained at a fixed income 
level, they are nothing but uncompensated (or Marshallian) demand functions.  By 
substituting (1.5) and (1.6) into the utility function, we obtain the indirect utility 
function, 
,))](),((ˆ)),(),((ˆ[))(),(( xRxIhxRxIzuxRxIv ≡     (1.7) 
which describes the maximum utility level available to consumers, given the net 
income, , and land rent, .5 )(xI )(xR
The demand functions satisfy the following useful relationships obtained by 
differentiating the budget constraint (1.3): 
 ,  (1.8) 0ˆˆ =++ RR zhRh
 ,  (1.9) 1ˆˆ =+ II zhR
where subscripts R and I denote respectively partial derivatives with respect to  
and .  Using these equations, we can see that the indirect utility function satisfies 
Roy's Identity6: 
)(xR
)(xI
  (1.10) .hvv IR −=
Since households are identical, in equilibrium the utility level must be the same 
everywhere in the city.  Otherwise, households at a place of lower utility level have an 
incentive to relocate, and the allocation cannot be a market equilibrium.  Thus the land 
                                                 
5 See Section 3 of Appendix III on the envelope property for discussions of the indirect utility function in 
conjunction with the Envelope Theorem. 
6 Roy's Identity is derived in the following way.  From (1.7), partial derivatives of  are given by ),( RIv




+= R
z
h
RzR hu
u
zuv ˆˆ  




+= I
z
h
IzI hu
u
zuv ˆˆ ? 
In view of (1.8) and (1.9), substitution of (1.4) into these equations yields 
hvv IR −=  . 
See Section 3 of Appendix III for a more elegant way of deriving Roy’s Identity which makes use of the 
Envelope Theorem. 
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rent must satisfy 
     (1.11) ,const.))(),(( ==− uxRxtyv
which can be solved for  to yield )(xR
 .  (1.12) )),(()( uxtyRxR −=
This function is called the bid rent function.  It describes the maximum rent 
which a household can pay at a particular distance from the center if it is to receive the 
given utility level.  If the utility level and the income level are known, the bid rent 
function gives the equilibrium rent.  This is merely a result of the rational behaviour of 
households.  If, for example, the actual rent were lower than the bid rent, it would be 
possible to achieve a higher utility level, and a rational household would not fail to do 
so.  The actual rent cannot be higher than the bid rent simply because it is impossible 
to pay any higher rent and achieve the given utility level.  The bid rent function is 
extremely useful in a model with one type (or a few types) of households, since in each 
type the income and the utility level must be the same at any distance from the center.  
The bid rent function summarizes, in a single function, the rent profile that is 
compatible with the given income and utility levels. 
At the edge of the city, where xx = , the residential rent 
must equal the rural rent Ra: 
 aRxR =)(   .      (1.13) 
Given the levels of income and utility, (1.12) and (1.13) completely determine the 
rent profile.  Once the rent profile is determined, the allocation of a city is fully 
characterized, since (1.5) and (1.6) give the consumption of the consumer good and of 
land for housing at each location. 
In this simple model, the transportation cost function and the utility function 
completely determine the spatial structure of the city as Figure 2 illustrates.  Consider 
any two locations, , and , where  is closer to the center than .  Inspection 
of the budget constraint (1.3) shows that a budget line intersects the vertical axis at 
.  Since the utility level is maximized under the budget constraint, the budget 
line must be tangent to an indifference curve at the optimum.  If the utility level is the 
same everywhere in the city, households are on the same indifference curve, u, at any 
location x.  The budget line is thus fully determined and the consumption of the 
consumer good and land can be read off. 
1x 2x 1x 2x
)(xty −
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Figure 2.  Allocation in the basic model 
 
The bid rent is given by the slope of the budget line.  Convexity of indifference 
curves implied by quasi-concavity of the utility function ensures that the bid rent is 
lower at  than at .  That is, the bid rent curve, , is a decreasing 
function of distance x from the center.  Furthermore, the lot size increases and the 
consumption of the consumer good decreases with distance from the center, as 
households substitute land for the consumer good. 
2x 1x )),(( uxIR
More precise properties can be derived by using calculus.  From (1.11) and Roy's 
Identity (1.10), the rent profile satisfies the following simple relationships: 
 )(1 xhRI =      (1.14) 
 .)(1 xhvR Iu −=    (1.15) 
Thus, demand for land is a reciprocal of the partial derivative of the bid rent function 
with respect to income.  Differentiating (1.12) and substituting (1.14) yields 
 ,0)()()( <′−=′ xhxtxR     (1.16) 
which shows that the land rent declines with distance from the center. 
If demand functions are obtained for a given utility level instead of a given 
income level, we have compensated (or Hicksian) demand functions:7 
      (1.17) )
)
                                                
),(()( uxRzxz =
     (1.18) ),(()( uxRhxh =
 
7 See Section 3 of Appendix III for a derivation of the compensated demand function and its properties 
from the expenditure function. 
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The compensated demand functions are useful since the signs of partial derivatives are 
unambiguous: 
  (1.19) 0≥Rz
 . (1.20) 0≤Rh
The first inequality is a result of the fact that if there are only two goods, they are 
always net substitutes.  The second inequality represents the elementary property that 
the (own) substitution effect is negative. 
The slopes of  and  are obtained from (1.16), (1.19) and (1.20): )(xz )(xh
 0
)(
)(')(')(' ≤−== RR zxh
xtxRzxz     (1.21) 
 0
)(
)(')(')(' ≥−== RR hxh
xtxRhxh .   (1.22) 
The consumption of the consumer good is a nonincreasing function and the lot size a 
nondecreasing function of distance.  The latter property is used by urban economists to 
explain the fact that the population density declines with distance from the center in 
most cities. 
Differentiating (1.16) again, we obtain 
 )(
))((
)('
)(
)(")( 2 xtxh
xh
xh
xtxR ′+−=′′   (1.23) 
From (1.22), a sufficient condition for  is that t  is nonpositive.  This 
yields another well-known result: if the commuting cost is a linear or concave function 
of distance from the CBD, the rent function is convex. 
0)('' >xR )('' x
We were able to treat  and h  as choice variables because we assumed 
that housing capital is extremely cooperative.  We have ignored a very important 
aspect of the housing market: the durability of the housing stock.  The model therefore 
describes a long-run stationary state which may never come to exist.  In order to 
introduce durability we would have to develop a dynamic model, making analysis much 
more complicated. 
)(xz )(x
 
1.2.  Several Income Classes 
The above analysis can be easily extended to include different types of 
households.8  In this section we consider the case where there are two income classes.  
For simplicity, and in accordance with empirical observations, land is assumed to be a 
normal good:  
                                                 
8 Although everybody is assumed to have the same skill, households can have different incomes since 
they may own different shares of firms and land. 
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 . 0)](),([ˆ >xRxIhI
Assuming normality, we can show that there is segregation by income: the 
residential zone is divided into two rings, each occupied by one income class.  
Moreover, we can show that the richer group lives in a ring farther from the center, 
which agrees with the actual residential pattern in most American cities.  The 
argument is quite direct. 
Space is occupied by those who are willing to pay the highest rent for it.  In 
other words, the equilibrium rent at any point is simply the highest of the bid rents at 
that point.  Now, the bid rents are functions of income and utility levels, and the rich 
have higher incomes than the poor: . >ry Py
At some radius x*, rich and poor living in the same city must live side by side.  
This radius is the boundary between two rings of households with different incomes.  
At this location the two income groups must pay the same rent.  From (1.16), the bid 
rent function is steeper for the lower income group since t' is the same for both groups, 
and by the normality assumption the lower income group consumes a smaller amount of 
land.  It follows that the richer income group has the higher bid rent outside x* and 
lives there.  Thus the equilibrium residential pattern is complete segregation with the 
richer income class living in the outer ring.9 
 
Figure 3.  Two income classes 
 
The flatter bid rent curve of the rich can be understood as follows.  Suppose that 
as a poor household moved outwards, the loss of utility due to increased commuting 
costs was just offset by an increase in utility arising from increased land use.  Clearly, 
this is possible only if the rent on a unit of land falls.  But since richer households have 
larger lot sizes, the same decline in rent allows them larger savings in the total 
                                                 
9 For arbitrary utility levels, it is possible that the bid rent of one income class is higher than that of the 
other everywhere in the city.  In such a case only one income class lives in the city.  The utility levels 
must be adjusted in order for both groups to live in the city. 
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expenditures on land.  Richer households, therefore, benefit more from the same fall in 
rent and would be willing to accept a smaller decline in rent as they move outward.  
The bid rent curve of the rich thus falls less rapidly with distance from the center. 
This result has been used to explain the residential pattern observed in the United 
States.  However, it crucially depends on the assumption that all income classes have 
the same commuting costs.  Since time costs constitute a large portion of commuting 
costs, richer households may live closer to the center if their value of time is much 
higher than poorer households'.  This may explain why the opposite spatial pattern is 
observed in most cities in Europe, Latin America and Japan, as well as the existence of 
high-rent luxury apartments near the center of most cities.  According to an empirical 
study (1977) by Wheaton, if time costs are taken into account, the tendency of wealthier 
households to move to the periphery is weak even in American cities.  This suggests 
that the observed pattern is mainly caused by other factors, such as the concentration of 
older houses in central cities. 
1.3  A Closed City 
In the previous subsection, important variables such as incomes and utility levels 
were left undetermined.  In this and the following subsections, different ways of 
determining them are introduced.  For simplicity, we consider cities with only one 
income class. 
The analysis in subsection 1.1 shows that the allocation of a city is completely 
determined by utility maximization of households and spatial arbitrage, if the utility 
level, the income level and the size of the city are specified.  Since we already have 
condition (1.13) as one of the three equations required to determine these variables, 
only two more equations must be specified. 
In this subsection, we consider a closed city; immigration into and out of the city 
is impossible and therefore the population is fixed.  For convenience, the population is 
identified with the number of households.  Denoting the total population of the city by 
P, the population constraint is 
 ∫= x dxxNP 0 )(
)(xN
    (1.24) 
where  is the number of households living between x and .  Recalling 
that  and  denote respectively the total land available for housing and the 
lot size at radius x, we can write  as 
dxxN )(
)(xH
dxx +
L )(xh
 
)(
)(
)(
xh
xLxN H=    (1.25) 
The aggregate production function is 
 ,     (1.26) )(PFY =
where all factors other than labor are assumed to be fixed and suppressed.  If a city 
resident is paid the value of the marginal product of labor, the wage rate is given by 
.  If city residents collectively own firms and factors other than labor, a city 
resident will receive the average product, 
)(' PFw =
PPF )( .  In either case wages are a fixed 
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amount w if the population is fixed. 
Income may differ from wages depending on the treatment of land rent.  We 
consider only the two polar cases; the "absentee-landlord" case, and the 
"public-ownership" case.  Intermediate cases are left to the reader.  In the 
absentee-landlord case, land is owned by landlords who do not live in the city, and the 
rent is spent outside the city.  The income of a resident is simply the given wage rate: 
 .      (1.27) wy =
(1.24) and (1.27) give our missing two equations and the allocation of the city is 
completely determined. 
The absentee-landlord case is used more often in descriptive analysis to avoid an 
artificial institutional arrangement.  If the optimality of an allocation is a major issue, 
however, the absentee-landlord case is not convenient because the welfare of absentee 
landlords has to be taken into account, forcing us to compare utilities of landlords and 
tenants.  We shall therefore adopt the public-ownership framework in normative 
analysis. 
For the public-ownership case we assume the following rather artificial 
institutional arrangement.  The city residents form a government which rents the land 
for the city from rural landlords.  We assume that landlords cannot obtain any 
monopolistic power, so that the city government needs only to pay the rural rent Ra.  
The city government, in turn, subleases the land to city residents at the competitively 
determined rent, .  The net revenue is divided equally among households. )(xR
There is dxx)(θ of land between x and , out of which the city sublets 
 to city residents and uses the rest for public purposes such as roads and parks.  
The net revenue of the government is then given by 
dxx +
dxxLH )(
 [ ]∫ −x aH dxxRxLxR0 )()()( θ    . 
The income of a household is the sum of wages and the "social dividend" it receives 
from the city government: 
 [ ]dxxRxLxR
P
wy
x
aH∫ −+= 0 )()()(1 θ    (1.28) 
We temporarily assume that the entire land is rented to city residents for residential use: 
 )()( xxLH θ=               xx ≤≤0      (1.29) 
We shall relax this assumption in Chapter IV when we introduce land for transportation 
use. 
(1.28) describes how factor incomes are allocated.  If we consider how the goods 
are allocated, the following constraint is obtained: 
 [ ]{ }∫ ++= x a dxxRxNxtxzPw 0 )()()()( θ     (1.30) 
The city residents collectively command Pw units of the consumer good, which are 
consumed or spent on commuting costs and the payment of the rural rent.  This 
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constraint is a resource constraint that the city faces and will be used in the 
optimization framework.  The equivalence of (1.28) and (1.30) can be readily derived 
by using the budget constraint (1.3). 
 
1.4  A Small and Open City 
A perfectly closed city is one where migration in and out is impossible.  It is 
useful to consider the case in which migration is possible.  We assume that migration 
of households and transportation of products between cities are completely costless.  
We further assume that the city is so small that any change within the city does not 
affect the outside world.  Prices and the utility level within the city, therefore, equal 
world levels and may be taken as given. 
Since the population size is endogenous in an open city, wages cannot in general 
be taken as exogenous.10  Therefore, the income of a household is 
  )(Pwy =
in the absentee-landlord case, and 
 [ ]dxxRxLxR
P
Pwy
x
aH∫ −+= 0 )()()(1)( θ  
in the public-ownership case.  Either of these equations, if coupled with (1.24), 
determines the population size and the income level, and thereby completely specifies 
the resource allocation in the city. 
Although it is possible that the city government would be controlled by old 
residents who treat newcomers differently, as in some of the club theory literature, for 
example, McGuire (1974), we shall not pursue this line here.  We assume that 
newcomers receive all privileges of citizenship including a share of net city revenue. 
If a city is not small but open, a case intermediate between a closed city and a 
small city is obtained.  Given the total population of the economy, the population of 
the rest of the economy can be expressed in terms of the population, P, of the city.  
When households leave the city, the marginal product of labour rises in the city and 
falls elsewhere, as a result of diminishing returns.  Since migration is free, equilibrium 
will be reached when the utility level outside the city, V , equals the 
utility level in the city: 
0)(':)( >PVP
 . )
                                                
(PVu =
This condition replaces the fixed-population constraint in a closed city and the 
fixed-utility constraint in a small city.  This more general formulation will be used in 
Chapter VI.  Note that the polar cases of V  and V  yield a small 
city and a closed city respectively. 
0)(' =P ∞=′ )(P
 
10 If, however, constant returns to scale are assumed and a resident receives the average product, w is 
constant. This assumption is quite often made (at least implicitly) in the literature. 
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2.  Optimum Cities 
To obtain an optimal allocation, an objective, or criterion, function must be 
specified.  Probably the most natural one is a Benthamite social welfare function 
which is the sum of the utilities of individual households, 
∫x dxxNxhxzu0 )())(),(( . (2.1) 
Note that the Benthamite social welfare function requires that utility be cardinal.11  In 
addition it is commonly assumed that the marginal utility of income decreases as 
income increases.  This is a cardinal property and it is represented by the assumption 
that the utility function is concave. 
We can imagine the Benthamite optimum being achieved as follows.12  Let an 
individual choose the optimal resource allocation, including income distribution, based 
on her own selfish preferences.  Decisions must be made, however, "behind the veil of 
ignorance": she must not know which of the residents she will become.  If she has an 
equal chance of becoming any of the residents, her expected-utility maximization is 
equivalent to maximizing the Benthamite social welfare function. 
It turns out that at the Benthamite optimum the utility level varies with the 
distance from the center.  When land is a normal good, the utility level rises with 
distance from the CBD.  It also turns out that for an appropriate unequal income 
distribution the corresponding competitive equilibrium exactly replicates the optimum 
solution. 
Theorists have been intrigued to find that the optimal utility levels differ among 
locations even though the social welfare function is egalitarian.  This result is 
surprisingly robust, at least among additive social welfare functions.  It can be 
explained as follows.  Because of the difference in commuting costs, identical 
households at different locations have different capability to generate utility from the 
same amount of resource.  The Benthamite optimum, therefore, is attained if more 
resource is allocated to the more efficient households. 
As Appendix I shows, the difference in the efficiency with which households 
realize utility from their commodity bundles arises from the most fundamental 
properties of our spatial allocation problem.  We assumed that a household cannot live 
at more than one location.  Each household, therefore, must choose one location, and 
every location has an associated commuting cost.  Identical households with equal 
incomes, once they choose different locations and hence different consumption bundles, 
are in effect no longer identical.  If households are able to divide their time among two 
or more residences, however, every household faces the same opportunity set and the 
inequality of utility levels will disappear. 
                                                 
11 If utility is merely ordinal, any monotonic transformations of a utility function are considered as 
equivalent. A monotonic transformation can, however, yield a different Benthamite optimum.  In order 
to obtain the same Benthamite optimum, we must assume that utility functions are equivalent only up to 
linear transformations, i.e., utility is cardinal. 
12 See, for example, Arnott and Riley (1977). 
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Even if the social welfare function is made more egalitarian by taking a concave 
transformation of the utility function - that is, if a new social welfare function, 
[ ]∫x dxxNxhxzu0 )())(),((φ , 
is adopted - the optimal allocation continues to have unequal utility levels.  This 
conclusion follows immediately from the observation that even if we redefine the utility 
function as ))(()( ⋅=⋅ uU φ , our assumptions on the original utility function still hold for 
the new one. 
The only way of obtaining an equal utility level with an additive social welfare 
function is to take a limit coinciding with the Rawlsian welfare function, which 
maximizes the minimum utility level.  For example, Dixit (1973) considered the 
welfare function 
 ∫ −−x m dxxNxhxzu0 )())(),((  
and obtained a uniform utility level by taking the limit as .  Appendix I 
contains a detailed discussion of why utility levels differ between different locations 
except in the limit. 
∞→m
Some economists prefer the Benthamite welfare function on the grounds that the 
Rawlsian welfare function has the undesirable property of ignoring the welfare of all 
but the poorest individual.  Although the Rawlsian function is the only additive social 
welfare function that yields equal utility, there are other nonadditive functions that will 
do.  As shown in Appendix I, equal utility requires social welfare indifference curves 
to have sufficiently strong kinks on the line where utility levels are equal. 
Except in this section we will consider only cases where utility levels are equal 
for identical households.  The reason is twofold.  First, this case is mathematically 
more tractable, and easier to compare with the market equilibrium.  Second, readers 
might object to giving different utility levels to households which differ only in the 
location of their residences. 
2.1  A Closed City 
In this subsection, we consider optimal allocation of a closed city.  Only the 
public-ownership case is analyzed because in the absentee-landlord case the welfare of 
absentee landlords must be taken into account, which destroys the simple structure of 
our problem.  The total amount, Y, of the consumer good produced in the city is used 
for direct consumption, transportation, and the payment of the rural rent.  The resource 
constraint for the city is then 
 [ ]∫ ++= x a dxxRxNxtxzY 0 )()())()(( θ        (2.2) 
which corresponds to (1.30) in the previous section.  The city 
also faces the population constraint, (1.24), and the land constraint, 
 )()()( xhxNx =θ ,  xx ≤≤0  (2.3) 
The land constraint is obtained by combining (1.25) and (1.29). 
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The objective function is the Benthamite social welfare function (2.1).  The 
Lagrangian for this problem is 
[ ]{ }
[ ] )4.2(,)()()()()(
)()())()(()())(),((
00
00
∫∫
∫∫
−+


−+
++−+=Λ
xx
x
a
x
dxxhxNxxdxxNP
dxxRxNxtxzYdxxNxhxzu
θµγ
θδ
 
where δ , γ  and )(xµ  are respectively Lagrange multipliers associated with (2.2), 
(1.24) and (2.3).  δ  can be interpreted as the shadow price of the consumer good, γ  
the shadow 'price' of a household (with the total production in the city fixed), and )x(µ  
the shadow rent of land, all in utility terms.  The shadow 'price' of a household may 
sound peculiar, but it naturally appears in our problem because an increase in 
population changes the maximum value of the Benthamite social welfare function.  
The choice variables are , and )(),(),( xNxhxz x , where , , and  are 
chosen at each x between  and 
)(xz )(xh )(xN
0 x . 
As shown in section 4 of the appendix on optimal control theory, control theory 
may be applied to this problem and the following first order conditions are immediately 
obtained: 
δ=))(),(( xhxzuZ ?  xx ≤≤0 , (2.5a) 
)())(),(( xxhxzuh µ= ? xx ≤≤0 , (2.5b) 
[ ] γµδ +++= )()()()()( xhxxtxzxu , xx ≤≤0 ,       (2.5c) 
[ ] )()())()(()( xRxNxtxzxu aθδγδ =−+− . (2.5d) 
Using (2.5c), (2.5d) can be written 
 aRx δµ =)(  (2.5d') 
(2.5a) and (2.5b) require that the marginal utility of the consumer good equal its 
shadow price, and that the marginal utility of land equal the shadow rent at each radius.  
(2.5c) means that the utility level of a household equals the shadow value of its 
consumption bundle plus the shadow 'price' of a household.  A household at x 
contributes to the social welfare by , but consumes resources whose value is )(xu
[ ] )()()()( xhxxtxz µδ ++ .  The difference is the marginal social value of a household, 
or the shadow 'price' of a household, γ .  According to (2.5d'), the shadow rent of the 
city equals the rural rent times the shadow price of the consumer good at the optimum. 
If the utility function is concave and land is a normal good, we can also show that 
the utility level rises with distance from the center at the Benthamite optimum.  
Differentiating (2.5c) with respect to x and substituting (2.5a) and (2.5b) yields 
0)(/)()( <′−=′ xhxtx δµ .   (2.6) 
Thus the shadow rent is a decreasing function of distance from the center.  The desired 
result follows if the optimal utility level is a decreasing function of the shadow rent. 
Implicit differentiation of (1.3) and (1.4) yields the income derivative of the 
uncompensated demand function for land: 
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 )(),(ˆ ZZhZhZZI uuuuD
uRIh −= ? (2.7) 
where 
 ?   (2.8) hhZZZhhZhZ uuuuuuuD
222 −−≡
Since D is nonnegative when the utility function is quasi-concave, (strong) normality of 
land, , implies that 0ˆ >Ih
 .      (2.9) 0>− zzhzhz uuuu
From (2.5a) and (2.5b),  and  can be written as functions of )(xz )(xh )(xµ  
and δ : )),((~ δµ xz and )),((~ δµ xh , and the optimal utility level as  
[ ] )),((~)),((~),),(~)(* δµδµδµ xuxhxzuxu ≡= ? 
 
Differentiating (2.5a) and (2.5b), we obtain 
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From these equations, we get 
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This is negative since the denominator is nonnegative when the utility function is 
concave and the numerator is negative from (2.6).  Therefore, from (2.9) we obtain 
 0)(
~*
>′
∂
∂
= xu
dx
du µ
µ
.      ?2.11? 
Thus, the optimal utility level rises with distance from the center. 
Next, we examine whether the optimal allocation is attained as a competitive 
equilibrium.  An allocation is a competitive equilibrium in our model if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(i) Each household maximizes the utility level with respect to z and h subject to 
the budget constrain and taking the land rent, , as given. )(xR
(ii) No household has an incentive to move to other locations. 
(iii) Demand for land equals supply of land. 
(iv) Demand for the consumer good equals the supply of the consumer good. 
(v) The rent at the edge of the city equals the rural rent. 
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Defining δµ /)()( xxR ≡  and δγ /))(()( −≡ xuxy ? (2.5a) through (2.5c), (2.5d') and 
(2.6) can be rewritten 
.,const))(),(( =xhxzuz       ,0 xx ≤≤ , (2.12a) 
),(/ xRuu zh =        xx ≤≤0 ? (2.12b) 
),()()()()( xtxhxRxzxy ++=  xx ≤≤0 ,    (2.12c) 
aRxR =)( ?        (2.12d) 
)(/)()( xhxtxR ′−=′ ?       xx ≤≤0  (2.12e) 
Condition (i) is satisfied at the Benthamite optimum since (2.12b) is the first order 
condition for the problem of maximizing the utility function, , subject to the 
budget constraint, , with respect to z and h. 
),( hzu
)()()( xthxRzxy ++=
Condition (ii) is satisfied if a household living at any radius x* achieves its 
maximum utility at x*, that is, a household with income  maximizes the 
indirect utility function, v , with respect to x at x*.  The first order 
condition for the maximization is 
*)(xyy =
))(),(( xRxty −
[ ] 0)())(),(()( =′+−′−= xtxRxtyhxRv
dx
dv
I
)
,    (2.13) 
where we used Roy's Identity (1.10), and  is the uncompensated demand for land 
(1.6).  (2.12e) ensures that (2.13) is satisfied at the Benthamite optimum.  The second 
order condition is 
)(ˆ ⋅h
[ ] 0)(ˆ)(ˆ)(()()()(22 ≤′+′−′+′′+′′−= xRhxthxRxhxRxtvdxvd RII . (2.14) 
Since (2.13) is satisfied at each x if , we have )(xyy =
0)())(),()((ˆ)( =′+−′ xtxRxtxyhxR ,   xx ≤≤0 0.  (2.15) 
Differentiating this equation with respect to x yields 
0)](ˆ))()((ˆ)[()()()( =′+′−′′+′′+′′ xRhxtxyhxRxRxhxt RI . (2.16) 
Using this equation, the second order condition becomes 
0)()(ˆ2
2
≤′′= xyxRhv
dx
vd
II     xx ≤≤0 , (2.17) 
which is satisfied at the Benthamite optimum since from (2.11) we have 
 0/)()( >′=′ δxuxy   (2.18) 
if .  This also shows that the income level rises with distance from the center in 
market equilibrium, and corresponds to the result in subsection 1.2 that if land is 
normal, richer households live farther away from the center than poorer households. 
0ˆ >Ih
Conditions (iii), (iv) and (v) are guaranteed by (2.3), (2.2) and (2.12d).  Thus the 
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Benthamite optimum is attained as a competitive equilibrium for a suitable choice of 
income distribution. 
Now we add the constraint that the utility level be equal everywhere in the city, 
and maximize this equal utility level.  Thus, our problem is one of maximizing 
 ∫ dxxuNx )(0    (2.19) 
subject to the resource constraint (2.2), the population constraint (1.24), the land 
constraint (2.3), and the constraint that the utility level be equal everywhere in the city, 
))(),(( xhxzuu = ,      xx ≤≤0 . (2.20)  
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
[ ]
[ ]
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The only new Lagrange multiplier is )(xν  which can be interpreted as the weights that 
have to be attached to the utilities of households at different locations if all households 
are to obtain equal utility levels. 
As shown in section 4 of the appendix on optimal control theory, the first order 
conditions are 
0)()( =− xNux z δν             xx ≤≤0        (2.22a)  
0)()()( =− xNxux h µν              xx ≤≤0   (2.22b) 
[ ] )()()()( xhxxtxzu µγδ =−+−     xx ≤≤0  (2.22c) 
[ ] )()())()(( xRxNxtxzu aθδγδ =−+−             (2.22d) 
dxx
x
dxxN
x
)(
0
)(
0
ν∫∫ =  (2.22e) 
The difference from the Benthamite case mainly lies in (2.22a).  Here, the marginal 
utility of the consumer good does not need to be equal at different locations, while the 
utility level is equal.  In the Benthamite case, the marginal utility is equal but the 
utility level is not. 
Defining δµ /)()( xxR ≡  and δγ /)( −≡ uy , (2.22a) through (2.22e) can be 
written 
)(/ xRuu zh = ,                  xx ≤≤0     (2.23a)  
)()()()( xtxhxRxzy ++= ? xx ≤≤0      (2.23b) 
 23
The Basic Model 
aRxR =)( ?      (2.23c) 
dxNx
v
lxdxxN
x
I
)
0
)(
0
1 ∫∫ =


δ    .      (2.23d) 
Comparison of these equations with market equilibrium conditions in section 1 shows 
that the optimal solution exactly coincides with the market allocation of a closed city.  
(2.23d) shows that the reciprocal of the social value of the numeraire is equal to the 
average of reciprocals of marginal utilities of income. 
 
2.2  A Small and Open City 
In a small, open city it is meaningless to maximize the utility level of city 
residents because the level is determined independently of the allocation within the city.  
Under some circumstances, however, maximizing the net product of the city may be of 
interest: a mining company, for example, building a townsite on its own land would 
maximize the total product of the city minus the cost of maintaining the utility level 
required to attract a work force.  The profit for such a producer would be 
∫∫ ++− x ax dxxRxNxtxzdxxNF 00 )]()())()([()( θ  ?2.24? 
Labour costs do not include the land rent that workers pay since it is paid to the 
company. 
The net product (2.24) is maximized under the land constraint (2.3) and the utility 
constraint, 
uxhxzu =))(),((         .0 xx ≤≤    (2.25) 
where u  is the exogenously given utility level.  Note that since the population of the 
city is a choice variable in an open city, the population constraint can be ignored. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
∫
∫
∫ ∫
−+
−+
++−=Λ
.)]()()()[(
0
)(])(),(()[(
0
)]()())()([(
0
])(
0
[
dxxhxNxxR
x
dxxNuxhxzux
x
dxxRxNxtxz
x
dxxN
x
F a
θ
ν
θ
 (2.26) 
The first order conditions become, after simple manipulations,  
   ,)(xRuzh =u        ,0 xx ≤≤   (2.27a) 
     ,)()()()( xtxhxRxzF ++=′ .0 xx ≤≤   (2.27b) 
Considering  as land rent, we can observe that these optimality conditions 
coincide exactly with the market equilibrium conditions of the absentee-landlord case of 
the open city if workers earn wages equal to the value of marginal productivity of labor.  
)(xR
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Thus the market equilibrium is the optimal solution in this case as well. 
Notes 
The theory of residential land use which is described in this chapter was first 
established by Alonso (1964) following the pioneering work of Wingo (1961).  Many 
urban economists have extended Alonso's framework.  Extensive empirical research 
has also been carried out.  These efforts have culminated in Muth (1969) and Mills 
(1972a,b). 
The indirect utility function approach adopted in this chapter was introduced into 
an urban residential land use model by Solow (1973).  This approach has proved to be 
very useful in deriving qualitative results. 
The single-center assumption was relaxed by Romanes (1976) and White (1976).  
In a two dimensional case, introduction of subcenters gives rise to complicated partial 
differential equations which are very difficult to analyze. 
More than one income class was introduced by Beckman (1969) and Solow 
(1973) among others.  Beckman considered the case of Pareto income distribution.  
Beckman's solution was not correct since, as pointed out by Montesano (1972), he 
ignored boundary conditions (among other things).  Our treatment of different income 
classes is based on Solow's.  Miyao (1975) analyzed the dynamic stability of 
boundaries between different income classes.  Empirical research on spatial residential 
patterns with several income classes was carried out by Wheaton (1977). 
Time costs of commuting were included in Alonso's original formulation, though 
later studies tend to ignore time costs by considering the pecuniary cost as a surrogate.  
As discussed in subsection 1.2, the inclusion of time costs tends to weaken the tendency 
of the richer households to live farther from the center since the rich's value of time is 
higher than the poor's, making commuting costs for the rich greater than for the poor. 
Models with durable housing stock were analyzed by Fujita (1976a,b), and Anas 
(1976).  Since dynamic aspects must be taken into account in this case, the analysis 
becomes much more complicated. 
Definitions of closed and open cities were introduced by Wheaton (1974) in his 
comparative static analysis. 
The Benthamite optimal city was first analyzed by Mirrlees (1972).  He 
discovered that utility levels are not equal at the Benthamite optimum.  Riley (1973), 
(1974) further analyzed this property using different social welfare functions.  The 
product of individual utilities was used in Riley (1973) as the social welfare function, 
and a general class of concave and additive social welfare functions in Riley (1974).  
He derived a result parallel to ours: when land is a normal good and when there is no 
preference for location per se, individuals further out will receive greater utility levels at 
the optimum.  Our illustration in Appendix I of the reason why unequal utility levels 
are obtained at the optimum is largely based on Arnott and Riley (1977) and Levhari, 
Oron and Pines (1978). 
The Rawlsian case was considered by Dixit (1973).  The method of maximizing 
the utility level under the constraint that the utility level be equal everywhere in the city 
was adopted by Oron, Pines and Sheshinski (1973). 
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CHAPTER II  
CITY FORMATION AND CITY SIZES 
 
Complexity generally increases more rapidly than realism in model building.   
Although we understand many of the principles governing city formation, we do not yet 
have a model which includes any large part of our knowledge of real cities and remains 
simple enough to work with.  We can, however, extend the basic model of Chapter I in 
several ways, and obtain interesting results. 
In a sense, the open and closed cities of Chapter I hang in mid-air.  We assumed 
either a given population or a given level of utility, without considering how that level 
came about.  If we are interested in how these variables are determined, we need a 
general equilibrium model of an economy containing cities, not just a model of a single 
city.  In this chapter we explicitly introduce a rural sector spread over on a featureless 
plain.  The rural sector produces an agricultural good which is consumed by 
households in both the rural and urban sectors.  Circular cities producing an urban 
good are sprinkled about on the plain. 
In Chapter I we assumed that commuting is costly.  The commuting costs and, in 
fact, transportation costs in general work against city formation.  Concentration of 
production, for example, requires the transportation of products, workers, and material 
inputs.  To obtain cities in our model, therefore, we must assume that the concentration 
of economic activities results in a technological advantage which at least exceeds the 
transportation costs incurred.  Otherwise, production will take place where there are 
consumers, and the consumers, who find no advantage in working together, will spread 
out evenly to take advantage of all the available land. 
Cities will arise in our model if we assume any or all of the following:  
1.  concentration of immobile factors 
2.  increasing returns to scale or indivisibility 
3.  externalities or public goods. 
Cities arising from concentrations of immobile factors are relatively easily 
modeled, although we only mention them here.  Given an immobile and concentrated 
factor, like a coal bed, industries which use the factor, such as mining, locate at that 
point.  Industries such as steel, which use the primary product intensively, tend to 
locate nearby to save transportation costs.  Others which are related and a retail sector 
follow for the same reason.  The neoclassical model can describe such a city: there is 
convexity in production technology, and there are no externalities, and therefore the 
market mechanism can achieve an optimal allocation.1  A concentration of immobile 
                                                 
1 As discussed in Chapter I and Appendix I, there is a concealed nonconvexity in residential land use 
models, since a household can choose only one location.  The nonconvexity, however, does not affect 
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factors, however, can produce only a relatively small city, and does not seem to be an 
important cause of modern cities. 
We will first examine cities that arise from economies of scale.  Economies of 
scale are prevalent in modern technology and result from such things as the division of 
labor and the indivisibility of such factor inputs as machinery and buildings.  If the 
reduction in production costs due to scale economy is greater than the increase in 
commuting costs, a city will emerge.  Such a city is basically a factory surrounded by 
the residential zone of its workers and may well be called a ‘factory town’. 
Modern cities are, however, too complex to have resulted from simple economies 
of scale.  Why should industries gather in a large city, where the commuting costs for 
each are greater than they would be in a single industry town?  The answer is that 
industries find it profitable to gather together for a variety of reasons : communication 
costs and transportation costs of intermediate inputs can be saved; there is a larger pool 
of skilled labour to draw on, for example, and a more sophisticated infrastructure 
including transportation facilities.  In order to capture these elements in a simple 
model, we assume a variant of Marshallian externality.  We assume externalities 
among firms in a city, rather than among firms in an industry: all firms in a city are 
assumed to benefit from an increase in the population of the city.  This assumption 
introduces the possibility of a city cons isting of many firms by allowing increasing 
returns to scale which are internal to a city but external to the separate firms in a city. 
We assume identical cities in both the increasing-returns-to-scale and the 
Marshallian-externality cases.  This assumption allows us to obtain clear-cut results, 
but obviously fails to capture the complexity of the system of cities in the real world.  
In the last part of this chapter we discuss some possible extensions of the model, and the 
associated difficulties. 
One of the major theoretical issues we try to analyze in this chapter is whether the 
decentralized market system can achieve the optimal allocation of cities, especially the 
optimal city size.  If it cannot, we want to know how to correct the misallocation.  It 
is well known in Welfare Economics that competitive equilibrium is not usually Pareto 
optimal in the presence of increasing returns to scale or externalities: there is almost 
always room to make somebody better off without making any others worse off.  
Although the result holds in our model, it is possible to describe an institutional 
arrangement that leads to optimal allocation. 
The major difficulty in achieving an efficient allocation of an increasing-  
returns-to-scale industry is that the average cost always exceeds the marginal cost.  
Since an efficient allocation requires that the price be set equal to the marginal cost, the 
total revenue does not cover the total cost and the profit of a firm is negative.  It is 
difficult to give such a firm a subsidy to cover the loss without destroying the incentive 
to minimize costs. 
It turns out, however, that the loss of an urban producer equals the aggregate 
                                                                                                                                               
the optimality of competitive equilibrium. 
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differential rent (the competitive urban rent minus the rural rent) of a city when the 
number of cities is optimal.  This suggests that the optimal allocation could be 
achieved by a system of land developers.  In each city an urban producer would lease 
all the land necessary for a city, including the residential area, from the rural landlords 
at the rural rent; sublease it to households at the competitive urban rent; and maximize 
differential rent plus profit.  We will show that this arrangement does achieve the 
optimum allocation. 
The optimal allocation of an economy with externalities requires Pigouvian 
tax-subsidies: agents that induce external costs or benefits for other agents must pay 
taxes or be given subsidies.  In our model the population of a city gives external 
benefits to urban producers, so urban residents must be given subsidies.  A relationship 
similar to that between the profit and the differential rent in the increasing returns to 
scale case holds with respect to the Pigouvian subsidy and the differential rent: at the 
optimum number of cities the aggregate Pigouvian subsidy equals the aggregate 
differential rent.  This might seem to suggest that the optimal solution can be attained 
through the market if city governments return the differential rent to city residents as an 
equal social dividend.  Unfortunately, this is not true.  Though the optimal solution is 
indeed a market equilibrium under this institutional arrangement, city sizes greater than 
the optimum can also be equilibria. 
1.  The Model 
The basic model of Chapter I becomes a simple general equilibrium framework 
when the rural sector is explicitly introduced.  Consider a flat and fertile plain over 
which the rural sector is spread out.  Circular cities are sprinkled about on the plain as 
in Figure 1.  The plain is so large that the cities do not overlap. 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Spatial Configuration of the Economy 
We will imagine that each city consists of a business and production core 
surrounded by a residential zone.  For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that 
City Sizes 
 31
urban production takes no space and no materials, so that only labor enters the 
production function.  As before, households are identical, and each household has a 
single worker who commutes to a job at the center.  We use the words 'households' and 
'workers' inter-changeably, and the number of households is treated as the population.   
Commuting involves transportation costs but we assume that both urban and rural goods 
can be moved costlessly. 
The production function of an urban firm is  
 ),( cPf l ，                          (1.1) 
where l  and cP  are respectively labour input to a firm and the population of the city.  
We assume that all firms are identical.  If the number of firms is m, the total 
production of a city is  
 ),( cPmfY l= ，                 (1.2) 
where 
 
l
cPm = .            (1.3) 
Until section 5 we will assume that 0),( =cp Pf l  so that firms gain no advantage 
from increased population.  Since grouping firms will result in higher commuting 
costs, there will be only one firm in a city.  In this case the aggregate urban production 
function, )( cPF  and an individual firm's production function will be identical: 
 ),()( ccc PPfPF º .         (1.4) 
The production function is differentiable, with a positive marginal product.  In order to 
allow for the possibility of increasing returns to scale, we do not impose the condition 
that the production function be concave. 
We assume that the rural sector produces some complete and useful product, say 
soy beans, and that it has constant returns to scale.  The aggregate production function 
of the rural sector is 
 ),( aa HPG ),        (1.5) 
where aP  and aH  are respectively the aggregate labour and land inputs.  We 
assume that the production function is concave, homogeneous of degree one, 
differentiable, and that it has positive marginal products. 
Goods produced by rural and urban sectors are called the rural and the urban 
goods respectively.  Both goods are consumed by households.  All households have 
the same differentiable, quasi-concave utility function, 
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 ),,( hzau ,    (1.6) 
where a, z, and h are respectively the rural good, the urban good, and land for housing 
and where all goods are assumed to have positive marginal utilities. 
The number of cities is denoted by n.  For simplicity, we assume that all cities 
are identical, and we use the same notation for all cities.  Since all cities have the same 
technology, and all households are the same, the assumption can usually be justified 
when the number of cities is large enough. 
All cities are circular, and the amount of land available for housing between x  
and dxx +  from the center is xdxdxx pq 2)( = .  As the production does not require 
land, the residential zone stretches from 0  to x .  The consumption of land for 
housing is constrained by 
 )()()( xxNxh q= ,      xx ££0 ,     (1.7) 
where dxxN )(  is the number of households which live between x  and dxx + , and 
)(xh is the lot size of a house at x . 
The total available land for the economy, H , is divided between cities and rural 
areas.  The rural sector uses land both for production and for housing the rural 
workers.  The land constraint for the entire economy is 
 aa HhPdxx
x
nH ++= ò )(0q ,  (1.8) 
where h denotes the consumption of housing by rural residents.  Note that, if h appears 
without the argument x , it denotes consumption by a rural resident.  This distinction 
in notation will be used consistently.  Implicit in constraint (1.8) is the assumption that 
the total available land is large enough to preclude overlapping of city areas. 
Transportation requires many different inputs, but for the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that only the rural good is consumed in commuting.  We continue to assume 
that goods, urban and rural, can be transported costlessly.  The market clearing 
conditions for rural and urban goods are respectively 
 [ ] aPdxxNxtxaxnHPG aaa ++= ò )()()(0),( ,   (1.9) 
 zPdxxNxz
x
nPnF ac += ò )()(0)( ,    (1.10) 
where )(xz  and )(xh  are the urban consumptions of urban and rural goods, and z  
and a are the rural consumptions.  Commuting costs, )(xt , for a city resident at x  
satisfy 
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 0)0( =t .       (1.11) 
The labour force in a city is assumed to equal the number of households living in 
the city: 
 ò= dxxN
x
Pc )(0
.       (1.12) 
The population, P, of the whole economy, which is assumed to be given, is divided into 
urban and rural sectors: 
 cc PnPP += .     (1.13) 
2   A Fixed Number of Cities 
We first derive the optimal solution under the assumption that the number of cities 
is exogenously given.  As mentioned above, in this and the next two sections we 
assume that the marginal effect on production of increasing the population of a city is 
zero: 0),( =cP Pf l .  Firms gain no advantage having other firms in the city, therefore, 
and each city has only one firm.  The cities which we consider are based on economies 
of scale which are internal to the firm: ll /ff > .  Since l=cP  for a single firm 
city, our notation can be simplified by using the aggregate production function, )( cPF , 
and assuming 
 ccc PPFPF /)()( >¢ .  (2.1) 
The utility level is maximized subject to the constraints (1.7)-(1.10), (1.12), 
(1.13), and the equal-utility constraints, 
 uxhxzxau =))(),(),(( , xx ££0 ,      (2.2) 
 uhzau =),,( ,      (2.3) 
which require that all households receive the same utility level. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
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where control variables are )(),(),( xhxzxa , and )(xN ; control parameters are a, z, h, 
u, aP , aH , and x ; and )(xn , an , cd , ad , )(xm , m , and g  are respectively 
Lagrange multipliers for (2.2), (2.3), (1.10), (1.9), (1.7), (1.8), and (1.13).  Note that 
cP  is eliminated by substituting (1.12) into (1.10) and (1.13).  The Lagrange 
multipliers have basically the same interpretation as in Chapter I: )(xn  and an  are 
weights attached to the utilities of different households to obtain equal utility levels; cd  
and ad  are respectively shadow prices of the urban and rural goods; )(xm  is the 
shadow rent of land at distance x from the center of a city and m  the shadow rent of 
the rural land; and g  is the shadow 'price' of a household. 
The Lagrange multipliers express shadow prices in utility terms.  It is convenient 
to transform shadow prices into pecuniary terms.  Taking the rural good as a 
numeraire, we define acp dd /= , axxR dm /)()( = , aaR dm /=  and as dg /-= .  p 
is the shadow price of the urban good, )(xR  the shadow rent  at x, aR  the shadow rent 
of the rural land, and a the marginal social cost—the negative of the shadow price—of a 
household. 
First order conditions are immediately obtained by applying the result in the  
appendix on optimum control theory.  They become, after simple rearrangements, 
p
hzau
hzau
xhxzxau
xhxzxau
a
z
a
z ==
),,(
),,(
))(),(),((
))(),(),((
,       xx ££0 ,      (2.5a) 
)(
))(),(),((
))(),(),((
xR
xhxzxau
xhxzxau
a
h = ,               xx ££0 ,   (2.5b) 
a
a
h R
hzau
hzau
=
),,(
),,(
,    (2.5c) 
aH RG = ,                                            (2.5d) 
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hRpzasG aP ++=+ ,                              (2.5e) 
)()()()()( xtxhxRxpzxasFp +++=+¢ ,    xx ££0 ,    (2.5f) 
aRxR =)( . 
(2.5a)-(2.5c) are the usual conditions equating marginal rates of substitution to 
(shadow) prices.  Note that (2.5a) implies that all households have the same marginal 
rates of substitution between the urban good and the rural good.  This is an immediate 
consequence of our assumption that it costs nothing to transport either good. 
(2.5d) states that the value of marginal productivity of land is equal to the shadow 
rent of land.  From (2.5c), (2.5d) and (2.5g), rural households, rural producers and 
urban residents at the edge of a city all face the same shadow rent.  This condition 
implies that shadow rent varies continuously over space. 
The social cost, s, of a household must be the value of resources it consumes 
minus the value of its marginal product: 
pa GhRpzas -++=  
FpxtxhxRxpzxas ¢-+++= )()()()()( . 
These yield respectively (2.5e) and (2.5f). 
If workers are paid the value of their marginal products, and if all prices equal 
shadow prices, a household must be given a subsidy which is equal to s in order to 
satisfy the budget constraint.  Because of the resource constraints, (1.9) and (1.10), 
however, the sum of the subsidies must equal the total surplus in the economy, which is 
the sum of the total rent and the total profit: 
 [ ] [ ]
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì ¢++++= ò FPFnpHhPRdxxxRnP
l
s caaa
x
0
)()( q . (2.6) 
If this optimal solution is decentralized using the usual price mechanism, an urban 
producer might incur a loss at the optimum, since we allowed increasing returns to 
scale.  In such a case the government must give the producer a subsidy equal to the 
loss.  If the subsidy does not weaken a firm's incentive to minimize costs, the price 
mechanism attains the optimal allocation.  Unfortunately, administering such a subsidy 
requires a prohibitive amount of information. 
These problems may not arise if the producer can act as land developer, collecting 
the residential land rent.  We consider this institutional framework in section 4. 
Of course, if the urban sector has decreasing or constant returns to scale, the urban 
sector earns a positive or zero profit, and hence a subsidy is not necessary.  In such 
cases, however, there is no reason to have cities, since by reducing city size 
transportation costs can always be reduced without raising production costs.  As will 
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be shown in the next section, the optimal solution with nonincreasing returns to scale 
requires that the urban sector spread uniformly over space. 
3.  A Variable Number of Cities 
When we treat the number of cities as an endogenous variable, it is convenient to 
assume that the number is so large that it can be safely approximated by a continuous 
variable.  Taking a derivative of the Lagrangian (2.4) with respect to n and substituting 
other first order conditions, we obtain 
  ò ò =--¢- .0)(0])()(0)([)( dxx
x
RdxxxR
x
PFpPPpF accc qq  (3.1) 
The number of cities should be increased up to the point where an additional city 
has zero social net value.  The net value of an additional city is the value of the gross 
product of the city minus the costs of producing it.  The value of the gross product is 
pF .  The cost of producing it is the cost of supporting workers.  Workers consume 
the rural good, the urban good, and land: and they pay commuting costs.  The total 
social value of their consumption is 
 ò ò+++ .)(0)()]()()([0 dxx
x
RdxxNxtxpzxa
x
a q , 
where land must be evaluated at the opportunity cost, aR , instead of the urban rent.  
This is not yet the social cost of supporting workers of an additional city.  Since the 
society incurs the social cost of a household, s, regardless of whether a household lives 
in the city or not, csP must be subtracted from the costs.  The net value of an 
additional city is then 
  ò ò =+-++- 0)(0)()]()()([0)( cac sPdxx
x
RdxxNxtxpzxa
x
PpF q . 
Substitution of (2.5f) into this equation yields (3.1). 
If the number of cities is optimal, the population of a city is such that it minimizes 
the value of per capita consumption of resources, or the average cost of maintaining the 
utility level.  Otherwise, there is some other population level which achieves the same 
utility level with a lower per capita consumption of resources, and the value of 
resources used by the entire urban sector can be reduced by changing the population 
size of all cities while changing the number of cities accordingly to keep the population 
of the entire urban sector unchanged.  The resources saved could be used to raise the 
utility level, which proves that the allocation cannot be optimal.  Note that 
consumption of resources in this argument does not need to be modified by subtracting 
the social cost of a household. 
This observation facilitates another interesting interpretation of the optimality 
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condition.2  The net cost of maintaining the utility level is equal to the total city 
consumption, plus the opportunity cost of land, minus total production.  Expressed in 
terms of city population, the net cost is simply a total cost function, 
  ò ò -+++= .)()(0)()]()()([0)( cac PpFdxx
x
RdxxNxtxpzxa
x
PTC q  
The per capita, or average, cost is 
ccc PPTCPAC )()( = . 
 
          Figure 2. Optimum City Size 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the average cost is minimized when it equals the 
marginal cost.  The marginal cost is the cost of adding a household to the city.  Since 
at the optimum the cost of adding a household must equal everywhere in the city, we 
may consider the addition at any radius.  Addition at the edge of the city is easiest 
because there is no ambiguity about whether the rural rent  or the urban rent expresses 
the value of land.  The cost of adding a household at x  is the value of consumption 
minus the marginal product: 
 ,)()()()()()( cac PFpxhRxtxpzxaPMC ¢-+++=  
which, from (2.5f), equals the social cost of a household, s, and also equals the value of 
                                                 
2 This interpretation was suggested by Arnott.  Similar interpretation is published in Arnott (1979). 
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consumption minus the marginal product at any other radius when consumption of land 
is evaluated at the urban shadow rent: 
 ,)()()()()()()( cc PFpxhxRxtxpzxaPMC ¢-+++=  .0 xx ££  
Multiplying this equation by )(xN  and integrating it from 0 to x  yields 
 ò ò ¢-+++= .)()()(0)()]()()([0)( cccc PFpPdxxxR
x
dxxNxtxpzxa
x
PMCP q  
At the optimum the average cost equals the marginal cost, which implies equation (3.1) 
above. 
We can rewrite (3.1) as 
 
ò -=¢-- .)(])([0)]()([ dxxRxR
x
PFPPFp accc q  (3.1') 
If factor prices are equal to the values of marginal productivities, the left can be 
interpreted as the operating loss of an urban firm.  Then (3.1') states that, in a single 
firm city the firm's operating loss is equal to the aggregate differential rent (the urban 
rent minus the rural rent) if the number of cities is optimal.  Using this equation, we 
can rewrite (2.6) as 
 PHRs a= , (3.2) 
which says that the social cost of a household equals the per capita rural rent. 
With constant or decreasing returns to scale, firms earn nonnegative profits.  By 
(3.1') the aggregate differential rent would be nonpositive at the optimum, implying that 
cities have simply vanished.  This is quite reasonable since smaller cities have the 
advantage of lower transportation costs with no disadvantage on the production side. 
If the urban sector has increasing returns to scale, bigger cities have the advantage 
of lower average production costs.  The optimum city size or the optimum number of 
cities is determined so as to balance the transportation costs and the benefit from 
increasing returns to scale.  (3.1) shows that this balance is attained when the loss of 
the urban sector equals the aggregate differential rent. 
By solving the problem of Section 2, the utility level can be obtained as a 
function, u(n), of the number of cities.  The second order condition requires that 
0)(2
2
£
dn
nud . 
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By the Envelope Theorem,3 dnndu )(  is equal to the partial derivative of the 
Lagrangian (2.4) with respect to n. 
 ò -+¢-=¶
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= })(])([
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x
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ndu
aca qd  (3.3) 
Hence, using the fact that the term with dnd ad  vanishes by (3.1), the second 
derivative is 
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which must be nonpositive at a maximum. 
The net benefit from an additional city is the sum of differential rent and profit.  
The optimum is attained at the point where the net benefit is zero.  In order to have 
maximum rather than minimum, however, the net benefit must be decreasing at the 
optimum, and the sum of the aggregate differential rent and the profit of an urban 
producer must be a decreasing function of the number of cities. 
The second order condition is usually satisfied if the degree of increasing 
returns to scale declines as a city becomes larger, because the aggregate differential 
rent is usually larger in a larger city. 
An important implication of this second order condition is that, if the aggregate 
differential rent exceeds the loss of the urban sector, there are too few cities.  Since 
cities tend to be larger when there are fewer cities, city size is likely to be too big in this 
case.  Notice, however, that this result is obtained under the condition that all variables 
other than the number of cities are optimally chosen.  If there is some distortion like 
monopsony pricing in the labour market, this condition is not satisfied, and the 
difference between the differential rent and a firm's loss does not serve as a signal of 
whether or not the city size is too big.  In the next section a paradoxical kind of 
monopsony pricing will be shown to exist at the market equilibrium of our model. 
4.  Market City Sizes 
As noted in section 2, a firm must be given an appropriate subsidy to achieve the 
optimal solution in a decentralized market system.  The result in section 3 shows that if 
the number of cities is optimal, the subsidy equals the total differential rent of a city.  
Thus the optimal solution can be decentralized by giving a firm a subsidy equal to the 
differential rent and distributing among all rural and urban households the rest of the 
rent (which equals the rural rent for the entire land, HRa ) as an equal lump-sum social 
dividend. 
                                                 
3 See Appendix III for the explanation of the Envelope Theorem. 
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There is, however, a way to achieve the optimal solution that does not require as 
much knowledge and action on the part of the government.  It turns out that the 
optimal solution can be achieved by allowing firms to lease the urban land including 
the residential area.  The entire available land is owned collectively by all households 
in the economy.  Rural producers and rural households rent the land and pay the rural 
rent.  An urban firm, acting as a developer of a whole city, also rents urban land at the 
rural rent, but subleases it to city residents at the competitive market rent.  Then the 
firm maximizes the sum of profit from production, which is usually negative, and the 
net rent.  Firms, like land, are owned collectively by all households, and profits are 
distributed equally among all households.  We show that such a system of 
urban-producers/ city-developers attains the optimal allocation, providing, of course, 
that the firms are perfectly competitive. 
The number of cities (and hence the number of firms) is assumed to be so large 
that a firm acts as a price and utility taker: since there are no transportation costs for the 
urban good, firms directly compete with each other in the product market, and a single 
firm cannot significantly affect the price of the urban good.  Under the assumption of 
perfect mobility, households move to the city where they can obtain the highest level of 
utility.  Faced with freely mobile households, a firm must make sure that its employees 
obtain at least the same utility level as they would in any other city.  This leads to 
utility taking behaviour as the number of firms becomes large.  Notice, however, that a 
firm does not take the wage rate as given.  Households decide to migrate on the basis 
of the utility level and not the wage rate.  As long as the utility level is not lower than 
at any other place, the wage rate can be freely chosen. 
A firm maximizes the profit on the entire development which is the revenue from 
the sales of its product, plus the land rent, minus the total wage bill, minus the total 
payment of the rural rent: 
 òò --+
xx
acc dxxRwPdxxxRPpF 00 )()()()( qq ,     (4.1) 
where w is the wage rate. 
Four variables, w, cP , x , and )(xR , are involved in this maximization problem, 
but the firm faces the constraints imposed by competition with other firms.  The 
maximum rent that households can pay, if they are to achieve the given utility level, is a 
function of their wage.  We can, therefore, reduce the problem to that of maximizing 
(4.1) with respect to the wage.  First, using the indirect utility function of households, 
we express )(xR  as a function of the wage. 
Since all firms and the entire land are collectively owned by all households in the 
economy, households obtain equal shares of profits of firms and the revenue from the 
rural rent paid by both the rural and urban sectors.  Then the budget constraint is 
)()()()()( xtxhxRxpzxasw +++=+ ,    xx ££0 , (4.2) 
where s is the share of the rent and profit, and satisfies (2.6).  The following indirect 
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utility function is obtained as a result of utility maximization under the budget 
constraint: 
 ))(,),(( xRpxIv , (4.3) 
where )(xI  is the net income: 
 )()( xtswxI -+º . (4.4) 
Since the utility level, u, is taken as given, a firm maximizes profit under the constraint: 
 uxRpxIv =))(,),(( . (4.5) 
This constraint enables us to express )(xR  as the bid rent function, 
 ),),(()( upxIRxR = . (4.6) 
As in (I.1.14), we have 
 )(/1),),(( xhupxIRI = , (4.7) 
where IR  is the partial derivative of the bid rent function with respect to the net 
income )(xI . 
Substituting (4.7) and (4.4) into (4.1), we see that the firm's problem is to 
maximize 
 ò ò -++--
x x
acc dxxupxtswRdxxRwPPpF 0 0 )(),),(()()( qq  (4.8) 
subject to the constraints 
 ò -+=
x
Ic dxxupxtswRP 0 )(),),(( q , (4.9) 
 aRupxtswR =-+ ),),(( , (4.10) 
where p, u, and s are taken as given since the firm is small. 
Now the population of the city can also be written as a function of the wage.  
Although the price of the product and the utility level are taken as fixed, the wage rate 
affects the supply of labour, because households will move to achieve the given utility 
level.  From (4.10), x  can be expressed as a function of w, and (4.9) becomes the 
following labour supply function, 
 ò -+=
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0
)(),),(()(
wx
Ic dxxupxtswRwP q , (4.11) 
where s is given by (2.6). 
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Using this labour supply function we can demonstrate that firms have a kind of 
monopsony power despite the fact that they are competitive in the usual sense.  The 
slope of the 
supply curve is 
     ò ¢+=¢
x
IIIc wxxupxIRdxxRwP 0 )()(),),(()()( qq  
          ò ¢+=
x
II xtxNdxxR0 )(/)()(q , (4.12) 
where the second equality is obtained from (4.7) and 
 )(/1)( xtwx ¢=¢ . (4.13) 
Since IR  satisfies 
 [ ]upupxIRhupxIRI ,),),((/1),),(( = , (4.14) 
where ][h  is a compensated demand function for land, we have 
 0//),),(( 32 >-=-= hhhRhupxIR RIRII .           (4.15) 
Hence, (4.12) becomes 
 0)(/)()()/()(
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Thus the supply curve of labour is upward sloping, and firms have apparent monopsony 
power in the labour market.   
Using the labour supply function (4.11), we can also reduce the problem (4.8)-(4.10) to 
maximization of 
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with respect to w.  The first order condition is  
 [ ] 0)()(),),(()()()()(
0
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x
Icc qq  
   (4.18) 
From (4.10) and (4.11), this becomes 
wPFp c =¢ )( . (4.19) 
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Thus, even though a firm faces an upward-sloping supply curve in the labour market, it 
behaves like a price taker and sets the wage rate at the level where the value of marginal 
product equals the wage. 
The reason is that when the utility level is fixed, the decrease in income of 
workers is fully reflected in a decrease in expenditures on land.  Thus the increase in 
profit caused by lowering the wage is completely offset by the decrease in land rent, and 
the firm behaves as if there were no monopsony gain. 
It now follows that all the first order conditions for the optimum are satisfied in 
market equilibrium: (2.5f) is obtained from (4.2) and (4.19); (2.5g) is equivalent to 
(4.10); (2.5a)-(2.5c) are the results of utility maximization of households; (2.5d) and 
(2.5e) result from profit maximization in the rural sector; and free entry insures equation 
(3.1), which states that the maximized profit (including differential rent) is zero in 
equilibrium.  Therefore, if the first order conditions are sufficient to characterize the 
optimal solution, the market equilibrium is optimal under the institutional framework in 
which a firm can act as the developer of an entire city. 
When firms cannot act as developers, however, a market equilibrium differs 
from the optimal allocation.  A firm maximizes 
cc wPPpF -)( , (4.20) 
taking the price of the product and the utility level of the workers as given.  
Households receive equal shares of profits of firms and the total land rent including the 
urban rent, and s is given by (2.6).  In this case, too, a firm has monopsony power in 
the labour market in the sense that it faces an upward sloping supply curve.  The 
labour supply function is given by (4.11).  A firm takes s as given in this case, as in the 
last. 
 The first order condition for profit maximization is 
 )(/)( wPPwPFp ccc ¢+=¢ .   (4.21) 
Free entry insures that the maximized profit is zero: 
 0)( =- cc wPPpF . (4.22) 
Multiplying (4.21) by cP  and subtracting it from (4.22), we obtain 
 [ ] 0)(/)()( 2 <¢-=¢- wPPPFPPFp ccccc ,   (4.23) 
which implies that market equilibrium occurs when the firm operates in the region of 
increasing returns to scale.  The profit is, however, zero, since by (4.21) a firm 
exploits monopsony power, and pays a wage rate lower than the value of the marginal 
product of labour. 
From (3.1), the optimal city size also occurs in the region of increasing returns to 
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scale.  Since market equilibrium and optimal city sizes are in the same range of the 
production function, observation about returns to scale cannot be used to determine 
which is larger in general.  It depends on the amount of monopsony power and the size 
of the aggregate differential rent.  In principle there is no reason why the equilibrium 
city size should coincide with optimum city size, and a city in which firms maximize 
profits but do not act as land developers has zero probability of achieving an exactly 
optimum city size. 
5.  The Marshallian Externality Case 
In the previous section scale economies were internal to the firm.  We now 
assume scale economy internal to a city but external to a firm.  Cities form because 
firms are more productive if they can draw on a larger population.  To capture this 
effect, we repeat the analysis of the previous sections with one change.  The 
production function of a firm is still 
 ),( cPf l     (1.1) 
but now we allow an increase in population to increase the firm's productivity: 
 0>Pf . (5.1) 
This version of the Marshallian externality can result in multi- firm cities, since 
the presence of additional firms is now an advantage.  If m is the number of firms, the 
total product of a city is 
 ),( cPmfY l=            (1.2) 
where 
 
l
cPm = .            (1.3) 
We assume increasing average returns to labour when the firm is small, with a 
gradual shift to decreasing returns as l  increases. 
As in the previous case, we first consider the case of a L, fixed number of cities.  
The optimization problem can be solved in the same way as before, if (1.2) and (1.3) are 
substituted into the proper places.  The first order condition (2.5f) is replaced by two 
conditions: 
 llff = ,                      (5.2) 
)()()()()( xtxhxRxpzxasspf c +++=++l ,  xx ££0 ,     (5.3) 
where 
 Pc pmfs =  (5.4) 
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(5.2) shows that the marginal product of labour equals the average product, and 
implies that firms operate under constant returns to scale at the optimum.  The 
optimum is attained in long-run equilibrium at which all firms operate at the bottom of 
the average cost curve since constant returns to scale hold when the average cost curve 
is flat. 
    From (5.3), the total value of household consumption equals the sum of the three 
terms on the left: the value of marginal productivity of labour; the value of the marginal 
external economy, cs , which an urban resident gives to the urban production sector; 
and the social dividend, s, equal for all households in both cities and the rural area.  
Therefore, a household must be given the Pigouvian subsidy, cs , in addition to wages 
and the social dividend, s.  A city resident gives external benefits to urban producers, 
and should be given a subsidy equal to the value of his marginal contribut ion to urban 
production. 
    Taking the number of cities as a variable now, the optimality condition becomes, 
after simple rearrangements, 
 [ ]ò -=
x
acc dxxRxRPs 0 )()( q . (5.5) 
Thus, at the optimum the total Pigouvian subsidy equals the total differential rent in a 
city.  As before, the equal lump-sum social dividend s is given by (3.2).4 
The optimal allocation is a market equilibrium in the following institutional 
setting.  All land is equally and collectively owned by all households in the economy.  
Residents in a city form a cooperative, or a city government, which rents all the land for 
the city at the rural rent.  Each household, in turn, rents land for housing from the city 
government, and pays the market-determined rent.  Since the urban residential rent is 
higher than the rural rent, the city government has a surplus revenue.  The surplus is 
returned to city residents as an equal subsidy.  It will be shown later that the optimal 
                                                 
4 It is easy to show that (5.5) is equivalent to (3.1).  From (5.2), we can express labour input to a firm as 
a function, )( cPl , of the population of a city.  The aggregate production function can then be written as 
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where the second equality is obtained from (5.2). Noting 
(1.3) and (5.4), we finally obtain 
 )]()([ ccccc PFPPFpPs ¢--=  
which shows that (5.5) is equivalent to (3.1). 
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solution is a market equilibrium under this institutional arrangement.  Unfortunately, 
however, the optimal allocation is not a unique market equilibrium.  A wide range of 
city sizes greater than the optimum can also be equilibria, and there is no reason to 
believe that the optimum is likely to be attained. 
This point can be illustrated in the following way.  If we specify the number of 
cities, a market equilibrium is obtained by substituting 
 [ ]ò -=
x
a
c
c dxxRxRP
s
0
)()(1 q  
and (3.2) into the first order conditions (2.5a)-(2.5e), (2.5g), (5.2) and (5.3).  Since the 
resulting population size is normally the same for all cities, we can consider the 
equilibrium utility level as a function,  )(* cPu , of the population of a city.  For 
simplicity, the function is assumed to be single-peaked as in Figure 3. 
Clearly, city sizes less than *cP , where the equilibrium utility level attains its 
maximum, cannot be equilibria.  If a household moves to another city, the utility level 
will rise in the receiving city, and fall in the city which has lost population.  Therefore, 
a household has an incentive to move to another city.  The receiving city would 
continue to grow at least until *cP  was reached.  The losing city would eventually 
disappear. 
 
 
 
City sizes greater than *cP , however, can be an equilibrium.  Households do not 
have an incentive to move to another city at a city size greater than *cP  since an 
increase in the population of the receiving city would lower the utility there.  For the 
same reason they do not have an incentive to move to the rural area, either.  The only 
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way, therefore, to reduce the city size is to create a new city.  If we do not allow for 
coalition or entrepreneurship to form a large new city, all new cities must start from one 
firm.  In this case, a new city will not be formed unless the size of existing cities 
exceeds *cP  by so much that the general utility level falls to that of a one-firm city.  
Therefore, the city sizes between *cP  and cP  tend to remain the same. 
It is easy to see that the city size, *cP , which maximizes the utility level among 
market equilibria coincides with that of the direct optimum.  Though the direct 
optimum does not have, among its constraints, the conditions for a market equilibrium, 
the first order conditions for the direct optimum include all the conditions required for a 
market equilibrium.  The two problems, therefore, must have the same optimum. 
Thus the minimum market city size coincides with the optimal city size when there 
is a Marshallian externality, and there is a strong tendency for market city sizes to 
become too large.  This result suggests that government intervention is necessary to 
achieve the optimum city size 
Whether intervention is required to not, the actual situation may be less serious 
than the model suggests.  Historical development has provided us with a hierarchy of 
cities rather than a single type.  Cities produce different sets of commodities, and 
bigger cities produce more commodities than smaller ones.  A new city at a certain 
level of the hierarchy can be created by adding firms producing new commodities to an 
existing city at a lower level of the hierarchy.  This does not require a very large 
population shift. 
The above special institutional arrangement which allows cities to collect land 
rent and distribute the revenue among city residents is not usually possible in a private 
ownership economy.  In a private ownership economy, migrational decisions are not 
affected by the land rent households can earn, though they are certainly affected by the 
level of the rent they must pay.  One reason is that households may be able to invest in 
houses in cities where they do not live.  Another is that even if all houses are 
owner-occupied, households must pay the discounted value of future rent when they 
move to a city.  The benefit of future high rent, which might attract households to a 
city, is thereby neutralized by the purchase cost of the house.  Thus the usual private 
ownership economy is closer to the case of 0=cs  and the city size which maximizes 
the utility level among market equilibria is different from the direct optimum. 
It is not clear in a general case whether this city size is bigger or smaller than the 
optimum city size.  If there is no rural sector, it is obvious that this city size coincides 
with the optimum.  Divergence from the optimum is caused by the fact that the 
absence of the Pigouvian subsidy distorts the allocation of households between the 
urban and the rural sectors.  In the real world it seems likely that the population in the 
urban sector is too small, because the incentive to live in cities is weaker due to the lack 
of the Pigouvian subsidy.  However, the problem is more subtle than it appears, since 
it involves determining the number of cities.  It is not quite clear how the number of 
cities is affected by the distortion. 
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We have assumed that it is the population of a city that generates an external 
economy.  Obviously, this is not the only formulation.  For example, we can assume 
that the total product of a city induces the externality, as in Henderson (1974).  In that 
case, the Pigouvian subsidy should be given to firms as excise subsidy on their 
products.  With this change, the above analysis can be applied and the same 
conclusions are obtained. 
6.  Differences in City Sizes 
So far we have considered only cities which have the same allocation, both at the 
optimum and in market equilibrium.  This is clearly unrealistic.  Relaxing the 
simplifying assumptions of previous sections, we can obtain differences among cities. 
First, production functions may differ among cities because of differences in 
climate, factor endowment, and so on, or simply because technology does not diffuse 
instantaneously.  Since cities with technological advantage tend to attract more 
households than others, city sizes vary. 
This extension turns out to be fairly simple.  In the case of increasing returns to 
scale, internal to a firm, the only change is that we must distinguish cities notationally 
since they in general have different allocations.  The first order conditions (2.5a), 
(2.5b), (2.5f) and (2.5g) hold in all cities.  In particular, (2.5f) and (2.5g)  for the i-th 
city must read 
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Combining these equations, we have 
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Since all households must receive the same utility, the right side is equal for all cities.  
Hence, the value of the marginal product of labour minus the commuting costs at the 
edge of a city is the same for all cities: 
)()( jjP
ii
P xtpFxtpF -=-               for any i, j.   (6.4) 
When the number of firms is optimized, the marginal firm will obtain zero profit 
(including the aggregate differential rent) and other firms will earn positive profits.5  
In exactly the same way as in the case of identical cities, it can be shown that, if firms 
                                                 
5 Here, it is implicitly assumed that there is no competitive bidding for the right to build a plant in a 
specific city. This is the reason why a firm located in an advantageous city earns excess profit.  The 
profit is caused by the Presence of some unpriced factors such as good climate, clean water, etc.  If these 
factors are competitively priced, all firms earn zero profit.  Even if there is no market for these factors, 
competitive bidding for the site of a plant drives down the profit to zero and the rent is captured by the 
owner of the site. 
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act as land developers, the market equilibrium attains the optimal allocation. 
We can analyze the Marshallian externality case in a similar way.  It is easy to 
see that the value of the marginal product of labour, plus the Pigouvian tax, minus the 
commuting costs at the edge of a city is equal for all cities; 
)()( jjc
jii
c
i xtspfxtspf -+=-+ ll          for any i, j . 
The condition for the optimum number of cities is that the aggregate Pigouvian 
subsidy equals the aggregate differential rent in the marginal city.  However, the 
equality does not hold in inframarginal cities.  This causes a difference from the case 
of identical cities.  If all cities are identical, the aggregate Pigouvian subsidy must 
equal the aggregate differential rent in all cities.  This is the reason why we obtained 
the result that, if the differential rent is returned to city residents as an equal subsidy, the 
optimal allocation is one of market equilibria.  If cities are not identical, the result does 
not hold, since the optimum Pigouvian subsidy is not equal to the average differential 
rent in inframarginal cities.  Therefore, even the best allocation among market 
equilibria does not coincide with the optimal allocation. 
A second class of differences which can give rise to differing cities includes all 
the ways that household tastes and skills may vary.  An extended analysis, 
unfortunately, is so messy that we have reluctantly decided to spare our readers. 
Although it is certainly more realistic to include these factors, they alone cannot 
explain the differences we observe in modern economies.  The fact that cities produce 
differing bundles of commodities probably explains more of the variation in their sizes 
than, for example, consumer tastes. 
Consider the effect of introducing more than one urban good into the model with 
increasing returns to scale.  If the goods have different production functions, the cities 
will have different sizes. 
If we ask whether a city can produce more than one good in our model, we 
discover an important implication of the assumption that transporting goods costs 
nothing.  Commuting costs can be saved by separating firms producing different 
goods, without incurring any additional costs, so two-product cities will not occur. 
If transporting urban goods is costly, however, cities producing more than one 
good might well arise.  The saving on transporting wet concrete or bottled coke to 
demanders, for example, might justify the extra commuter costs that result from having 
a concrete plant and a bottling plant in each city. 
The cost of goods transport has a strong influence on city form as well as size, 
although the subject is outside the range of this chapter.  Even if two or more 
commodities are produced in a city, the firms will not necessarily all locate at the 
center.  Retail stores, for example, disperse throughout a city to reduce the 
transportation costs of shopping for consumers.  Moreover, there is no a priori reason 
to expect that a concrete plant and a bottling plant locate at the center.  They might 
locate at the edge of a city to take advantage of lower land costs, and form a 
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multi-centered city. 
There is another problem in multi-product cities caused specifically by the cost of 
goods transport.  There can be only one firm with the greatest returns to scale in a city.   
If there were two, and if we could ignore the fact that the numbers of firms in other 
industries must be integers,6 then we could split the city into two.  Production costs 
would not increase in any industry and commuting costs would decrease, and society be 
better off with two cities instead of one. 
Therefore, we have to introduce externalities in order to attain a more realistic 
system of cities.  The simplest way is to add another urban good to the framework in 
section 5.  If there are two urban goods, we obtain three types of cities: 
two producing only one good, and one producing both.  It is easy to see that the 
same results as those in section 5 can be obtained for each type of city. 
However, there is no guarantee that cities producing both goods are bigger than 
cities producing only one good.  For example, if externality works only through the 
total population of a city, cities producing two goods have no more benefit from 
becoming bigger than cities producing one good.  Therefore, we might want to assume 
that there is a special benefit which arises from having two industries together. 
Although introducing cross product externalities is attractive, and would give rise 
to more realistic system of cities in our model, the analysis is simply too difficult for the 
present work.  We do not, therefore attempt to build a model of a system of cities of 
this type here. 
Notes 
Until Alonso's work (1971), the analysis of city sizes had been limited to the cost 
side, and the city size which gave the minimum cost had been considered optimal.  
Alonso introduced the output side, regarding a city as an aggregate production unit.  
There are two types of optimum city size in this model.  For the residents the optimum 
size is that which maximizes the difference between the average product (AP) and the 
average cost (AC).  For a national government interested in maximizing total product 
under conditions of labour surplus, the optimum size is where the marginal product 
(MP) is equal to the marginal cost (MC).  If the supply of labour is limited, this 
condition should be modified.  MP may not equal MC although the difference between 
MP and MC must be the same for all cities.  Alonso pointed out that if individuals 
maximize the difference between AP and AC, per capita tax of MP-AP-(MC-AC) can 
result in the optimum city size. 
Although Alonso's work was a big step forward in constructing the economic 
theory of city sizes, his approach has the following shortcomings.  First, the analysis is 
partial in nature, since only one city is considered: if the city is placed in a general 
                                                 
6 For example, if there are two firms of the greatest degree of increasing returns and three firms of the 
second greatest degree of increasing returns, splitting this city into two may involve an extra social cost 
since a city cannot have one and a half firms. 
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equilibrium framework, we may face different problems.  Second, the welfare aspect 
of the analysis is not very clear, since utility functions for households are not 
introduced.  Third, the cause of increasing average product is not explicitly 
formulated.  It is not clear, therefore, how individual firms and households behave in a 
market economy: increasing returns to scale for a firm, and external economies among 
firms have very different implications on individual behaviour.  Fourth, the spatial 
aspect of cities is ignored. 
There have been several attempts to overcome these shortcomings.  Borukhov 
(1975) built a very simple model of an economy consisting of many cities.  He 
showed that Alonso's second condition for the optimum city size is correct if the 
number of cities is given: at the optimum the difference between MP and MC is equal 
for all cities, but MP exceeds MC by an amount which has been interpreted as the 
opportunity costs of siting the population in alternative cities.  If the number of cities 
is a variable, however, this condition is not sufficient to characterize the optimal 
solution.  Since Borukhov was worried about integerness of the number of cities, he 
could not obtain a transparent condition for the optimum number of cities.  
However, if one is willing to approximate the number of cities by a continuous 
variable, and to assume that all cities are the same (as done in this chapter), it is easy 
to see that at the optimum the difference between MP and MC is equal to the 
difference between AP and AC.  This means that the difference between AP and AC 
is maximized at the optimum number of cities.  Therefore, the optimum for the 
residents coincides with that for a national government. 
If the difference between MP (MC) and AP (AC) is caused by externalities, the 
Pigouvian tax/subsidy discussed by Alonso is necessary.  However, our result suggests 
that the net Pigouvian tax/subsidy is zero at the optimum number of cities.  
Unfortunately, this does not imply that the optimal allocation is automatically attained 
by market mechanism.  As seen in section 5, city sizes tend to be too big because of 
the difficulty in forming a coalition to create a new sufficiently large city. 
Henderson (1974) formulated a more sophisticated model with three industries.  
The first is the export industry, which faces a fixed export price.  The export industry 
is assumed to have increasing returns to scale.  The second is the housing industry, 
which is assumed to have constant returns to scale.  Finally, the third industry 
produces an intermediate good which is used as an input (called sites) to the above two 
industries.  This industry represents the spatial aspect of cities (for example, 
commuting costs) which works to discourage formation of big cities.  Instead of 
explicitly introducing spatial dimension, Henderson assumed that sites are produced 
with labour under decreasing returns to scale.  The optimum city size balances 
increasing returns to scale in the export industry, and decreasing returns to scale in the 
site industry. 
One of the most important findings by Henderson is that a market economy tends 
to overshoot the optimum city size because of difficulty of forming a coalition to create 
a big city.  Our argument in section 5 is based on his observation. 
Henderson (1977) extended this analysis to a spatial model and obtained 
(independently of our work) results similar to ours in the Marshallian externality case.  
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One of the major differences is that he worked with special functional forms of 
production functions and utility functions, whereas we assume general functional forms. 
Henderson (1974) and Tolley (1974) analyzed the size of a city, considering the 
rest of the economy as given.  Both focused on the effect of pollution taxation on the 
city size.  Henderson showed that, since pollution taxation increases the welfare of city 
residents, the city size rises with immigration from the rest of the economy.  In 
Tolley's model pollution taxation increases the city size if the externalities originate in 
production of nontraded goods, but might reduce the city size if the  externalities 
originate in export production. 
Serck-Hanssen, in a pioneering but little known work (1969), first obtained the 
condition for the optimal number of cities discussed in section 3.  Adopting a 
framework due to Losch, he considered firms supplying their products in a space over 
which consumers are homogeneously distributed.  Instead of assuming commuting 
costs, he assumed positive transportation costs for products.  His optimality condition 
is essentially the same as ours, although in his model there is a complication arising 
from the fact that the optimal market areas are not circular but hexagonal in a 
two-dimensional space. 
Mirrlees (1974), Dixit (1973), and Starret (1974) derived conditions for optimal 
city size in models of closed economies similar to ours.  All of them assumed 
increasing returns to scale in the urban industry, and obtained results equivalent to that 
in section 3: the excess of marginal over average productivity equals the average 
differential rent (minus a correction if environmental externalities are present as in 
Mirrlees' model).  Concentrating on optimal allocations, they did not analyze how the 
market city size is determined. 
Vickrey (1977), in a very simple model, derived the result that the aggregate land 
rent equals the loss of a firm at the optimum, and argued that competition among cities 
leads to an efficient allocation.  Although his analysis is not rigorous, it has the same 
spirit as our analysis of a system of cities formed by land-developer firms. 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1975) introduced a public good which is local to a city while 
assuming constant returns in the production sector.  In this case the optimum city size 
is characterized by the condition, à la Henry George, that the cost of the public good is 
equal to the total differential rent of a city.  They also derived the following interesting 
formula: if the commuting costs are given by a linear function of distance (in our 
notation txxt =)( ), the aggregate differential rent equals the aggregate transportation 
costs in a linear city (q (x) = q ), or one half of the aggregate transportation costs in a 
circular city ( )(xq xp2= ).  Arnott (1979) generalized these results to include 
congestion in transportation, economies of scale in production, and other matters. 
The central place theory originating from the seminal work of Christaller (1966) 
and Lösch (1954) has a close relationship with our discussion of a system of cities in 
section 6.  Assuming that demand is uniformly distributed over space, the theory 
considers the spatial pattern of suppliers of goods.  A hierarchical structure of central 
places is derived by superimposing the geographical networks of market areas for goods 
with different market sizes.  As pointed out by Eaton and Lipsey (1979) among others, 
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the economic foundations of the theory are incomplete in an important respect.  The 
crucial assumption to obtain a hierarchical structure is that the location of a firm 
producing a good with a large market area attracts producers of other goods with 
smaller market areas.  Under this assumption, there is a hierarchy of central places: the 
biggest having producers of all goods, the second biggest having producers of goods 
with smaller market areas, and so on.  However, there is no explicit analysis of the 
force that causes producers to group together in this way.  Eaton and Lipsey built a 
model in which multipurpose shopping offers an incentive  for the formation of central 
places.  Our discussion in section 6 attempts to indicate how a theory of central places 
might be based on the economic forces causing the agglomeration of different 
industries. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Alonso, W., (1971), "The Economics of Urban Size", Papers of Regional Science 
Association 26, 67-83. 
Aoki, M., (1971), "Marshallian External Economies and Optimal Tax Subsidy 
Structure", Econometrica 39, 35-54. 
Arnott, R., (1979), "Optimal City Size in a Spatial Economy", Journal of Urban 
Economics 6, 65-89. 
Arnott, R. and J.E. Stiglitz, (1975), "Aggregate Land Rents, Aggregate Transport Costs 
and Expenditure on Public Goods", Discussion Paper #192, Institute for 
Economic Research, Queen's University. 
Borukhov, E., (1975), "Optimality in City Size and System of Cities: A Comment", 
Urban Studies 12, 325-328. 
Chipman, J.S., (1970), "External Economies of Scale and Competitive Equilibrium", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 86, 347-385. 
Christaller, W., (1966), Central Places in Southern Germany, (Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey). 
Dixit, A., (1973), "The Optimum Factory Town", The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 4, 637-651. 
Eaton, B.C. and R.G. Lipsey, (1979), "Microeconomic Foundations of Central Place 
Theory", Discussion Paper No. 327, Institute for Economic Research, Queen's 
University. 
Henderson, J.V., (1974), "The Sizes and Types of Cities", American Economic Review 
64, 640-657. 
Henderson, J.V., (1974), "Optimum City Size: The External Diseconomy Question", 
Journal of Political Economy 82, 373-388. 
City Sizes 
 54
Henderson, J.V., (1977), Economic Theory and the Cities, (Academic Press, New 
York). 
Livesey, D.A., (1973), "Optimum City Size: A Minimum Congestion Cost Approach", 
Journal of Economic Theory 6, 144-161. 
Lösch, A., (1954), The Economics of Location, (Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London). 
Mirrlees, J.A., (1972), "The Optimum Town", Swedish Journal of Economics 74, 
114-135. 
Richardson, H.W., (1972), "Optimality in City Size, System of Cities and Urban Policy: 
A Skeptic’s View", Urban Studies 10, 29-48. 
Serck-Hanssen, J., (1969), "The Optimal Number of Factories in a Spatial Market", in: 
H. Bos (ed.). Towards Balanced International Growth, (North-Holland, 
Amsterdam). 
Starrett, D.A., (1974), "Principles of Optimal Location in a Large Homogeneous Area", 
Journal of Economic Theory 9, 418-448. 
Tolley, G.S., (1974), "The Welfare Economics of City Bigness", Journal of Urban 
Economics 1, 324-345. 
Vickrey, W., (1977), "The City as a Firm", in: M.S. Feldstein and P.P. Inman (eds.). 
The Economics of Public Services, (Macmillan, London). 
Local Public Goods 
 55
CHAPTER III 
   LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 
The spatial equilibrium model in Chapter I can be used to analyze problems associated 
with optimal provision of local public services.  In the case of pure public goods it is 
extremely difficult to achieve the optimal allocation by a decentralized mechanism.  Local 
public goods which, while still public, are not perfectly public, however, allow the 
introduction of competition among suppliers and it is possible to devise a competitive 
mechanism which achieves the optimal allocation. 
A pure public good is consumed collectively: its consumption by any individual does 
not reduce the amount available for others.  The classic example of a virtually pure public 
good is national defense.  It is claimed that the amount of "security" one person 
"consumes" from her nation's "defense expenditure" has no effect on the amount available 
for others: the entire population is able to consume a pure public good. 
Conventional public good theory assumes that the number of consumers is fixed since 
the size of the community - usually a nation - is known.  For local public services the 
assumption breaks down because the population of local communities is endogenous, 
determined in the system's search for equilibrium.1  It is possible to take advantage of this 
problem, however. 
We know from the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that, if there are only 
pure private goods, a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal, that is, no one can be made 
better off without making somebody else worse off.  When there are public goods, 
however, a competitive equilibrium fails to attain Pareto optimality, and furthermore it is 
difficult to devise any other workable decentralized mechanism.  The problem arises 
because households have an incentive to "misreveal" their preferences.  By understating the 
marginal benefit it gains from the public good, a household can avoid being assessed its full 
share of the cost of providing the good, without suffering a reduction in supply.  Supply is 
unaffected , because the contribution of a single household is negligible.  This difficulty is 
often called the "free rider" problem. 
Since a pure public good is consumed by all households concurrently, a marginal 
increase in supply benefits all households simultaneously.  The marginal social benefit is 
therefore the sum of the benefits received by each household, which may be expressed as the 
sum of marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the numeraire. 
If all households were to pay the full value of the benefit they received, profit 
maximization would yield an efficient allocation.  Because of the free rider problem, 
however, it is extremely difficult to devise a pricing scheme in which every household has 
an incentive to reveal its marginal evaluation of the public good.2 
                                                 
1 Stiglitz (1977) emphasized this aspect of local public goods. 
2 Although dark (1971), Groves (1973) and Groves and Ledyard (1977) invented a mechanism in which a 
household has an incentive to reveal its preferences correctly, this mechanism is rather artificial.  Green and 
Laffont (1977) proved that this mechanism is the only one that does not have the preference revelation 
problem. 
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In the case of local public goods, competition between different communities can 
work in a manner similar to competition between suppliers of private goods.  The 
preference revelation problem still remains within a community since a local public good 
has the same characteristics as a pure public good within a community.  It is, however, 
possible to exploit the special property of local public goods, the fact that the population of 
beneficiaries is endogenous to the system.  If a community increases the supply of local 
public goods, the community becomes more attractive, which induces immigration of 
households.  This increases demand for housing, causing land rent to rise.  The marginal 
social benefits of the public goods are therefore reflected, at least partially, in the marginal 
increase in land rent.  If the community is infinitely small relative to the rest of the world, 
the marginal benefits equal the increase in the total land rent in the community.  Then the  
behaviour which is characteristic of a land developer, maximizing land rent net of the cost of 
providing the public goods, leads to the efficient supply of the public goods. 
In order to illustrate the basic principle, we start in section 1 with a simple case.  
Public goods are assumed to be extremely local in the sense that they are jointly consumed 
only by residents at a location.  To simplify the analysis we assume that public goods 
supplied at a certain distance from the city center can be consumed only by residents living 
at that distance from the center.  In effect we pretend that neighbourhoods form a series of 
concentric rings, each of unit width, around the city center.  It may seem a bit peculiar, but 
the assumption is nothing more than a mathematical convenience which yields perfectly 
sensible and general results.  This type of public good represents, in an extreme form, 
goods consumed only by households living very close to the location of supply; street 
lighting, for example, or neighbourhood beautification, or snow removal.  The extremely 
local public goods are embedded in the closed city of Chapter I. 
Not surprisingly, the optimum solution must meet the Samuelsonian condition that the 
sum of marginal rates of substitution be equal to the marginal cost of the public good.  
Another interesting property of the optimal solution is that the differential rent (the 
difference between the urban rent and the rural rent) at the edge of the city equals the cost of 
the public good there. 
The optimal solution can be achieved either by centralized control, which requires 
impractical amounts of information, or through a decentralized mechanism such as a system 
of neighbourhood development corporations which rent land at the rural rent and maximize 
their profits.  In the second half of section 1 a system of competitive land developers with a 
developer in each neighbourhood is described and its optimality demonstrated. 
In section 2 we examine a crowding phenomenon by assuming that the cost of 
producing the same amount of the public good rises as the number of residents increases.  
The major difference in this case is that the optimal solution requires a congestion tax on 
households.  The congestion tax at any location equals the marginal increase in the cost of 
the public good caused by adding a househo ld there.  The system of competitive land 
developers achieves the optimal allocation if a land developer charges the congestion tax 
and maximizes rent plus tax minus the costs of providing the public good. 
In section 3 we consider a local public good which is jointly consumed by all residents 
in an entire city, rather than by residents at a certain radius.  Museums, theaters, sewage 
systems, and large parks may fit this category.  Competition between cities is introduced by 
assuming that there are many identical cities.  The results are parallel to those in the 
increasing-returns-to-scale case of the previous chapter, as well as those in the extremely 
local public good case of the present chapter.  If a competitive land developer develops an 
entire city, the local public good is optimally supplied when the number of cities is very 
large.  Moreover, the zero profit condition from free entry insures the optimum number of 
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cities. 
Crucial in deriving our results is that, in the eyes of a developer, the utility level of the 
residents is fixed.  This suggests that we can extend the result to more general models as 
long as this condition is guaranteed.  In Appendix II we consider one example of such an 
extension, in which two inputs, land and labour, are used in production. 
It is worth emphasizing that our results depend on the assumption that all households 
in the economy are identical in terms of both skills and preferences.  Although we may 
relax this assumption to include different types of households, we must assume that there are 
many households in each type in the whole economy and that one region contains a very 
small fraction of the households in each type.  Since identical households receive the same 
utility level in equilibrium, regardless of where they live, a change in the supply of local 
public goods in one small region has a negligible effect on the general utility level.  If all 
households are different, however, the utility levels of residents cannot be taken as constant 
even in the case where the population of the region is very small compared with the rest of 
the world.  Therefore, at best we can only say that the system of competitive land 
developers approximates the optimal allocation of local public goods.  How good an 
approximation it achieves is an empirical question.  Considering the fact that there is no 
perfect mechanism to supply public goods, however, our scheme of letting competitive land 
developers supply local public goods is worth a serious consideration.  Our result would 
suggest, for example, that when a land developer develops a new community, the developer 
rather than a local government should pay for the public good supplied in the community. 
1.  An Extremely Local Public Good 
Consider an extremely local public good in the public-ownership, closed-city case of 
Chapter I.  The amount of public good supplied between x and dxx +  is denoted by 
dxxX )( .  Though we consider only one public good for notational simplicity, the 
conclusions obtained in this section are valid for any number.  The public good is 
extremely local in the sense that the public good supplied at x is jointly consumed only by 
residents of a ring of unit width between 
2
1
-x  and 
2
1
+x .  If we assume that public 
goods supplied at different radii are perfect substitutes, then a household at x had available. 
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or approximately )(xX , of the public good and its utility function can be written 
 ))(),(),(( xXxhxzu . (1.1) 
It is assumed that the consumer good is the only input in the production of the public 
good.  The public good is assumed to be produced separately at each location at a cost 
))(( xXC .  Then the resource constraint (I.1.30) is rewritten as follows. 
 
 [ ]{ }ò =+++
x
a PFdxxRxXcxNxtxz0 )()())(()()()( q  (1.2) 
The land constraint is the same as (I.2.2), and the population constraint as (1.1.24):  
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 )()()( xNxhx =q  (1.3) 
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The sum of the equal utilities, 
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0
)( , (1.5) 
is maximized under the constraints (1.2), (1.3), (1.4) and the equal utility constraint, 
 uxXxhxzu =))(),(),(( . (1.6) 
The first order conditions for this problem become, after simple rearrangements:  
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(1.7a) and (1.7c) are the same as in Chapter I.  (1.7a) equates the marginal rate of 
substitution between housing and the consumer good to the shadow rent.  (1.7c) states that 
the household expenditure on private goods, evaluated at the shadow prices, must be the 
same everywhere in the city. 
Conditions (1.7b) and (1.7d) are new.  (1.7b) is the Samuelsonian condition for 
efficient supply of the public good described in the introduction: the marginal cost of the 
public good at x must equal the sum over all residents at x of the residents' marginal rates of 
substitution between the public good and the consumer good.  A unit increase in the supply 
of the public good between x and dxx +  raises the utility level of a household there by 
Xu .  Since dxxN )(  households receive the benefits of the public good, the marginal 
social benefit in utility terms is dxxNuX )( , and in pecuniary terms dxxNuu ZX )()/( .  The 
social optimum is achieved when the marginal benefit equals the social marginal cost, 
dxxXc ))((' .3 
(1.7d) shows that the shadow rent at the boundary of the city is not equal to the rural 
                                                 
3 If we go back to the original formulation, a household at x has available ò
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Consider the costs and benefits of a unit increase of )(xX  between x and dxx + .  The costs are dxXc )(' .  
On the other hand, the utility level of a household between 2/1-x  and 2/1+x  rises by dxuX , and the 
marginal benefit a household receives is dxuu zX )/(  in pecuniary terms.  The social benefit is obtained by 
summing this over all households between 2/1-x  and 2/1+x  so that the optimality condition is  
 dxxXcdxxdxN
u
ux
x z
X ))(()(2
1
2
1 ¢=ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
¢¢ò
+
-
. 
Equation (1.7b) is obtained if we can approximate )()/( xNuu zX ¢  for all x' between 2/1-x  and 2/1+x  by 
)()/( xNuu zX  . 
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rent as in Chapter I, but rather greater than the rural rent by the cost-per-unit-area of 
producing the public good there. 
This optimal solution can be achieved in the following ways.  First, local 
governments might supply the local public good so as to equate the sum of marginal rates of 
substitution to marginal cost of the public good at each location.  The city would lease the 
land to those who pay the highest rent, which would be Zh uuxR /)( =  in market 
equilibrium.  Part of the revenue would then be used to produce the public good and the 
rest returned to residents as an equal subsidy.  The public good would be supplied out to 
the radius where the market rent minus the rural rent equals the cost of the public good per 
unit acre.  Under this arrangement utility maximization by households ensures conditions  
(1.6) and (1.7a) and the market equilibrium attains the optimal allocation.4  Unfortunately, 
this method is not practical since local governments must know the marginal rates of 
substitution, and these are very hard to discover. 
The second way to implement the optimal solution can be seen as a system of land 
developers.  Imagine a large number of developers in a city, each developing an extremely 
small area, and each supplying the local public good in their area.  The developers rent land 
from the rural landlords and sublet it to city residents at the market rent.  In our circular 
city, it is convenient to allow each developer to develop a band around the city center at a 
given radius.  The deve loper's profit, which is the differential rent minus the cost of 
providing the public good, becomes 
 [ ] ))(()()( xXcxRxR a -- q . 
In order to ensure that all households obtain the same utility level, we assume that the profit 
is distributed equally among all city residents. 
Since each developer is very small, its action does not significantly affect the utility or 
the income levels.  Therefore, when he changes the supply of the public good, land rent 
moves in such a way that utility and income both remain unchanged.  The change in land 
rent can be obtained as follows.  A household maximizes the utility function (1.1) under 
the budget constraint (1.7c), which can be summarized as the indirect utility function, 
  
 ))(),(),(( xXxRxtyv -  (1.8) 
as in (I.1.7).  Equating the indirect utility function to the fixed utility level, u, we obtain the 
                                                 
4 The reader may wonder whether a household would not prefer to rent land directly from the rural owners or 
the central government and live outside the boundary of the city, where the public good is not supplied.  If the 
optimal solution requires a positive supply of the public good at the boundary of the city, then households do 
not have an incentive to live in the places where the public good is not supplied.  It suffices to show that 
households obtain higher utility at the boundary if the public good is supplied than not, since locations farther 
than the boundary are even less desirable. 
From (1.7c) and (1.7d), the following resource constraint is satisfied at x . 
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A household which lives on the other side of x  has the budget constraint; 
 hRxtzy a++= )(  .     (**) 
Since the same amount of resource is used up in both cases, under (*) be higher than or equal to the maximum 
attainable utility level under the budget constraint (**). Otherwise, the utility level of x  can be increased by 
making the supply of the public good zero without lowering the utility level of other locations. 
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bid rent function,  
  
 ))(,),(( xXuxtyR -  (1.9) 
as in (I.1.12). 
A profit maximizing developer at x maximizes 
  
 [ ] ))(()())(,),(( xXcxRxXuxtyR a --- q   (1.10) 
with respect to )(xX , which yields 
  
 )()( XcxRX ¢=q . (1.11) 
This implies that the optimality condition (1.7b) is satisfied.  By Roy's Identity (1.1.10) the 
bid rent function satisfies 
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Noting that XX uv = and ZI uv =  by the Envelope Theorem5, we can rewrite this equation 
as 
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Equation (1.5b) follows, since from the land constraint (1.3), )()(/)( xNxhx =q . 
The land developer operates only when profit can be made:  
  
 [ ] 0))(()()( ³-- xXcxRxR a q . (1.13) 
This condition insures that (1.7d) is satisfied at the edge of the city. 
Thus the system of land developers achieves the optimality conditions (1.7b) and  
(1.7d).  Since other conditions are also satisfied in market equilibrium, the optimal 
allocation can be reproduced if the local public good is supplied by extremely small land 
developers. 
Note that developers need to know only the land rent, and not the utility function.  
Therefore, the informational requirement is the same as the usual price mechanism.  There 
still remains, however, a difference from the market system for private goods.  Since firms 
and households maximize their objective functions taking prices as given, maximization 
processes are not affected by situations outside them, whereas the maximization problem for 
land developers involves an important endogenous price, namely, land rent, which is 
determined through reactions of households to the supply of the public good.  Therefore, 
the profit-maximizing level of the , local public good can only be found after observing 
                                                 
5 See Appendix III on the envelope property. 
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levels of land rent corresponding to many different supply levels. 
The system of land developers may be interpreted as the mechanism proposed by 
Negishi (1972) and combining Margolis' principle of fiscal profitability with Tiebout's 
voting with one's feet.  According to the principle of fiscal profitability, a local government 
pays for the local public good from a tax on land, and determines the supply of the public 
good which maximizes the rent net of the tax.  This behaviour is identical to the 
profit-maximizing behaviour of a developer.  Voting with one's feet allows households to 
choose the local government that offers the preferred bundle of local public goods.  In our 
model the free choice of location represents voting with one's feet.  This, coupled with the 
assumption of extremely small local governments, will insure that local governments take as 
given the utility level of residents. 
The above result relies on the fact that the margina l benefits of the public good are 
capitalized in land rent.  Multiplying (1.12) by )(xq , we obtain 
 )()( xN
u
u
Rx
z
X
X =q : (1.14) 
the marginal increase in land rent at x, caused by a unit increase of the public good, equals 
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the consumer 
good, which in turn equals the marginal benefits of the public good.  This result is 
characteristic of a small economy in which the utility level can be taken as given, and is 
independent of the public good being optimally supplied.  The benefit of the public good 
must accrue to somebody or become a deadweight loss.  Since there is no deadweight loss 
in the first best world, all the benefits must be received by somebody.  In our model, the 
only place the benefits can go is land rent. 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the capitalization of the benefits of public goods.  Consider an 
increase in the supply of the public good from x１ to x２.  Then a smaller bundle of ),( hz  
is necessary to achieve the same utility level, u, and the indifference curve shifts toward the 
origin.  The equilibrium consumption moves from Q  toQ¢ .  The benefits of the increase 
in the supply of the public good can be represented by the amount of resources freed by this 
move.  Since both z and h change, we must evaluate the change by using some relative 
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price.  There are at least two possibilities.  If we use the before-the-change rent, R１, the 
benefits of this change are AC in Figure 1, or ][ 1 hRz D+D- ; and if we use the 
after-the-change rent, R２, the benefits are AD, or ][ 2 hRz D+D- . 
From Figure 1 (or from simple algebraic manipulations) it is clear that AC, which is 
CGAG - , also equals the change in rent, 21 RRR -=D , multiplied by the after-the-change 
consumption level of housing, h２, i.e., Rh D2 ; and that AD equals the change in rent 
multiplied by the before-the-change consumption, Rh D1 . 
Although it is not clear in this partial analysis which measure of benefit is a better 
approximation6, if the change in X is infinitesimal, the two measures coincide, and the 
problem disappears.  For a marginal change in X, therefore, the benefits a household 
receives equal 
dX
dR
h , which is equivalent to (1.10).  The social benefit is the sum of the 
benefits of all households who consume the public good and is given by 
dX
dR
x)(q  in our 
model.  Thus the rise in land rent completely capitalizes the marginal benefits of the public 
good. 
The diagram also shows that the marginal rate of substitution between the public 
good and the consumer good is the correct measure of the marginal benefit of the public 
good which a household receives.  When the consumption of land is held constant, a 
reduction in the consumption of the consumer good made possible by the increase in the 
public good equals QE.  If the change in the supply of the public good is small, QE is 
approximately Xuuz zX D=D )( , since by total differentiation  
 0==+ dudxudzu Xz , 
where 12 XXX -ºD .  Moreover, as XD approaches zero, QF approaches Xuu zX D)( .  
QF equals AD, and hence gives the benefit of the marginal increase evaluated at the 
after-the-change price.  Thus zX uu  is the correct measure of the marginal benefit of the 
public good. 
2.  An Extremely Local Congestible Public Good 
In the previous section we assumed that the local public good was a pure public good 
at each radius.  In particular, we assumed that the costs of providing the same level of the 
public good did not depend on the number of consumers.  This assumption does not hold 
for most public services.  For example, the same park gives different levels of services 
depending on the number of people using it.  The cost of providing the same level of park 
services usually increases as the number of users increases. 
In this section we assume that the cost of producing the same level of the public good 
increases as population density increases.  The cost function for the local public good is 
modified as 
                                                 
6 Following the approach due to Negishi (1972), Harris (1978) showed, in the context of public inputs rather 
than public consumption goods, that the value of the change evaluated at the after-the-change prices is the 
lower bound of the benefits and that the value at the before-the-change prices is the upper bound.  Since in 
our case the value of the change evaluated at the after-the-change price is greater (in the absolute value) than 
the value at the before-the-change prices, Harris' result must clearly be modified.  It is still an open question 
whether a similar relationship can be established in our model. 
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 ))(),(( xNxXc , (2.1) 
where 
 .0>NC  
As in the previous section, the optimal solution can be easily obtained.  The first 
order conditions are (1.7a) and 
 X
Z
X CxN
u
u
¢=)(   (2.2a) 
 NCxhxRxtxzy +++= )()()()(  (2.2b) 
 Na cxNxRxRxNxXc )()(])([))(),(( +-= q . (2.2c) 
 
(2.2a) is the same as before: the marginal cost of the public good must equal the sum of 
marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the consumer good for all 
households at each radius.  Terms in (2.2b) and (2.2c) containing NC  are new.  In order 
to achieve this solution in a market system, a household must pay a congestion tax equal to 
the marginal cost of adding a household, 'Nc , and varying with distance from the center.  
Then (2.2c) states that the government budget is balanced at the edge of the city.  The sum 
of the revenues from the congestion tax and the land rent is exactly equal to the sum of the 
rural rent and the cost of the public good at x . 
Consider again a system of competitive neighbourhood developers supplying the 
public good.  As before we assume that no developer is large enough to affect the utility 
and income levels.  We now assume that each developer charges a congestion tax (or the 
membership fee to join the location) and maximizes profit including the tax.  If the 
congestion tax at x is denoted by )(xs , the developer at x maximizes 
 ))(),(()()()()( xNxXcxNxsxxR -+q . (2.3) 
The policy variables for the developer are )(xs  and )(xX .  )(xR  and )(xN  are 
determined through the market's adjustment. 
As in the previous section (c.f., Equation (1.9)), we can derive the bid rent function; 
 ))(,),()(( xXuxsxtyR -- . (2.4) 
As in (I.1.14), the function satisfies 
 
)(
1))(,),((
xh
xXuxIRI = , (2.5) 
where )()()( xsxtyxI --º .  The number of households at x, therefore, satisfies 
 ))(,),()(()()( xXuxsxtyRxxN I --= q . (2.6) 
Thus a developer maximizes 
))](,),()(()(),([
))(,),()(()()(
)())(,),()((
xXuxsxtyRxxXc
xXuxsxtyRxxs
xxXuxsxtyR
I
I
---
--+
--
q
q
q
 (2.7) 
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with respect to )(xs  and )(xX .  It is easy to see that optimization with respect to )(xs  
yields 
 Ncxs =)( . (2.8) 
As in the previous section, optimization with respect to )(xX  yields (2.2a), and the 
nonnegative-profit condition guarantees (2.2c).  Thus the optimal supply of the public good 
and the optimal level of the congestion tax are obtained. 
In the previous section we showed that the marginal benefit of the public good is fully 
reflected in the increase in land rent.  It may seem plausible that, when there is a 
congestion tax, some of the benefit of an increase in the supply of the public good will show 
up as an increase in tax revenue, so that the marginal benefit would equal the change in the 
sum of land rent and the congestion tax.  Differentiating the sum, however, yields 
dX
dN
xsxN
u
u
dX
dN
xsRx
dX
dN
xs
dX
ds
xNR
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ds
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xsxNxXuxsxtyRx
dX
d
z
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+=
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q
q
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(2.9) 
where the second and the last steps use (2.5) and (2.8) respectively.  The change in the 
sum, therefore, exceeds the marginal benefit, and the difference is the increase in tax 
revenue caused by an induced change in population, ))(( dXdNxs .  The increase in 
population raises the tax revenue, but at the same time increases the cost of producing the 
public good.  From (2.8), the two increases are equal at the optimum, and the in-crease in 
tax revenue, being completely absorbed by the increased costs, does not constitute net social 
gain. 
(2.9) also shows that, if the congestion tax, )(xs , is held constant, the earlier result 
follows: 
 
[ ]
constant)(if
))(,),()(()(
==
--
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u
u
xXuxsxtyRx
dx
d
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X
q
 
Thus, if, for example, the marginal cost of a population increase, Nc , is constant, the 
marginal benefit of the public good exactly equals the increase in land rent. 
3.  A Public Good Local to a City 
In this section a local public good is assumed to be jointly consumed by all residents 
of a city.  Consider n identical cities which produce the consumer good under constant 
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returns to scale.  A city's production function is cwP , where cP  is the population of the 
city and the marginal product of labour, w, is constant.  Note that the existence of a public 
good provides a reason for having a city: an increase in population lowers the per capita 
cost of supplying the same amount of the public good.  Cities, therefore, may exist even if 
production technology has constant returns to scale. 
The utility function of a household is 
 ),),(),(( Xxhxzu  (3.1) 
where X is the consumption of the local public good and is equal for all residents in a city.  
The cost in terms of the consumer good of the public good is 
 )(XC , (3.2) 
where there is no congestion effect.7  We do not explicitly introduce a rural sector but the 
rural rent, aR , is assumed to be paid by cities.  Then the resource constraint is 
 [ ]{ } c
x
a wPXCdxxRxNxtxz =+++ò )()()()()(0 q . (3.3) 
The total population, P, of city residents is assumed to be given.  The population 
constraints are 
 cnPP =  (3.4) 
and 
 ò=
x
c dxxNP 0 )( . (3.5) 
Our optimization problem is one of maximizing the sum of equal utilities, 
 ò
x
dxxNn
0
)( , (3.6) 
under the above constraints (3.3)-(3.5) and the constraint that all households have the same 
utility level, 
 .)),(),(( uXxhxzu =  (3.7) 
If the number of cities is fixed, we obtain the first order conditions (1.5a), (1.5b), and 
 ò ¢=
x
Z
X xCdxxN
u
u
0
)()( , (3.8a) 
 aRxR =)( .  (3.8b) 
                                                 
7 This formulation implicitly assumes no transportation costs for the local public good.  In this sense the 
public good is like a telephone system, a cable television network or a sewage system but not like a theater or a 
central park.  Transportation costs of a local public good can, however, be easily introduced and do not 
change our results.  If the public good is supplied at the center of the city, we may even interpret )(xt  as 
including transportation costs of the public good. 
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(3.8a) is the Samuelsonian condition that the sum of marginal rates of substitution over all 
residents in a city must equal the marginal cost of the public good.  (3.8b) is a familiar 
equality between the urban rent at the edge of a city and the rural rent. 
If the number of cities is a policy variable, we must add the following condition: 
 [ ]ò =-
x
a XCdxxRxR0 )()()( q . (3.9) 
The total differential rent is equal to the total cost of the public good.  Therefore, if a city 
government collects land rent, pays the rural rent, and supplies the local public good, its 
budget is balanced at the optimal number of cities. 
Now, consider the benefit of the public good in a market economy.  We first derive a 
formula which holds for any type of city, and then consider the special cases of a closed city 
and a small open city in an economy with many cities.  In our market cities, city 
governments are assumed to collect the land rent, and to return the surplus, after the 
payment of the rural rent and the cost of the public good, to residents as an equal subsidy.  
Since everybody has the same marginal productivity, the wage rate is also the same, and 
therefore income is the same for all households.  Then the budget constraint for a 
household is given by 
 ),()()()( xhxRxtxzy ++=  (3.10) 
for an appropriate income y. 
The bid rent function can be derived as in the previous sections: 
 ].,),([)( XuxtyRxR -=  (3.11) 
The effect on land rent of a change in the supply of the public good is 
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where the second equality is obtained from (2.5), (I.1.15) and (1.10).  Multiplying both 
sides by )(xq , integrating from 0 to x , and rearranging terms, we obtain 
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(3.13) 
Thus the marginal benefit of the public good is reflected in the changes of land rent, the 
utility level and the income level.  Notice that this equation holds for any degree of 
openness of a city. 
First, consider the public-ownership case of a single closed city, where the population 
of the city is fixed.  The argument applies as well to an economy with many cities when the  
number of cities is given.  The income of a household satisfies 
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x
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Differentiating this equation, and noting that (3.8b) holds in equilibrium, we obtain 
 [ ]ò ¢--+=
x
ac xCdX
xd
xRxRdxx
dX
xdR
dx
dy
P
0
)()()()()( qq  
         ò ¢-=
x
xCdxx
dX
xdR
0
).()()( q  (3.15) 
Substituting (3.15) into (3.13) yields 
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which states that, if the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost, the utility level of 
residents rises as the supply of the public good is increased.  At the optimum, where the 
utility level is maximized, we have 
0=
dX
du  
which, coupled with (3.16), yields the Samuelsonian condition (3.8a) for the optimum 
supply of the public good.  Notice that in a closed city the land rent does not necessarily 
reflect the benefit of the public good. 
Next, consider a small, open city.  When the number of cities is very large, a city 
may be considered to be very small.  In such a case the utility level of households can be 
considered as given for a city and (3.13) becomes 
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Therefore, if the income level is given, an increase in land rent fully reflects the benefits of 
the public good: 
 ò ò=
x x
z
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.)()()( q  (3.17) 
There are at least two such cases.  First, if land is owned by absentee landlords, the income 
of city residents is not affected by the supply of the public good.  More important in our 
context is the case where a central government collects all the fiscal surpluses of city 
governments and distributes them as an equal subsidy.  If a city is small compared to the 
whole economy, the policy in that city affects the subsidy received by its residents only 
negligibly, and the income level can be considered as fixed. 
The latter case completely parallels the treatment of the extremely local public good 
case: if a profit-maximizing city developer, owned equally by all households in the 
economy, supplies the public good, the optimal supply of the public good is achieved.  A 
city developer maximizes the profit 
 [ ]ò --
x
a XCdxxRxR0 )()()( q  
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with respect to X among market equilibria.  Then at the maximum we have 
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where derivates are taken across equilibria.  Combining this equation with (3.17), we 
obtain the condition (3.8a) for the optimum supply of the public good.  Therefore, a system 
of land developers does not require that the region be either homogeneous or physically 
small to achieve an optimum.  We do need smallness in the sense that the utility and the 
income levels of residents are not affected by policies within a city. 
If the number of cities is optimal, the profit of a city developer is zero from (3.9).  
Therefore, the zero profit condition from free entry insures the optimal number of cities.  
This result parallels those in the cases of increasing returns and Marshallian externality in 
Chapter II.  The main difference is that in the public good case the supply of the public 
good must be determined, as well as the population of a city, while there is no such variable 
in previous cases. 
In the case of Marshallian externality the market city tended to be too large.  This 
problem does not appear when city formation results from the existence of public goods.  
Consider the utility level attainable in a city given the allocation in the rest of the world.  In 
the Marshallian externality case the utility level first rose as the population of the city 
increases, reached a maximum at *cP , and then fell as illustrated in Figure 2a.  
 
 
Since the utility level was low when the population was small, it was difficult for a new 
small city to attract residents.  In the public good case, however, the situation is different.  
For the same supply level of the public good the utility level achievable in a city is higher 
when the population of the city is smaller as illustrated in Figure 2b.  Since the public good 
is financed by the land rent, residents do not pay any tax for the public good.  The residents 
are therefore better off in a smaller city, since they can enjoy the same amount of the public 
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good with smaller average commuting costs.  In such a case a new small city has no trouble 
attracting residents. 
 
Notes 
The analyses in this chapter derive from two separate bodies of literature.  The first is 
concerned with attaining an efficient supply of a local public good.  The second with the 
relationship between land rents and the benefits of public goods. 
Samuelson (1954) has shown that it is extremely doubtful that any decentralized 
market system can determine the optimal level of a pure public good.  His main argument 
is that there is always an incentive to misreveal one's preferences.  For local public goods, 
however, Tiebout (1956) has argued that a decentralized market mechanism can indeed 
work.  Freedom of personal migration among jurisdictions works as voting with one's feet 
which insures efficiency. 
As shown elsewhere (Kanemoto (1976)), this hypothesis is not correct if local 
governments are passive in supplying local public goods.  An argument similar to the 
discussion of optimum and market city sizes in the Marshallian externality case in Chapter II 
can be applied to show that, though the optimal; solution is one of market equilibria, there 
are many other equilibria, and there is no reason to believe that the optimal solution is likely 
to be attained. 
The multiplicity of equilibria occurs since a sudden formation of a new community 
which is sufficiently large to be viable is usually impossible in a decentralized economy.  
Therefore, one way to avoid the difficulty is to allow free coalition.  As shown by Pauly 
(1970), however, an efficient allocation is a core only if the total population is divisible by 
the best community size.  Otherwise, a core does not exist.  Furthermore, informational 
requirement to attain a core would be formidable. 
Another way of avoiding the difficulty is to introduce an active role of local 
governments.  McGuire (1974) and Berglas (1976) assumed a profit maximizing behaviour 
of the suppliers of a local public good.  They showed that if there are sufficiently many 
suppliers, an efficient allocation of the public good is attained.  For this to be true, 
however, a firm should be able to determine the number of the members of the club as well 
as the supply of the public good and the tax (or the membership charge, in their club theory 
terminology).  Though this may be plausible in a club theory, it is usually difficult for a 
local government to control the population of its jurisdiction.  If the population of a 
community is determined by free migration, the difficulty of forming a sufficiently large 
new community will remain to be an obstacle to achieving the efficient community size. 
If there is a factor whose supply is fixed, notably land, this difficulty disappears.  As 
a local government's policy, Margolis (1968) suggested the principle of fiscal profitability: 
local governments seek to minimize the burden to the local tax payers.  However, he 
remained doubtful on the optimality of the supply of public goods in a model with the 
principle of fiscal profitability and voting with one's feet. 
Negishi (1972) developed a formal model to analyze this problem and showed that 
Pareto optimality can be attained under the following three assumptions.  First, the 
marginal rate of substitution between land and local public goods is equal to the reciprocal 
of the ratio of land inputs to local public goods.  Second, local public goods are financed 
by proportional taxes on land.  Third, local governments believe that marginal and average 
land value productivities of a public good are equal.  Unfortunately, these assumptions 
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(especially, the first one) are quite restrictive. 
We have shown that Negishi's first and second assumptions are not necessary to 
establish efficiency of the principle of fiscal profitability coupled with voting with one's feet, 
if a jurisdiction is very small relative to the whole economy. 
The second source of our analysis is the literature on the relationship between land 
rents and the benefits of public projects.  Polinsky and Shavell (1975) and Pines and Weiss 
(1976) showed that the marginal increase of the land rent in an open and small region 
correctly reflects the marginal benefit of a public project.  Pines and Weiss.  added a 
qualification: if relative prices of goods are affected by the public project (for example, in 
the case of leisure), this may not be true.  We show in Appendix II, however, that, even if 
the wage rate is affected by the supply of the public good, the marginal benefit is correctly 
reflected in land rent.  We have shown elsewhere (Kanemoto (1978)) that the conclusion 
holds for models which are still more general than the one used in the appendix, even when 
leisure is introduced. 
The model of an extremely local public good is similar to models in Schuler (1974) 
and Helpman, Pines and Borukhov (1976).  )  Their main concern is, unlike ours, the 
spatial pattern of the supply of the local public good. 
The model of a public good local to a city is similar to that of Arnott and Stiglitz 
(1975) who considered only the optimal allocation.  They obtained the result that, in a city 
with the optimum population, the aggregate land rent equals the total expenditure on public 
goods.  This result was first obtained by Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski (1974) and 
sometimes called the Henry George Theorem or the Golden Rule.  We found that this 
property follows from the conditions for the , optimal number of cities.  It is apparent that 
the problem of the optimal number of cities is equivalent to the problem of the optimum 
population of a city in a model with identical cities. 
Arnott (1979) discussed market city sizes.  His approach, in contrast to ours, was to 
assume away entrepreneurship of city developers.  He therefore repeated the argument 
which Henderson (1974) gave in the case of Marshallian externality and concluded that the 
market city size tends to be greater than the optimum. 
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Traffic Congestion 
CHAPTER IV 
TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND LAND USE FOR 
TRANSPORTATION:  
OPTIMUM AND MARKET CITIES 
 
Traffic congestion probably induces the most important kind of externality in cities; 
the waste of resources and time in inefficient transportation may be enormous.  In this 
chapter we extend the basic model to examine commuter congestion when city land is used 
for transportation.  A new problem we face is how to allocate land between transportation 
and residential uses, or how much road to build. 
Traffic produces a variety of externalities, noise, pollution, and risk of injury among 
them, which affect people whether they are traveling or not.  Traffic congestion, however, 
tends to affect travelers most.  Each additional vehicle on the road adds to the congestion 
and increases the travel time for others.  Since the additional traveler decides to travel on 
the basis of her own costs, and does not have to compensate other travelers for the increased 
costs she imposes on them, her decision may be socially inefficient. 
Decisions may be inefficient in various ways: it may be better to use less congested 
roads, or other modes of transportation, to travel at a less congested time, or less frequently, 
and so on.  In this chapter, we concentrate on the distortion of residential decisions, 
assuming that no other decisions can be changed.  Households are not charged for costs 
they impose on others, so they pay less than the social cost for their transportation.  Since 
land rents reflect the differential commuting costs, they are also distorted; and the lot sizes 
chosen by households are therefore socially inefficient. 
The obvious way of achieving an efficient allocation is to levy congestion tolls equal 
to the costs that a commuter imposes on others.  In practice, however, it is technically and 
politically difficult to introduce congestion tolls. 
Allocation of land between transportation and residential uses introduces another 
complication.  Policy makers generally presume that market prices correctly reflect the 
social marginal value of goods.  This presumption, however, is erroneous if congestion 
tolls are not levied.  The private transportation costs are different from the social 
transportation costs, and market rents are not equal to social rents.  The usual benefit-cost 
criterions based on market prices are, therefore, misleading. 
In the next chapter we analyze the "second best" solution under which congestion tolls 
are not levied but social benefits and costs rather than market benefits and costs are used as 
a criterion for building roads.  In this chapter, however, we compare the market allocation 
with the optimum allocation based on true social costs.  At the optimum, congestion tolls 
are levied and the amount of land allocated to roads is optimal, while at the market 
allocation congestion tolls are not levied and roads are built according to the erroneous 
benefit-cost criterion based on market prices. 
For the sake of simplicity we make the following (drastic) simplifying assumptions 
about the transportation sector. 
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(a)   Automobiles are the only mode of transportation.  Although extending the model to 
include alternate modes would introduce many interesting problems, the analysis 
would require at least another chapter. 
(b)   Circumferential travels are costless.  This assumption allows us to maintain the 
one-dimensional framework.  We may imagine that there are so many radial roads 
that any household can reach one of them with negligible costs.  Miyao (1978) 
relaxed this assumption and considered a two-dimensional rectangular city.  In order 
to carry out this extension, he had to simplify other aspects of the model.  Although 
the two-dimensional case introduces the problem of route choice, we do not expect 
qualitatively different results. 
(c)  All commuters arrive at and leave the CBD at the same time, and travel at the same 
speed.  This assumption simplifies the analysis greatly since the traffic volume at 
each radius can be represented by the number of workers living outside the radius.  In 
reality, people are probably brighter than this, and try to avoid the peak time.  Our 
assumption essentially describes the upper limit of urban congestion. 
(d)   There are no road construction costs.  The only costs of building roads are the 
opportunity cost of land.  This assumption can be easily relaxed. 
(e)   Allocation within the CBD (central business district) can be ignored.  In effect, we 
assume that commuting costs inside the CBD are zero.  This assumption was relaxed 
by Livesey (1973) and Sheshinski (1973) in a model simpler than ours. 
(f)   Time costs can be ignored.  This is consistent with previous chapters, and does not 
affect the results. 
1.  The Model 
Two new elements are required to extend the transportation sector of the basic model 
in Chapter I.  First, transportation is assumed to require land.  Land allocated to 
transportation use at radius x is denoted by )(xLT .  The land constraint becomes 
 )()()( xxLxL TH θ≤+ ,  (1.1) 
where, as in Chapter I,  denotes the amount of residential land. )(xLH
We continue to ignore the allocation within the CBD and assume that the residential 
zone stretches from  to 0=x xx = .  We do not, however, assume that the CBD is a 
point.  This change is made because, if )0(θ  is zero or close to zero, all the available land 
is devoted to roads near the CBD.  In such a case, the nonnegativity constraint, , 
for 
0)( ≥xLH
xx ≤≤0 , is binding, and we obtain a corner solution.  For simplicity, we assume that 
enough land is available near the center to preclude the corner solution. 
The second new element is traffic congestion: commuting costs for each individual 
depend on the number of others using the same road at the same time.  Specifically, it is 
assumed that the commuting cost per mile per household at radius x is a function of the 
volume of traffic T(x) and the amount of land allocated for transportation  at that 
radius: 
)(xLT
 , (1.2) ))(),(( xLxTg T
where the cost increases as the volume increases, 
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 , (1.3) 0),( >TT LTg
and decreases as more land is used as roads, 
 . (1.4) 0),( <TL LTg
We concentrate on the total amount of land used for roads at each radius, and do not 
analyze how the width of an individual road is determined.  In this chapter the width of the 
road refers to the total amount of land used for transportation at a radius, instead of the 
width of an individual road. 
Commuting costs incurred by a household living at x are 
 . (1.5) ∫ ′′′= x T xdxLxTgxt 0 ))(),(()(
Differentiation of this equation with respect to x yields the following differential equation: 
 .  (1.6) ))(),(()( xLxTgxt T=′
This differential equation, with the boundary condition at , 0=x
   ,   (1.7)  0)0( =t
is equivalent to (1.5). 
Since all commuters arrive at and leave the CBD at the same time, and that they travel 
at the same speed, the traffic volume at a radius x is equal to the number of households 
living outside x: 
 ∫ ′′= xx xdxNxT )()( ,    (1.8) 
where N(x)dx is the number of households living between x and x+dx, and is given by 
(I.1.25): .  This is equivalent to the differential equation, )(/)()( xhxLxN H=
 ,      (1.9) )(/)()( xhxLxT H−=′
with the boundary condition, 
 0)( =xT .     (1.10) 
t(x) is usually called the private transportation cost and is different from the social 
transportation cost, since it does not include the external costs imposed on other commuters.  
The social transportation cost, , at radius x is an increase in the total transportation 
cost there, , caused by a marginal increase in traffic: 
),( TLTG
),( TLTTg
[ ] TLTTgLTG TT ∂∂≡ /),(),(  
),(),( TTT LTTgLTg += . (1.11) 
An additional car on the road causes more congestion and increases the transportation costs 
of other commuters by .  Since there are T cars on the road, the total increase in the Tg
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costs for other travelers is Tg .  This external cost must be added to the private 
transportation cost, g.  In the transportation economics literature, the private transportation 
cost is sometimes called the average transportation cost, and the social transportation cost is 
called the marginal transportation cost for the obvious reason. 
T
H h/
∫
xh ))(
[ )( Lxz
2.  A Closed City 
In a closed city the population of the city, P, is given.  The population constraint 
(I.1.24) gives the boundary condition for (1.9) at  :0=x
 T(0) =P.  (2.1) 
To save space we analyze only the public-ownership case, which is slightly simpler 
than the absentee-landlord case.  In our version of public ownership the resource 
constraint is 
 [ ]∫ ≤++x aT PwdxRLTTgzL0 ),( θ . (2.2) 
The available resource, Pw, is spent on the consumer good, , commuting costs, Tg, 
and the rural rent, 
hzLH /
θaR .  This constraint is different from the constraint (I.1.30) in Chapter 
I in the following two respects.  First, equality is replaced by inequality.  This does not 
change the conclusions because the constraint holds with equality both at the optimum and 
in market equilibrium.  For technical reasons, the inequality constraint is more convenient 
in this and the next chapters, since the associated Lagrange multiplier can be signed.  
Second, the transportation cost, tN, is replaced by Tg.  Equivalence of these two 
formulations can be easily seen by integration by parts. 
 
2.1.  The Optimum City 
In the optimum city the sum of utilities, 
 [ ]x H dxxhxuL0 )(/)( , (2.3) 
 
is maximized under the constraints (1.1), (1.9), (1.10), (2.1), (2.2), and the equal-utility 
constraint, 
 ,             uxzu =),(( xx ≤≤0 . (2.4) 
The control variables are the consumptions of the consumer good and housing, z(x) and h(x), 
and the total widths of the road and the residential area,  and ; and the control 
parameters are the utility level, u, and the physical city size, 
)(xLT )(xLH
x . 
The Theorem of Hestenes, which is stated in the appendix on optimal control theory, 
can be applied to this problem.  The Hamiltonian is 
[ ] )())(),(()()(/)()(/)()( xRxLxTgxTxhxxhxLxu aTHH θδλφ ++−−= , (2.5) ]
where )(xλ  and δ  are adjoint variables associated with the differential equation (1.9) 
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and the isoperimetric constraint (2.2) respectively.  δ  is a constant, and satisfies 
0=
[ Tg+
[ (H
=
(Tg
 [ ]/
0 


 ++− ∫x aH dxRTghzLPw θδ ,       0≥δ . (2.6) 
As in previous chapters, δ  can be interpreted as the shadow price of the consumer good in 
utility terms.  The ad joint variable, )(xλ , satisfies the adjoint equation 
 ),(),()( TTT LTLTgxT
−=′−=
∂
∂ δλφ   (2.7) ]
The second equality shows that )(xλ′  equals the shadow price of the consumer good times 
the social transportation cost at x defined in section 1.  Thus )(xλ′  is the social cost of 
transportation in utility terms.  The first equality confirms this interpretation, since it says 
that a marginal increase in traffic at radius x decreases the sum of utilities by )(xλ′ . 
According to the maximum principle, the Hamiltonian must be maximized under the 
constraints (1.1) and (2.4).  The Lagrangian for this problem is 
[ ] )())()())(),(()( xLxLxxuxhxzux T−−+−+= θµνφψ  , (2.8) ]
where )(xν  and )(xµ  are respectively the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (2.4) 
and (1.1).  The first order conditions 
are 
 0)(
)(
)()(
=−
−−
=
∂
∂ x
xh
xzxu
LH
µδλψ   (2.9a) 
 0)(),( =−−=
∂
∂ xLTTg
L TLT
µδψ     (2.9b) 
 0)()(
)(
)()(
−
−−
−=
∂
∂
huxxNxh
xzxu
h
ν
δλψ    (2.9c) 
 0)()( =−−=
∂
∂ xNux
z z
δνψ  .  (2.9d) 
)(xµ  must satisfy the condition that 
 [ ] 0)()()()( =−− xLxLxx THθµ ,        0)( ≥xµ , (2.10) 
and can be interpreted as the shadow rent of land in utility terms. 
The transversality condition for x  is  
[ ] [ ] 0)())(),()()(/)()()()( =+−−−= xRxLxxTxhxLxzxux aTH θδδλψ , 
  (2.11) 
which simply says that the city should not extend beyond the point where the marginal 
social contribution of developing an additional unit of land is zero.  The transversality 
condition for u, 
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 ∫∫ = xx dxxdxxN 00 )()( ν  (2.12) 
is the same as (I.2.22e) and has the same interpretation. 
To simplify the interpretations of the optimality conditions, it is convenient to recast 
shadow prices in terms of the consumer good.  Define 
 [ )0()(1)( λλδτ −≡ xx ]. (2.13) 
Then )(xτ satisfies both 
 0)0( =τ   (2.14) 
and 
 ),(),()( TTT LTTgLTgx +=′τ ,     (2.15) 
and can be interpreted as the social transportation cost of commuting from radius x to the 
center.  Similarly, the social rent at x is 
 δµ /)()( xxR ≡ .  (2.16) 
Equation (2.9a) may be interpreted as the optimal household budget.  We can 
rewrite (2.9a) as 
 )()()()( xxhxxzu λµδ ++= . 
Dividing through by δ , defining 
 [ ] δλ /)0(−≡ uy ,             (2.17) 
and using (2.13) and (2.16), we obtain 
 )()()()( xxhxRxzy τ++= .   (2.18) 
This equation expresses the socially optimal allocation of household income at x if y is the 
income, R(x) the market rent, and )(xτ  the commuting costs.  Then, by (2.15), households 
must pay the social transportation costs, or the private transportation costs plus the costs of 
externalities imposed on other travelers.  In other words, some way must be found to 
collect a congestion toll if the price system is to achieve the optimum city. 
Notice that in this simple model congestion tolls can be levied according to the 
location of residence.  A household living at x should pay the amount 
  ∫ ′′′′x TT xdxLxTgxT0 ))(),(()( ,
of congestion tolls.  However, this kind of distance tax is not optimal in a more general 
model in which households can choose when to travel or the best mode among several 
modes of transportation. 
Rewriting Equation (2.9b) as we did (2.9a), we obtain 
 .          (2.19) )(),( xRLTTg TL =−
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Now since  is simply the marginal reduction in total transportation costs from 
widening the road at x with the traffic volume fixed, (2.19) reveals that at the optimum the 
marginal reduction in transportation costs from widening the road equals the shadow rent.  
For later use, we define  as the market benefit, B(x), of widening the road: 
),( TL LTTg−
− ),( LTTg TL
 .              (2.20) ))(),(()()( xLxTgxTxB TL−≡
Combining (2.9c) and (2.9d), and solving for  yields zh uu /
 )(xR
u
u
z
h
= ,       (2.21) 
which says that the marginal rate of substitution between land and the consumer good equals 
the shadow rent at the optimum.  This condition is obtained if a household maximizes 
utility and pays the congestion tax, and therefore allocates its budget according to (2.18). 
The transversality condition (2.11) becomes1  
 aRxR ′=)(      (2.22) 
that is, the urban rent at the edge of the city equals the rural rent. 
Thus the optimum solution can be attained by the decentralized market mechanism if 
three conditions are met: all households are given the equal income y; congestion tolls equal 
to the external costs, Tg , are levied at each x; and roads are built according to the 
benefit-cost criterion, equating the marginal reduction of transportation costs from widening 
the road to the market rent. 
T
Note that the marginal benefits of the road are given by the marginal reduction of 
transportation costs with the volume of traffic fixed.  This is true even though the 
construction of a new road changes the allocation of the entire economy: the change in 
commuting costs induces a change in land rent, and hence in the consumption decisions of 
households, which changes the residential structure of the city.  Due to the envelope 
property, all the indirect effects cancel out each other and the benefits are simply given by 
the direct saving in transportation cost.2  This is a general property of the first best 
optimum.  As will be shown in the next chapter, however, the effects of induced changes 
do not wash out in the second best world where congestion tolls are not allowed. 
When we consider the relationship between the total congestion tolls and the total 
land rent of the road, one of the standard results from production theory is obtained: profit is 
negative under marginal cost pricing when there are increasing returns to scale, zero in the 
constant returns case, and positive in the decreasing returns case.  First, consider the case 
where transportation technology exhibits constant returns to scale: the average transportation 
cost, g, remains the same if the volume of traffic, T, and the width of the road, , are 
increased with the same proportion.  In the constant-returns-to-scale case,  can 
TL
)TL,(Tg
                                                 
1 We have been able to prove this only in the case where is finite at ),( TLTg x  and  for all 
. In that case
∞<),0( TL Lg
0>TL 0))(),(()( =xLxTgxT T , and )()( xxLH θ= , and hence (2.11) implies aRxR =)( .  The first 
equality is obvious from 0)( =xT .  The second equality is obtained since otherwise )x(R  is zero from (2.19) 
and 0) =x(T . From (2.11) and (2.9a), this implies that 0)( =xRaθ , which cannot happen if and 0>aR
0)( =xθ . 
2 Wheaton (1977) and Arnott (1976) observed this well-known result in the context of urban land use. 
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be written as 
 )./(~),( TT LTgLTg =  
Then, the total congestion tolls at x are  
 ))(/)((,~))(/)(( 22 xLxTgxLxTgT TTT = , 
and the total land rent at x is 
 ))(/)(('~))(/)(( 2 xLxTgxLxTgTL TTLT =− . 
Thus the congestion tolls exactly cover the land rent of the road at each radius. 
A proportionate increase of T and  decreases the average transportation cost, g, in 
the case of increasing returns to scale, and increases in the case of decreasing returns to 
scale.  Therefore, for a change in T and 
TL
TL  satisfying 
 
T
T
L
dL
T
dT
= , 
the corresponding change in g, 
  
,)( TTLTT
TLT
dLLgLTg
dLgdTgdg
+=
+=
is negative in the case of increasing returns and positive in the case of decreasing returns.  
Thus the total congestion tolls are less than the total land rent in the increasing returns case, 
 , LTT gTLgT −<
2
and greater in the decreasing returns case,  
 . LTT gTLgT −>
2
If the transportation authority pays for land rent of the road and collects congestion 
tolls, its budget is balanced in the constant returns case, it makes a profit in the 
decreasing returns case, and suffers a loss in the increasing returns case, which is 
analogous to the results in the usual production theory. 
2.2.  The Market City 
Let us consider an allocation where the congestion tolls cannot be levied.  The width 
of the road is not determined by the market, but by the benefit-cost criterion based on 
market prices (to be explained below).   
When congestion tolls are not levied, households pay only the private transportation 
costs, t(x), given by (1.6) and (1.7).  Assuming that all households receive the same income 
y, we obtain the budget constraint (I.1.3), 
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 xxxtxhxRxzy ≤≤++= 0)()()()( , 
where R(x) is land rent.  The first order condition for utility maximization is given by 
(I.1.4): 
 )(xR
u
u
Z
h
= . 
The utility level must be the same everywhere in the city because of spatial arbitrage.  
This is equivalent to the condition 
 xxxtxRxh ≤≤=′+′ 0,0)()()( , (2.23) 
which is obtained from (I.1.16). 
Since the residential rent is equal to the rural rent at the edge of the city, we have 
(I.1.13): 
 aRxR =)( . 
In the public-ownership case on which we shall concentrate, the differential rent is 
returned to residents.  Thus the income level is given by 
 })()()({1
00 ∫∫ −+= x ax H dxxRdxxLxRPwy θ .   (2.24) 
It is easy to see that this is equivalent to (2.2) with equality. 
It is assumed that the (erroneous) benefit-cost criterion based on market prices is 
adopted to determine the allocation of land between housing and transportation uses.  
Roads are widened until the market benefit equals the market rent.  The market benefit, 
B(x), is the reduction of transportation costs from a marginal increase in land used for roads, 
which is given by (2.20).  Then we have 
       (2.25) )())(),(()( xRxLxTgxT TL =−
in equilibrium.  Note that this is the same as the benefit-cost criterion (2.19) adopted in the 
optimum city.  Although this naive benefit-cost criterion leads to the optimum allocation of 
land when congestion tolls are levied, it is no longer optimal in the absence of congestion 
tolls. 
Since no available land is left vacant unless the rent is zero, (1.1) holds with 
equality: 
 xxxxLxL TH ≤≤=+ 0),()()( θ .    (2.26) 
Comparing these equations with those obtained in the optimum city, we can see that 
the only difference lies in transportation costs.  In the market city residents pay the private 
(or average) transportation cost, while in the optimum city they also pay congestion tolls, 
which make up the difference between the private and social (or marginal) transportation 
cost. 
2.3.  Comparison Between the Optimum and Market Cities 
In this section the optimum and market cities characterized in the previous sections are 
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compared.  Unfortunately, the complexity of the model prevents us from carrying out the 
comparison in the general case.  We, therefore, calculate numerical examples using the 
Cobb-Douglas type utility function. 
 ,   (2.27) αα −= 1zhu
and the Vickrey type transportation cost function without a constant term,  
 KTLTgxt )()( =′ ,    (2.28) 
where g and k are positive constants. 
These functions are chosen for the convenience of computation and are not quite 
realistic.  The properties of the functions are as follows.  The Cobb-Douglas utility 
function (2.27) implies that the proportion of income net of commuting costs spent on land 
is always α .  In other words, the income elasticity of demand for land is one and the price 
elasticity is minus one.  The transportation cost function (2.28) represents constant returns 
to scale in transportation technology.  Since there is no constant term, transportation costs 
are zero when there is no other car on the road.  Transportation costs rise when the traffic 
density, , or the number of travelers per unit width of the road, rises.  The elasticity 
of transportation costs with respect to traffic density is k and constant. 
TT L/
 
 
 
 
The city is assumed to be circular, although not necessarily a complete circle.  Since 
commuting costs in the CBD are zero by assumption (e), we need only consider the 
residential zone, where the supply of land is 
 )()( cxx +=θθ ,   (2.29) 
with positive constants θ  and c.  The constant c is chosen so that roads do not cover all 
the land at .  In the numerical calculations, 0=x 2=θ  and c . 50=
The results of calculations are shown on Tables 1 and 2.3  In Table 1, k is assumed to be 1 
and g to be .  5−10 α  is assumed to be 0.2, which means that a fifth of the income net of 
                                                 
3 For the details of calculations, see the Appendix to Chapter V, Part I of Kanemoto (1977). 
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transportation costs is spent on land.  It should be remembered that actual housing is 
included in the consumer good.  The number of households in the city is 100,000, and 1 
unit of resources expressed in terms of the consumer good is available for each household.  
The rural rent is 1 per unit of land. 
 
Table 1  
Comparison between Optimum and Market Cities:  1=k
 
 Optimum Market 
Rent at radius 0  ))0((R 31.3 14.9 
Income per household (y) 1.30 1.03 
City size )(x  94.29 120.3 
Utility level (u) 0.3955 0.3640 
Total area  )10( 3× 6.39 12.0 
Total area of roads  )10( 3× 2.14 5.88 
Total rent  )10( 4× 1.91 1.50 
Total transport costs  )10( 4× 1.72 2.79 
0.1,000,100,1,0.1,10 5 ===== − aRPwkg  
)50(2)(,2.0 +== xxθα  
 
Table 2 
Comparison between Optimum and Market Cities:  2=k
 
 Optimum Market 
Rent at radius 0  ))0((R 18.9 5.22 
Income per household (y) 1.33 0.83 
City size )(x  123.0 177.7 
Utility level (u) 0.4450 0.3619 
Total area  )10( 4× 1.26 2.91 
Total area of roads  )10( 3× 5.10 18.5 
Total rent  )10( 4× 1.85 1.22 
Total transport costs  )10( 4× 1.34 2.23 
0.1,000,100,1,0.2,105.0 8 ====×= − aRPwkg   
)50(2)(,2.0 +== xxθα  
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There is a striking difference in physical city size between the optimum and market 
cities: the length of the residential zone of the optimum city is just over three quarters of that 
of the market city, and the total area of the residential zone (including the road) is just over a 
half.  Because congestion tolls are levied in the optimum city, the land rent tends to be 
higher and consequently the optimum city is denser than the market city. 
The rent at  in the optimum city is more than twice as high as that in the market 
city, and the total land rent of the residential land in the optimum city is greater than that of 
the market city even though the market city is considerably bigger.  The total rent is 19.1% 
of the total available resources in the optimum city and 15% in the market city. 
0=x
In the optimum city the total transportation cost not including congestion tolls is about 
62% of those in the market city.  Transportation costs constitute 17.2% of the total 
available resources in the optimum city and 27.9% in the market city.  Thus the absence of 
congestion tolls results in the excessive use of resources in transportation.  Since , 
congestion tolls in the optimum city equal the private transportation cost.  This means that 
when congestion tolls are included, the total commuting costs paid by households are twice 
as much as the total transportation costs calculated in Table 1.  Therefore, although less 
resources are devoted to transportation in the optimum city than in the market city, 
households pay more commuting costs in the optimum city if we include congestion tolls.  
Of course, the revenue from congestion tolls is returned to the city residents in our model, 
and congestion tolls do not represent any consumption of resources. 
1=k
The total land allocated to housing is greater in the market city.  On the average, 
therefore, residents in the optimum city consume less land.  Notice, however, that housing 
consumption need not decrease because it is a part of the composite consumer good.  Since 
the total transportation costs (excluding congestion tolls) are smaller in the optimum city, 
the total consumption of the consumer good is greater.  This overwhelms the decrease of 
the consumption of land and the utility level is higher in the optimum city.  Thus the main 
advantage of the optimum city lies in the fact that the total transportation costs are reduced 
through dense habitation. 
Notice that household income y is 1.3 although we assumed that only one unit of the 
consumer good was available to each household.  The difference is the average expenditure 
on rent and congestion tolls which is returned to city residents in the public-ownership case. 
The road width functions are plotted in Figure 2.  The superscripts 0 and m denote 
respectively the optimum and market solutions.  The road in the market city is wider than 
that 
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in the optimum city everywhere in the city.  In this sense, the benefit-cost criterion based 
on market prices has a tendency to overinvest in roads.  The ratio between the width of the 
road and the available land is plotted in Figure 3.  In both optimum and market cities the 
ratio decreases monotonically with distance from the center. 
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The rent function is plotted in Figure 4.  The rent is higher in the optimum city than 
in the market city near the center but lower near the edge. 
As shown in Figure 5, near the CBD the traffic density is higher in the optimum city, 
which reflects the fact that the road is narrower in the optimum city.  Near the edge of the 
city, however, the traffic density is higher in the market city even though the market city has 
the wider road, because the optimum city has fewer commuters near the edge simply 
because the optimum city is smaller. 
Table 2 shows the results of the case of ,  and 8105.0 −×=g 2=k 2.0=α .  The 
assumption of  implies more acute congestion than in the previous case.  This is the 
reason why the difference in the utility level is greater here.  All the qualitative results are 
the same, however. 
2=k
 
 
 
 
3.  An Open City 
In this section we consider a small, open city where the utility level in the city must 
equal the level outside the city.  This case would be relevant when a planner of a small city 
is contemplating a long-run policy.  In order to isolate problems pertaining to traffic 
congestion from others, we assume constant returns to scale in production: the aggregate 
production function of the city is 
,wP  
with a constant w.  The analysis can be easily extended to the case where the aggregate 
production function of a city exhibits increasing or decreasing returns to scale. 
In a small, open city, the utility level of residents is given and the population of the 
city becomes an endogenous variable.  Therefore, (2.1) is replaced by 
 uxhxzu =))(),(( ,     (3.1) 
where u  is the utility level given for the city. 
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Only the absentee-landlord case is considered in this section.  Absentee landlords 
receive congestion tolls as well as land rent.  The income of a household, then, is given by 
w, and the resource constraint (2.2) no longer holds. 
3.1  The Optimum City 
As in Chapter I, we maximize the net product of the city after the cost of maintaining 
the given utility level of residents.  Thus our problem is one of maximizing 
 [ ]{ }∫ −−−x aH dxxRxhxLxtxzw0 )()(/)()()( θ ,           (3.2) 
 
subject to the constraints (1.1), (1.6), (1.7), (1.9), (1.10), and (3.1).  The Hamiltonian is 
 [ ] ))(),(()(
)(
)()()(
)(
)()()( xLxTgx
xh
xLxxR
xh
xLxtxzw THaH ηλθ +−−−−=Φ ,   (3.3) 
and the Lagrangian for the problem of maximizing the Hamiltonian under the constraints 
(1.1) and (3.1) is 
 [ ] [ )()()()())(),(()( xLxLxxuxhxzux ]TH −−+−+Φ=Ψ θµν ,   (3.4) 
where )(xλ and )(xη  are respectively adjoint variables associated with differential 
equations (1.9) and (1.6).  )(xν and )(xµ  are Lagrange multipliers for (3.1) and (1.1). 
If we define )()( xxR µ=  and )()()( xxtx λτ += , the first order conditions 
become, after simple manipulations: 
 TTggx +=′ )(τ            (3.5) 
 τ++= Rhzw                 (3.6) 
       (3.7) )(),( xRLTTg TTL =−
 )(xR
u
u
z
h
=                (3.8) 
 0)0( =τ                    (3.9) 
 aRxR =)( .                (3.10) 
 
It can be seen immediately that these equations coincide with (2.15), (2.18), (2.19), 
(2.21), (2.14) and (2.22) obtained in a closed city if w is replaced by y.  Therefore, the 
difference between open and closed cities lies in the determination of income and utility 
levels.  In a closed city these two variables are determined so as to satisfy the population 
constraint (2.1) and the resource constraint (2.2), whereas in an open city the utility level is 
given from outside, and the income level is equal to the marginal productivity of labor, 
which is also assumed to be given.  Note that neither land rent nor congestion tolls are 
returned to residents in this section. 
If the production sector is competitive, the wage will be equal to the marginal 
productivity of labor.  Therefore, if the land is owned by absentee landlords, the optimal 
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solution can be obtained by levying congestion tolls and by constructing roads so as to 
equate the market rent to the marginal benefit from widening the road. 
3.2  The Market City 
In the market city, it is assumed that production is carried out competitively.  Since 
we consider only the absentee landlord case, the income of residents is the competitive wage 
w.  In the absence of congestion tolls, the commuting costs are given by t(x).  When the 
market rent is given by , a household faces the budget constraint, )(xR
  ).()()()( xtxhxRxzw ++=
A household maximizes the utility level under this budget constraint, which yields the 
first order condition: 
 )(xR
u
u
z
h
= . 
The maximized utility level must be equal to the given utility level, u , everywhere 
in the city. 
Roads are built according to the benefit-cost criterion based on market prices: 
  . )(),( xRLTTg TL =−
At the edge of the city, the market rent equals the rural rent: 
 aRxR =)( . 
Again, we can observe that the only differences between closed and open cities are 
boundary conditions which determine the income level and the utility level: in a closed city 
the income level is given by (2.23) and the population constraint (2.1) must hold, but in an 
open city the utility level is fixed at u  and the income level is also a constant w. 
3.3.  Comparison Between Optimum and Market Cities 
The optimum and market cities obtained in the previous sections are compared. 
First, since )0(τ  and t  are both zero, households at  face the same 
budget constraint, 
)0( 0=x
hRzw (0)+= , 
in both optimum and market cities.  In order for the utility levels to be the same, the rents 
at  must be the same in the two cities: 0=x
)0()0(0 mRR = , 
where superscripts 0 and m respectively denote optimum and market solutions. 
Since congestion tolls are levied in the optimum city, it is expected that households 
pay more transportation costs in the optimum city.  If this is true, the rent function has a 
steeper slope in the optimum city than in the market city and the land rent in the optimum 
city is lower than that in the market city everywhere in the city except at  where they 0=x
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are equal.  Though we have not been able to show this in a general case, it is true if we 
assume the Cobb-Douglas type utility function (2.27) and the Vickrey type transportation 
cost function (2.28).4  The rent profiles in this case are depicted in Figure 6. 
The traffic density has the same pattern as the rent function.  At , optimum 
and market cities have the same traffic densities and in the rest of the city the market city 
has a higher traffic density. 
0=x
The market city size is bigger than the optimum city size.  It can be shown that, in the 
case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function and the Vickrey transportation cost function, the 
residential zone is exactly  times longer in the market city than in the optimum city.  
In a closed city, the difference between market and optimum city sizes is not as large as in 
an open city.  This is because the population is fixed in a closed city and the rent at the 
CBD and the income level are both higher in the optimum city. 
1+k
 
 
 
The widths of roads have been calculated for a variety of parameters.  In most cases 
the market city has a wider road than the optimum city though we have found some 
exceptional cases where the optimum city has a wider road near the center.  However, even 
in such cases the ratio between the total area of roads and the total area of residential land is 
greater in the market city.  One example in which and  is 
plotted in Figure 7.  In this case roads are wider everywhere in the market city. 
510,1,1 −=== hkw 364.0−=u
                                                 
4 See Chapter V, Part I of Kanemoto (1977). 
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4.  An Economy Consisting of Many Cities 
In this section we briefly consider an economy consisting of many cities, under the 
assumption that the number of cities is a variable.  Only the optimum allocation is analysed 
since the market city size may be indeterminate as shown in Chapter II. 
For simplicity, we assume that no one lives in the rural area and that all cities are 
identical.  Then the population of the economy, P, the population of a city, P, and the 
number of cities, n, must satisfy the relationship 
 .       (4.1) cnPP =
The boundary condition for T(x) at  is now 0=x
 .       (4.2) cPT =)0(
The aggregate production function of a city is 
 ,    (4.3) )( cPF
and we assume increasing returns to scale.  The resource constraint (2.2) must be rewritten 
as 
 )(]),([
0 c
x
aTH PFdxRLTTghzL ≤++∫ θ .            (4.4) 
Now, our problem is one of maximizing the common utility level, u, subject to the 
resource constraint (4.4), the traffic flow constraint (1.9), the equal utility constraint (2.4), 
the land constraint (1.1), the population constraint (4.1), and the boundary conditions for 
T(x), (4.2) and (1.10).  The Lagrangian for this problem is 
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)5.4()].0([)(
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dxLLxndxuhzuxn
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dxRTghzLPFnu
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x
H
x
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If we define 
 ))0()((1)( λλδτ −≡ xx    (4.6) 
and 
 δµ )()( xxR ≡ ,     (4.7) 
the first order conditions become, after some rearrangements, 
  xxxxhxRxzPcF ≤≤++=′ 0)()()()()( τ , (4.8) 
and (2.14), (2.15), (2.19), (2.21), and (2.22).  The only new condition is (4.8), which means 
that a worker is paid the value of marginal productivity of labor. 
The condition can be related to the results in Chapter II.  Multiplying (4.8) by N(x) 
and integrating from 0 to x  yields 
 ∫ ++=′ x Hcc dxxLxRxNxxNxzPFP 0 )]()()()()()([)( τ .  (4.9) 
The resource constraint (4.4) holds with equality, and the total transportation costs are the 
same regardless of how costs at different radii are added, 
∫∫ = xx tNdxTgdx 00 . 
We therefore have 
 [ ]∫ ++= x ac dxxRxNxtxNxzPF 0 )()()()()()( θ .    (4.10)  
Subtracting (4.8) from (4.9) yields 
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]∫
∫
=−+
−+′−
x
x
aHccc
dxxtx
dxxRxLxRPFPPF
0
0
.0)()(
)()()()()(
τ
θ
 (4.11) 
The first square bracket is the profit from production, which is negative because of 
increasing returns to scale; the second term is the net rent revenue after the payment of the 
rural rent; and the third term the total congestion toll.  Thus the loss incurred by a producer 
equals the sum of the net rent revenue and the total congestion toll.  This is more general 
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than the result in Chapter II, which states that the operating loss of a producer equals the 
total differential rent, or the market rent minus the rural rent.  Notice also the similarity 
with the results of Section 2 of Chapter III which considers congestion in the consumption 
of local public goods. 
If transportation technology has constant returns to scale, the total congestion toll 
equals the land rent on the road.  In this case (4.11) is equivalent to the result obtained in 
Chapter II, 
 [ ] [ ]∫ =−+′− x accc dxxRxRPFPPF 0 0)()()()( θ :       (4.12) 
the loss of a producer equals the total differential rent. 
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Notes 
Traffic congestion has usually been analyzed in nonspatial frameworks.  Strotz 
(1965) extended the usual analysis to a spatial model in which a city is divided into a finite 
number of homogeneous rings.  He characterized the optimal solution and showed that the 
optimal solution requires congestion tolls.  He also showed that congestion tolls exceed or 
less than expenditure on roads if transportation technology has decreasing or increasing 
returns to scale respectively. 
Solow and Vickrey (1971) formulated a model of a long narrow city in which 
distance is a continuous variable.  They solved the problem of minimizing transportation 
costs using calculus of variation.  Mills and de Ferranti (1971) consider a similar 
transportation-cost-minimization problem in a circular city Livesey (1973) and Sheshinski 
(1973) extended their model to analyze land use within the CBD.  Legey, Ripper and 
Varaiya (1973) extended the model to include capital.  They also introduced the market 
city where roads are built according to the benefit-cost criterion based on market prices and 
compared optimum and market cities.  It was shown that the market city is more dispersed 
than the optimum city. 
All these papers considered closed cities where the tot product (or the total 
population) of the city was fixed.  Kanemoto (1975) introduced an open city where the city 
faces fixed export price. 
None of the above models allow for substitution between land and other factors.  
Dixit (1973), Oron, Pines and Sheshinski (1973) and Riley (1974) considered traffic congest 
in a model which allows for the choice of housing lot size and therefore substitution 
between land and other goods.  Indepedent of our work, Robson (1976) compared optimum 
and market cities in the same model as ours.  He considered the case of 2/1=α  in the 
utility function (2.27).  Though calculations are easiest in this case, the assumption implies 
that all households spend half of their incomes-after-commuting-costs on land which is quite 
unrealistic. 
Kanemoto (1976) considered a production city with substitutability between labor and 
land in an open city framework.  The results are parallel to those in section 3 on the open 
city. 
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CHAPTER V 
TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND LAND USE FOR 
TRANSPORTATION:  
THE SECOND BEST CITY1 
 
In the previous chapter we introduced traffic congestion and analyzed the 
optimum and market allocations.  With transportation congestion, an additional 
traveler imposes external costs on other travelers by slowing them down.  The optimal 
solution requires congestion tolls to "internalize" this externality.  It is, however, 
difficult to charge congestion tolls because of very high administrative costs.  In fact, 
there are very few roads where congestion tolls are levied and there is no city where 
congestion tolls are adopted in the whole city.  It is, therefore, very important to 
consider what can be done given the constraint that congestion tolls are not allowed. 
In the market city of the preceding chapter, we assumed that roads are built 
according to a naive benefit-cost criterion: the direct saving in transportation costs from 
widening the road is equated to the market land rent.  This benefit-cost criterion leads 
to a misallocation of land between transportation and residential uses since, given the 
absence of congestion tolls, the market rent does not correctly reflect the true  social 
scarcity of land. 
In this chapter we consider the second best problem, which is to optimize the 
allocation of land between roads and residence when congestion tolls are not levied.  
The benefit-cost criterion that must be adopted to achieve the second best allocation is 
more complicated than the one in the optimum city or the market city.  The cost side 
must be the shadow rent, or the social rent, which is no longer equal to the market rent.  
The benefit side also differs from the marginal direct saving in transportation cost 
(unless compensated demand for land is completely price or rent ine lastic).  The 
reason is as follows.  A reduction of transportation costs from widening the road 
induces a change in the market rent.  If demand for land is responsive to a price 
change, this has a side effect of changing the consumption decisions of households.  
As shown in the previous chapter, the social value of the change is zero due to the 
envelope property if the market rent equals the social rent.  In the second best city, 
however, the market rent is not equal to the social rent, and a change in the consumption 
decision results in a net social gain or loss.  The loss or gain is the difference between 
the social benefit and the marginal reduction in transportation costs. 
Since the naive benefit-cost criterion usually adopted by policy makers leads to a 
suboptimal allocation of land, it is of interest to know the direction of the misallocation, 
that is, whether there is overinvestment or underinvestment in roads.  The direction of 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on my  1977 paper in the Journal of Urban Economics.  I would like to thank 
Academic Press, Inc. for permitting me to include an extended version of the paper in this book. 
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misallocation may be determined by comparing the market city with the second best 
city, but the second best city is, unfortunately, so complicated that we have not been 
able to carry out the comparison directly.  We therefore examine the direction of a 
change that the naive benefit-cost criterion suggests at the second best optimum.  More 
specifically, we compare the marginal saving in transportation costs and the market rent 
when roads are built in the second best way. 
This comparison yields unambiguous results only if the benefit-cost criterion is 
adopted in a small region while the allocation in the rest of the city is held constant.  
The criterion leads to overinvestment in roads if the marginal saving in transportation 
costs is greater than the market rent at the second best optimum.  If, however, the 
criterion is adopted in the entire city, interrelationships among different locations 
introduce complicated reactions, and we cannot obtain a definite answer. 
In the second best city, the market rent at the edge of the city does not equal the 
rural rent although the shadow rent does.  This result is in sharp contrast to those 
obtained in the optimum and market cities.  The city must be expanded out to the 
radius where the contribution of an additional unit of land equals the rural rent.  This 
requires the shadow rent to be equal to the rural rent.  Since the market rent equals the 
shadow rent in the optimum city, the market rent also equals the rural rent at the edge of 
the city.  In the second best city, however, the market rent is no longer equal to the 
shadow rent and hence is not equal to the rural rent at the edge. 
Imposing another constraint that the market rent equals the rural rent at the edge 
of the city does not essentially change the situation.  It is always possible, for instance, 
to make the width of the road zero and transportation costs per mile infinite at the edge 
of the city.  This can cause a sudden drop in the market rent profile at the city's edge so 
that the market rent equals the rural rent after the drop and the constraint can be 
satisfied without changing the  allocation inside the city.  The only way to make the 
constraint significant is to restrict the shape of the road width functions, for example, to 
the class of linear functions as in Solow (1973). 
The case where compensated demand for land is completely price inelastic is 
peculiar in the following two respects.  First, the social marginal benefit of the road 
equals the direct marginal saving in transportation costs, since a change in rent caused 
by widening the road does not induce any change in consumption decision.  Second, 
the absolute level of the market rent is indeterminate as long as difference in rents at 
different locations is such that the utility levels are equal.  The second property 
mislead Solow and Vickrey (1971) and Kanemoto (1975) to conclude that the market 
rent is lower than the shadow rent everywhere in the city.  In this case, there is no need 
for a jump in the market rent to make the market rent equal to the rural rent at the edge 
of the city, since the level of the market rent is indeterminate.  This, coupled with the 
result that the slope of the shadow rent is steeper than that of the market rent, implies 
that the market rent is lower than the shadow rent everywhere in the city.  This result, 
however, is misleading since it does not carry over to the case where the elasticity is not 
zero even when the elasticity is extremely small. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  The model is set up in section 1.  Section 
2 is the largest section in this chapter and devoted to the case of a closed city.  The 
section is divided into three subsections: in subsection 2.1 the first order conditions for 
the second best optimum are derived and interpreted, in subsection 2.2 the benefit (the 
Traffic Congestion: Second Best 
 96
direct marginal saving in transportation costs) and cost (the market rent) of the naive 
benefit-cost criterion based on market prices are compared at the second best optimum, 
and in subsection 2.3 the case of completely inelastic demand for land is considered.  
An open city is analyzed in section 3, and an economy consisting of many cities in 
section 4. 
1.  The Model 
In this chapter we make the same technological assumptions as in Chapter IV.  
The only difference lies in the nature of the optimization problem: in this chapter 
congestion tolls are not allowed but the width of the road is optimized, whereas in the 
optimum city both congestion tolls and the width of the road could be chosen, and in the 
market city congestion tolls were not allowed and the road was built according to the 
erroneous benefit-cost criterion based on market prices. 
Since congestion tolls are not allowed, households pay the private (or average) 
transportation cost, )(xt , defined by (IV.1.6) and (IV.1.7): 
 )),(),(()( xLxTgxt T=¢     (1.1) 
 .0)0( =t         (1.2) 
If we denote the income of a household by y and the rent at x by )(xR , a 
household at x maximizes the utility function, )),(),(( xhxzu  under the budget 
constraint 
 ).()()()( xtxhxRxzy ++=      (1.3) 
Because of spatial arbitrage, the rent function, )(xR , must be such that the utility levels 
are equal everywhere in the city.  As in section I.1.1, all this information can be 
summarized in the bid rent function, 
 ),),(()( uxtyRxR -=  (1.4) 
which satisfies (I.1.14) and (I.1.15): 
 ),(/1)),(( xhuxtyRI =-  (1.5) 
 ),(/1)),(( xhvuxtyR IU -=-  (1.6) 
where u is the equal utility level.  Consumptions of the consumer good and housing are 
given by the compensated demand functions, 
 ),),(()( uxRzxz =  (1.7) 
 ),),(()( uxRhxh =           (1.8) 
which satisfy (I.1.19) and (I.1.20): 
 0)),(( ³uxRzR ,      (1.9) 
 0)),(( £uxRhR .      (1.10) 
The volume of traffic at x, )(xT , satisfies (IV.1.9) and (IV.1.10): 
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 [ ],),),((/)()( uuxtyRhxLxT H --=¢  (1.11) 
 .0)( =xT  (1.12) 
The widths of the residential area and the road must satisfy the land constraint (IV.1.1): 
 )()()( xxLxL TH q£+ . (1.13) 
2.  A Closed City  
In a closed city the population of the city is fixed, which yields the boundary 
condition (IV.2.1) for )(xT  at 0=x : 
 .)0( PT =  (2.1) 
Using (1.4), (1.7), (1.8) and a different representation of transportation costs (tN instead 
of Tg), we can rewrite the resource constraint (IV.2.2) as 
 .)}()(
]),),(([
)(]),),(([{
0
PwdxxRxL
uuxtyRh
xtuuxtyRzx
aH £+-
+-
ò q  (2.2) 
2.1.  Derivation and Interpretation of First Order Conditions 
In the second best problem the distortion of relative prices caused by the absence 
of congestion tolls is taken as given.  The bid rent function (1.4) and demand 
functions, (1.7) and (1.8), of the consumer good and land capture the response of 
households to this distortion.  Thus the second best problem maximizes the sum of 
utilities, (IV.2.3), 
 ò -
x H dx
uuxtyRh
xuL
0
,
]),),(([
)(  (2.3) 
under the constraints (1.1), (1.2), (1.11), (1.12), (1.13), (2.1), and (2.2).  There are two 
state variables in this problem: )(xt  and )(xT .  The control variables are )(xLH  
and ).(xLT   The control parameters are y, u, x , and )(xt . 
We assume that the market rent at the edge of the city, )(xR , is not restricted to 
equal the rural rent.  In this case, there is no constraint on )(xt .  The constraint on 
the market rent at the edge of the city does not cause any essential difference in the 
optimum allocation if we assume that transportation costs per mile become infinite, as 
the width of the road tends to zero.  Under this assumption it is possible to have the 
same allocation inside the city and at the same time to satisfy the constraint by causing a 
jump in the market rent.  Since the difference in allocation occurs only in an 
infinitesimal interval, this is possible without violating the resource constraint.  Thus 
the constraint on the market rent is superfluous. 
The Hamiltonian for the second best problem is 
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where )(xl , )(xh , and d  are respectively adjoint variables associated with (1.11), 
(1.1), and (2.2).  Forming the Lagrangian, 
  )]()()()[( xLxLxx TH --+F=Y qm , (2.5) 
where )(xm  is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (1.13), we obtain the 
following necessary conditions for the optimum: 
 ),()( TT LTgxT
hl =¢-=
¶
F¶ ,  (2.6) 
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where m  and d  satisfy 
 0)]()()()[( =-- xLxLxx THqm ,                     0)( ³xm  (2.10) 
 ò =++-
x
aH dxRTghzLPw 0 0}][{ qd ,                 0³d . (2.11) 
The transversality conditions for x , )(xt , u, and y are  
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h
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,     (2.12) 
 0)( =xh    (2.13) 
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tzu
0
0})]({[ ddl .        (2.15) 
For convenience, we divide the shadow prices, mhl ,, , and the utility, u, by d , 
and substitute the original notations for the variables obtained.  This operation converts 
the shadow prices from utility terms into pecuniary terms.  Substituting (2.8) into (2.7), 
and noting that the rent function and the compensated demand functions satisfy both 
(1.5) and 
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 0=+ RR zRh , 2  (2.16) 
we can rewrite (2.7) as 
 eN
R
R
Nx
-
--=¢-
m
h )( ,  (2.17) 
where e is the price (rent) elasticity of compensated demand for land defined by 
 0³-=
h
Rh
e R .    (2.18) 
The inequality is obtained because the substitution effect, Rh , is always nonpositive as 
in (1.10).  Notice that e is a function of R and u and hence in general varies over space. 
From (2.7), )(xh ¢-  can be interpreted as the social benefit of a unit increase of 
the commuting costs, )(xt , of residents living at x.  When )(xt  increases by one unit, 
the total commuting costs are paid by )(xN  households who are living at x.  This is 
represented by the first term on the RHS of (2.17).  In addition to this direct effect, the 
increase of )(xt  has a side effect on the consumption decisions of households.  The 
market rent, )(xR , must fall to compensate the increase of the commuting costs, )(xt , 
which induces a change in consumptions of housing and the consumer good.  The 
second term on the RHS of (2.17) captures this indirect effect. 
By the envelope property the second term vanishes when the social rent is equal to 
the market rent.  The envelope property, (2.16), insures that, in the neighborhood of 
the equilibrium (or optimal) point, the changes in consumptions of the two goods 
evaluated at market prices counteract each other.  In the first best world, therefore, 
where market prices reflect social va lues, the social cost of a unit increase of )(xt  is 
)(xN . 
There is another case where the second term vanishes.  When housing demand is 
completely price inelastic, 0=e , the change of the rent does not affect the 
consumption decision.  Therefore, there is no side effect even when the social rent is 
different from the market rent.  This is also a first best situation because the decisions 
of households are not affected by the existence of congestion and the first best solution 
can be attained without congestion tolls. 
(2.17) shows that the adjustment of consumption has a socially desirable effect if 
R is greater than m , which makes sense intuitively.  An increase in commuting costs, 
)(xt , lowers the market rent, )(xR .  When the market rent is higher than the social 
rent, a fall in the market rent brings it closer to the social rent, and the adjustment of 
                                                 
2 This can be shown as follows.  By the definition of compensated demand functions, ),( uRh  and 
),( uRz  must satisfy  
 [ ]),(),,( uRzuRhuu = , 
for any R.  Differentiating both sides with respect to R, we obtain 
 0=+ RzRh zuhu . 
Since Ruu zh = , this implies  
 0=+ RR zRh  . 
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consumption works in the socially desirable direction. 
Integrating (2.17) from x to x  and using the transversality condition (2.13), we 
obtain 
 ò ¢
-
--=
x
x
xeNd
R
R
Tx
m
h )( .   (2.19) 
Thus, )(xh-  is the social cost of increasing commuting costs of all households living 
between x and x  by one unit. 
Using this interpretation of )(xh , we can interpret )(xl ¢  in (2.6) as the social 
congestion cost due to a unit increase in traffic.  A unit increase in traffic between x 
and dxx +  causes more congestion there and raises transportation costs to pass 
through the ring by dxLTgT T ),( .  Since all households living beyond the ring must 
pass through the ring, the social cost of this increase in transportation costs is 
approximately dxxdxgx T )()( lh ¢=- . 
From (2.8) and the budget constraint (1.3), we have  
 
)(
)()()(
xh
xyu
xRx
l
m
--
+= , （2.20） 
where )(xm  is the shadow rent of land at x and the right hand side is the marginal 
value of land in residential use.  The shadow rent differs from the market rent, and 
hence from the marginal rate of substitution between housing and the consumer good.  
The difference is caused by the second term on the right side, which reflects the 
congestion costs. 
From (2.9) the shadow rent )(xm  also satisfies 
 ))(),(()()( xLxTgxx TLhm = .     (2.21) 
The right side can be interpreted as the social marginal value of land in transportation 
use.  A marginal increase of land allocated to roads lowers transportation costs at the 
radius.  The social value of this decrease is given by the right side of (2.21). 
From (2.6) and (2.21), we obtain 
 ][)( LTTT gLTgLTx +-=-¢ hml , 
where, as shown in subsection 2.1 of Chapter IV, the square bracket on the right side is 
negative if transportation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale and positive in 
the case of decreasing returns.  Since Lg  is negative and )(xm  is nonnegative, 
(2.21) implies that )(xh  is nonpositive.  Thus the following relationships hold 
between the total social congestion costs and the total shadow rent of roads at any 
radius: 
 
case. returns decreasing in the        
case returnsconstant  in the)()(
case returns increasing in the        
>
=¢
<
TLxTx ml  
  (2.22) 
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This result is more general than the condition obtained for the first best solution, where 
the relationship was expressed in terms of the actual congestion tolls and the road rent. 
Using (2.19), we can rewrite (2.21): 
 ò ¢
-
-=
x
xTL
xeNd
R
R
LTgxBx
m
m ),()()( ,     (2.23) 
where 
 ),()( TL LTTgxB -º    (2.24) 
is the marginal direct saving in transportation costs from widening the road as defined 
by (IV.2.20), and is sometimes called the market benefit.  The second term on the right 
of (2.23) represents the social cost of the adjustment in the consumption of land for 
housing, which is characteristic of the second best world. 
The naive benefit-cost criterion based on market prices cannot achieve the second 
best allocation of land.  Although the social marginal values of land in residential and 
transportation uses are equal at the second best optimum, the market rent of the 
residential land is not in general equal to the market benefit of the road, since the market 
values differ from the social values as shown in (2.20) and (2.23). 
It is easy to see that the transversality conditions, (2.12) and (2.13), imply that the 
shadow rent equals the rural rent at the edge of the city:3 
 aRx =)(m .       (2.25) 
The transversality condition, (2.15), can be written more simply: 
 ò =
-x
eNdx
R
R
0
0m .           (2.26) 
Though this equation is very important in deriving qualitative results (it is used in both 
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 below), it is difficult to provide an interesting interpretation.  
(2.14) can be simplified by using uncompensated demand functions for land and 
for the consumer good, ),(ˆ RIh  and ),(ˆ RIz , defined in (I.1.5) and (I.1.6) respectively.  
Compensated and uncompensated demand functions satisfy the following relationships 
derived in (3.14) and (3.16) of Appendix III. 
 IIu hvh ˆ=  
 IIu zvz ˆ=  
 IRR hhhh ˆˆ -= . 
From these equations and (I.1.9), (1.6), and (2.16), (2.14) can be written 
 [ ]òò --=ú
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h
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RNdx
v 00
ˆ11
m
d
.   (2.27) 
                                                 
3 In deriving this condition, we assumed that g is finite at  x .  It seems very unlikely that g  becomes 
infinite at x  because traffic is very light and available land is very large there. 
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This equation describes the relationship between the social value of the numeraire good 
)(d  in utility terms and the marginal utility of income )( Iv .  When there is no 
congestion, the right side vanishes and we obtain (I.2.23d) which says that the averages 
of reciprocals of these two are equal.  When the shadow rent is not equal to the market 
rent, the reciprocal averages differ by the term on the right. 
From (2.20) and (2.23), the benefit-cost criterion that must be used to achieve the 
second best allocation differs from the naive one adopted in the optimum and market 
cities.  Unfortunately, it is not easy to calculate the correct benefit and cost.  We can 
express the difference, )(xr , between the shadow rent, which represents the correct 
social cost, and the market rent by 
 [ ] )(/)()()()( xhxyuxRxxr lm --=-º .     (2.28) 
The difficulty is that the values of u and )(xl  are not directly observable.  The policy 
maker can, however, observe ),(),(),(),( xLxTxNxh T and )(xR  without too much 
difficulty, and can estimate, with some more difficulty, the compensated price elasticity, 
)(xe .  We therefore express )(xr  in terms of these variables.  From (2.6) and 
(2.19), )(xr  satisfies  
 )()()()( xhxrxhxr ¢+¢  
 ))(),(()()(
)(
)()( xLxTgxdxNxe
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xT TT
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+= ò , (2.29) 
and from (2.26), 
 ò =
x
dxxNxe
xR
xr
0
0)()(
)(
)( .      (2.30) 
The difference between the shadow rent and the market rent can be calculated by 
solving the differential equation (2.29) with the boundary condition (2.30).  Then the 
social marginal cost of widening the road is simply the sum of the difference, )(xr , and 
the market rent, )(xR .  Although it is not extremely difficult to solve the differential 
equation numerically in simple models like ours, the calculation is likely to be 
formidable in a more realistic model. 
Once the difference between the shadow rent and the market rent is obtained, the 
social benefit can be easily calculated from (2.23): 
 ò ¢¢¢¢
¢
-
x
xTL
xdxNxe
xR
xr
LTgxB )()(
)(
)(),()( . 
2.2.  Comparison of the Market Benefit and the Market Rent 
Having simplified and interpreted first order conditions, we can now proceed to 
examine the consequence of the benefit-cost analysis based on market prices.  Our 
ultimate goal is to compare the market benefit, )(xB , and the market rent, )(xR , at the 
second best optimum.  It is convenient to compare the social rent, )(xm  , with each of 
these first. 
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In this subsection we consider the case where compensated demand for land is not 
completely price inelastic: .0>e  
The social rent is equal to the market rent in the optimum city with optimal 
congestion tolls.  If, however, congestion t tolls are not levied, the market rent diverges 
from the social rent.  Since transportation costs are lower than they should be,  
 
 
Households tend to locate too far from the CBD.  People seeking land farther 
from the center bid up the rent at larger radii, and the market rent tends to be flatter than 
the social rent.  The following Theorem shows that the market rent crosses the  social 
rent at some intermediate radius, and that the social rent must be higher than the market 
rent inside the radius and lower outside the radius.  This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Theorem 1: If 0>e  for any radius, then there exists an xˆ  strictly between 0 and x  
)ˆ0( xx <<  such that )ˆ()ˆ( xRx =m , and 
 )()( xRx >m                 for   xx ˆ0 <£ , 
 )()( xRx <m                 for   xxx £<ˆ . 
 
Proof:  
From (2.26) and 0>e , it is impossible to have )()( xRx >m  for all x or 
)()( xRx <m  for all x.  Since both )(xm  and )(xR  are continuous, they must cross 
somewhere: there exists an xˆ , xx<< ˆ0 , where )ˆ()ˆ( xRx =m .  From (2.20), at this 
point )(xl  satisfies 
 yux -=)ˆ(l . 
From (2.6), (2.9), (2.10), (IV.1.3), and (IV.1.4), we obtain 
 0/)( >-=¢ LT ggx ml . 
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This inequality is strict at xˆ  since 0)ˆ()ˆ( >>= aRxRxm .  Hence we obtain the 
following inequalities: 
 yux -<)(l    xx ˆ<  
 yux ->)(l   xx <ˆ . 
From (2.20), these inequalities imply 
 )()( xRx >m   xx ˆ<  
 )()( xRx <m   xx <ˆ , 
which in turn implies that xˆ  must be strictly between 0 and xˆ  to satisfy (2.26). 
  Q.E.D. 
We next compare the market benefit and the social rent.  The next Theorem 
shows that they are equal at 0=x  and that the market benefit is greater than the social 
rent in the rest of the city.  Thus the market benefit overestimates the true social 
benefit.  This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The result can be understood intuitively as follows.  Recall that the difference 
between the market benefit and the social rent is the social value of the adjustment of 
consumptions in response to a decrease in transportation costs.  First, consider the 
social value of the adjustment caused by a transportation improvement at 0=x .  The 
improvement reduces commuting costs for all households by the same amount, which is 
equivalent to  
 
 
an increase in the income, y, of every household in the city.  Since y is optimally 
chosen, the change in the utility level caused by an infinitesimal increase in y is zero.  
The social value of the consumption adjustment is, therefore, zero for an improvement 
at 0=x . 
Next, consider an improvement at any radius x beyond xˆ  in Theorem 1.  This 
decreases commuting costs of households living farther than x and raises the market rent 
there.  Since the social rent is lower than the market rent beyond xˆ , this works in a 
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socially undesirable direction and causes a social loss.  Thus the social benefit (and 
hence the social rent) is less than the market benefit at any radius beyond xˆ . 
An improvement inside xˆ  benefits both households living outside xˆ  and inside 
xˆ .  The consumption adjustments of households outside xˆ  cause social losses for the 
same reason as above, but those of households inside xˆ  are socially beneficial since 
the social rent is higher than the market rent there.  The next Theorem shows, 
however, that the former is always greater than the latter except for an improvement at 
0=x  in which case the two are equal. 
 
Theorem 2: If 0>e  for any x, then we obtain 
 )0()0( B=m   
and 
 )()( xBx <m ,                for    xx<<0 . 
Proof:  
We first show that for any x strictly between 0 and x , 
 ò <¢
-x
x
xeNd
R
R 0m . 
For x greater than or equal to xˆ , this can be immediately obtained since 
)()( xRx <m  from Theorem 1.  For x less than xˆ  this is obtained from 
 òò <¢
-
-=¢
- xx
x
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R
xeNd
R
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0
.0mm  
Hence (2.23) yields 
 )()( xBx <m                       xx <<0 . 
At 0=x , the following equality is obtained: 
 ò
-
-=
x
TL eNdxR
R
LTgB
0
))0(),0(()0()0( mm  
 )0(B= , 
where the second equality is obtained from (2.26), since Lg  can be seen to be finite at 
0=x . 
At xx = , however Lg  becomes infinite and we must use L’Hôpital’s Rule to 
obtain 
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where the first equality is obtained from (2.9), the second equality by L’Hôpital’s Rule, 
the third equality from (2.17), and the inequality from aRxxR => )()( m  and the 
elementary result that the limit must be nonpositive when it is approached through 
nonpositive values.  From (2.23) this implies 
 )()( xBx <m  
  Q.E.D. 
 
Combining Theorems 1 and 2, we can immediately see that the market benefit is 
greater than the market rent near the center.  However, it is not clear whether or not 
this remains to be true when we move farther from the center.  The next proposition 
throws a light on this question. 
 
Proposition 1: If the compensated demand for land is not completely price inelastic 
)0( >e , then the market benefit is always greater than the market rent near the CBD. 
Near the edge of the city, however, the market benefit is smaller than the market rent if 
the price elasticity is less than one, and is greater than the market rent if the elasticity is 
greater than one. 
Proof:  
The first half is immediately obtained from Theorem 1 and 2. 
From the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain 
 )()()()( xBRRxRxBxR aa -+-=-  
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Noting that the denominator and the square bracket of the numerator are both positive, 
we get 
 )()( xBxR
<
>
=   where   1
<
>
=e . 
  Q.E.D. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the market benefit and the market rent 
in the case of price inelastic demand for land: the market benefit is greater than the 
market rent near the center of the city, but drops below it near the edge.  As a result, 
the naive benefit-cost criterion has a tendency to overinvest in roads near the center and 
to underinvest near the edge.  When demand for land is price elastic as in Figure 4, the 
benefit-cost criterion tends to overinvest in roads both near the center and near the edge 
of the city4. 
   
Since the Cobb-Douglas type utility function (IV.2.27) has the elasticity a-1 , 
which is always less than 1, there is a tendency in that case to overinvest in roads near 
the center and to underinvest near the edge. 
The conclusion depends on the elasticity of demand for land since difference 
between the market benefit and the social rent reflects the side effect due to the change 
of housing consumption, and the change of housing consumption is greater when the 
elasticity is bigger. 
Notice that since these results are valid only in the neighbourhood of the second 
best solution, we do not have a definite answer as to whether the second best solution 
has a wider road than the market solution. 
When the naive benefit-cost analysis based on market prices is adopted only in a 
small ring at x, and roads are built in other parts of the city to achieve the second best 
allocation, the above comparison between two equilibria is valid.  If, for example, the 
market benefit is greater than the market rent in the ring between x and dxx + , the 
naive criterion calls for the road to be widened until the marginal market benefit of 
further widening falls to the market rent.  When the ring is very narrow the market rent 
is not significantly affected by a change in road width there, and the preceding 
conclusions hold. 
If, however, the naive benefit-cost criterion is adopted in the entire city, this 
                                                 
4 Note that the case where )(xB  is lower than )(xR  somewhere in the middle of the city is not 
excluded. 
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argument cannot be applied because the market rent curve changes.  Widening of the 
road in the rest of the city might cause such a rise in market rent at some locations that, 
even though the market rent at the second-best allocation was below the market benefit, 
the road might become narrower as a result of changes elsewhere. 
Furthermore, since the market rent is higher than the rural rent at the edge of the 
city, the city tends to expand.  This causes another tendency toward overinvestment in 
roads.  The reader may think that this effect would not appear if the second best 
problem were solved with the additional constraint that the market rent equal the rural 
rent at the edge of the city.  In our model, however, under the reasonable assumption 
that transportation costs per mile, ),( TLTg , are infinite when the width of the road is 
zero, the constraint is superfluous and the effect does not disappear. 
The constraint on the market rent at the boundary,  
 aRuxtyR =- )),(( ,     (2.28) 
would restrict y, )(xt , and u to a hypersurface.  The optimum allocation for the 
problem with this additional constraint is essentially the same as that for the problem 
without the constraint: the allocation is exactly the same within the boundary x , and 
),( TLTg is made infinite at x  causing a jump in )(xt  of an appropriate size to satisfy 
the constraint (2.28).  Since the jump which occurs in an infinitesimally small interval 
does not involve a finite social cost, the same maximum without the constraint is 
attained.5 
Now, we briefly consider the possibility that )(xt  has jumps even without the 
constraint (2.28).  In such a case the usual maximum principle like the Theorem of 
Hestenes in Appendix IV cannot be applied since it assumes that state variables are 
continuous.  Kanemoto (1977b) analyzed the case by considering the problem with an 
upper bound on ),( TLTg  and letting the upper bound tend to infinity. 
The following argument shows that a jump in )(xt  is indeed possible.  Equation 
(2.21) suggests that )(xh  must be nonpositive, since )(xm  is nonnegative.  There is 
no guarantee, however, that )(xh  is nonpositive since )(xh  must also satisfy (2.19).  
If compensated demand for housing is sufficiently price elastic, the indirect benefit from 
increasing transportation costs (the second term on the right side of (2.19)) may 
overwhelm the direct cost (-T), in which case )(xh  becomes positive.  Then the 
necessary conditions for the optimum involve contradiction, which suggests that the 
maximum does not exist within the range of functions assumed by the maximum 
principle. 
In order to show that such a case can occur, we rewrite (2.19) as 
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5 It can be shown that, if g is infinite when TL  is zero, then a jump in )(xt  may occurs at x .  See 
Kanemoto (1977b).   Although the proof there has a minor error, the conclusion can be easily seen to be 
correct. 
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This equation shows that, if [ ]aRxRxRxe -> )(/)()( , )(xh  is positive near x .  In 
particular, if 0=aR  and 1)( >xe , then )(xh  is positive.  There certainly exists a 
well-behaved utility function whose compensated demand function is price elastic. 
In Kanemoto (1977b) it was shown that, if ),( TLTg  tends to infinity as traffic 
density, TLT , approaches infinity, a jump in )(xt  occurs at a point where )(xh  is 
positive.  Theorem 1 remains valid even when a jump occurs.  Theorem 2 and 
Proposition 1 are also valid if aR  and )(xR  are replaced by the left side limits, 
 )(
lim
)( x
xx
x mm
­
= , 
 )(
lim
)( xR
xx
xR
­
= . 
If g remains finite even when TLT  approaches infinity, TL  becomes zero for a 
finite length.  It can be easily seen that if the upper bound for g is sufficiently large, the 
same results are obtained. 
2.3.  Completely Price Inelastic Demand for Land 
Next, consider the case where the compensated demand for land is completely 
price inelastic: 0=e  for any u and R.  This case is obtained, for example, if the utility 
function is a Leontief type, so that land and the consumer good are always consumed in 
fixed proportions. 
As we mentioned in subsection 2.1, the side effect due to the adjustment of 
consumption decisions vanishes in this case, 
 )()( xTx -=h , 
and the market benefit coincides with the social rent, 
 )()( xBx =m ,            xx<<0 . 
Since (2.26) is satisfied at all levels of )(xR , the level of )(xR  is indeterminate.  
This can be understood as follows.  Suppose that the optimum is obtained by the rent 
function, )(* xR .  Consider the effect of raising the rent function by an arbitrary 
amount c everywhere in the city.  Since the utility level cannot be higher than the 
optimal level, if we can show that the optimal utility level is attained even when the 
market rent is cxR +)(* , we can conclude that the market rent is indeterminate at the 
optimum. 
When the utility level is given, the assumption of completely inelastic demand 
implies that lot sizes are constant regardless of the market rent.  This has two 
implications: the lot size is the same everywhere in the city, and it does not change 
when the rent profile rises to cxR +)(* .  In our model differential rent is returned to 
residents as an equal subsidy, so the income of households rises by ch*, where h* is the 
optimal lot size.  Households, therefore, can afford the optimal bundle at the higher 
rent level, and the optimum utility level is attained with the new market rent profile, 
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cxR +)(* .  The market rent is thus indeterminate if 0=e . 
One important implication of this indeterminacy is that the optimal solution can 
be achieved without having a jump in the rent function even if we add the constraint 
that the market rent be equal to the rural rent at the boundary.  After solving for the 
optimal allocation without the constraint, we simply lower the market rent curve until 
the rent at the boundary equals the rural rent.  This observation yields the following 
proposition which is the result obtained by Solow and Vickrey (1971), and Kanemoto 
(1975). 
 
Proposition 2: If the compensated demand for land is completely price inelastic, and if 
the market rent equals the rural rent at the edge of the city, then at the optimum the 
market benefit equals the market rent at the edge of the city and is greater in the rest of 
the city. 
 
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 5.  Note that the second best optimum 
coincides with the first best optimum, since, when demand for land is completely price 
inelastic, the only difference between them is the market rent that does not affect 
consumption decisions of households. 
 
The proposition suggests that there is a strong tendency towards overinvestment  
in roads when 0=e .  Considering the results obtained in the preceding section,  
however, the proposition is somewhat misleading.  As long as compensated demand 
for land is not completely price inelastic, the market rent is not indeterminate and we 
obtain a situation like the one depicted in Figure 1, where the social rent is higher than 
the market rent near the center and lower near the edge.  Although the market benefit 
approaches the social rent as the elasticity tends to zero, the relationship between the 
market rent and the social rent remains basically the same as long as the elasticity is 
positive, since (2.26) is effective even when the elasticity is very small.  How the 
relationship among the market rent, the social rent, and the market benefit changes as 
the elasticity becomes smaller is illustrated in Figure 6.  If the elasticity is greater than 
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1, the market benefit is greater than the market rent at the edge of the city, as in Figure 
6a (which reproduces Figure 4).  If the elasticity is between 0 and 1, the market benefit 
falls below the market rent but is still higher than the social rent at xx = , as in Figure 
6b (or Figure 3).  As the elasticity approaches zero, the market benefit tends to the 
social rent, but the market rent remains higher than the social rent at xx = .  In the 
limit we obtain the case, depicted in Figure 6c, in which the market benefit is less than 
the market rent near the edge of the city.  Thus Figure 5 and hence Proposition 2 
cannot approximate the case where the elasticity is close to, but not exactly, zero. 
 
 
 
The conclusion that the naive benefit-cost criterion has a tendency toward 
overinvestment is nevertheless correct, since the market city has a wider road than the 
optimum city, as shown in Kanemoto (1975).  The main reason is that at the second 
best optimum the market rent is higher than the rural rent at the edge of the city.  This 
tends to make the market city larger than the second best city.  In the models in Solow 
and Vickrey (1971) and Kanemoto (1975), where a fixed amount of land is required for 
nontransportation use, the city can grow only if the road is widened. 
3.  An Open City 
Next, consider an open and small city in which the utility level is given from 
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outside: uu = .  This time we consider the, absentee- landlord case.  The income of a 
household is given by the value of marginal productivity of labour: wy = .  These   
two conditions replace the population constraint (2.1) and the resource constraint (2.2) 
in a closed city.   
The bid rent function (1.4) and the compensated demand functions, (1.7) and 
(1.8), become   
 )),(()( uxtwRxR -= ,  (3.1) 
 )),(()( uxRzxz = , (3.2) 
 )),(()( uxRhxh = . (3.3) 
The net product of the city after the cost of maintaining the given utility level of 
residents, 
 [ ]{ }ò ---
x
a dxxRxNxtxzw0 )()()()( q ,    (3.4) 
is maximized.  The Hamiltonian and the Lagrangian for this problem are 
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and 
 [ ])()()()( xLxLxx TH-+F=Y qm ,  (3.6) 
where )(xl  and )(xh  are respectively the adjoint variables associated with (1.11) 
and (1.1), and )(xm  is a Lagrange multiplier for (1.13). 
The control variables are )(xLH  and )(xLT , and the control parameters are x , 
)(xt  and )0(T .  We assume that a city planner can determine the boundary of the city 
regardless of the level of the market rent there.  Under this assumption there is no 
constraint on )(xt . 
The first order conditions are 
 )(/)()()( xhxxRx lm -= ,    (3.7) 
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m ),()()( ,    (3.8) 
 LT ggx ¢-=¢ /)( ml     (3.9) 
 0)0( =l ,   (3.10) 
 aRx =)(m ,   (3.11) 
where )(xB  is defined by (2.24), )(xm  satisfies (2.10), and e is the price elasticity of 
compensated demand for land as defined by (2.18).  These conditions are similar to 
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those obtained for a closed city and have similar interpretations.6 
Calculations of the correct benefit and cost are the same as in the closed city 
except for the boundary conditions.  From (3.7) through (3.10), the difference between 
the shadow rent and the market rent, )(xr , satisfies the differential equation 
 ),()/()()()()( TLTTgxeNdRrTxhxrxhxr
x
x úû
ù
êë
é ¢+=¢+¢ ò ,      (3.12) 
with the boundary condition 
 .0)0( =r  
When this differential equation is solved, the social marginal cost of the road is given 
by )()( xRxr + , and the social marginal benefit is 
 ò ¢-
x
xL
xeNdRrgxB )/()( . 
Next, we compare the market benefit, )(xB , and the market rent, )(xR , at the 
second best optimum to see whether the naive benefit-cost criterion results in 
overinvestment in roads.  In order to do so, we first compare the market rent, )(xR , 
and the social rent, )(xm .  Since congestion tolls are not imposed, the social 
transportation costs are greater than the private trans-portation costs.  The social rent, 
therefore, tends to be steeper than the market rent.  In the open city, however, both 
rents   are equal at the center by the transversality condition (3.10).  Thus the social 
rent is lower than the market rent everywhere   in the city except at the center where 
they are equal, and the following theorem is obtained.   
 
Theorem 3:  
 )0()0( R=m , 
and 
 )()( xRx <m ,                       xx<<0 . 
 
We omit the proof, which is quite simple.  Notice that this theorem holds even if 
the compensated demand for land is completely price inelastic. 
Next, we compare the market benefit and the social rent.  The market benefit 
differs from the social rent by the indirect effect through consumption decisions.  A 
reduction in transportation costs at a radius has a tendency to raise the market rent 
beyond that radius.  Since, by Theorem 3, the market rent is higher than the social rent, 
raising the market rent increases the gap.  The indirect effect of a reduction in 
transportation costs thus causes a social loss, and the social benefit is smaller than the 
                                                 
6 As in the closed city, )(xh  may become positive, and a jump in )(xt  may occur.  However, the 
following theorems and proposition hold even if )(xt  has a jump. 
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market benefit. 
 
Theorem 4: If e > 0 for all x, then 
 )()( xBx <m ,                      xx<<0 . 
 
For xx < , the Theorem is immediately obtained from (3.8) and Theorem 3.  At 
xx = , spitaloHL '' )  rule yields the inequality as in the proof of Theorem 2. 
The above two theorems show that the market benefit is greater than the market 
rent at least near the center.  The naive benefit-cost analysis, therefore, has a tendency 
to overinvest in roads near the center.  The following proposition shows that this 
pattern is reversed near the edge of the city if the elasticity of demand for land is less 
than one. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose the compensated demand for land is not completely price 
inelastic.  Then the market benefit is greater than the market rent near the center.  If, 
further, the price elasticity of compensated demand for land is less (greater) than one, 
the market benefit is smaller (greater) than the market rent near the edge of the city. 
 
The proof is the same as that of Proposition 1.  Figure 7 depicts the case of 
inelastic demand.  Figure 8 the case of elastic demand.  Notice that relative positions 
of the market benefit and the market rent are the same as in a closed city though their 
relationships with the social rent are different. 
 
 
 
In a closed city the market benefit equaled the social rent at the center, but in an open 
city the market benefit exceeds the social rent  everywhere.  In a closed city the market 
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rent crossed the social rent at some intermediate point, while in an open city the market 
rent is equal to the social rent at the center. 
 
 
When compensated demand for land is  completely price inelastic, the second term 
on the RHS of (3.8) vanishes.  The market benefit, therefore, coincides with the social 
rent and we obtain the following proposition which is illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Proposition 4: If compensated demand for land is completely price inelastic, then the 
market benefit is equal to the market rent at the center and is smaller than the market 
rent in the rest of the city. 
 
Thus, in sharp contrast to Proposition 2 in a closed city, there is a tendency to 
underinvest in roads everywhere in the city.  Since the market rent is higher than the 
rural rent at the edge of the city, however, the market city tends to be bigger than the 
optimum city.  This increases the total population of the city and hence the total traffic, 
which works in the direction of widening the road.  In Kanemoto (1975), the road is 
shown to be wider in the market city than in the optimum city. 
 
4.  An Economy with Many Cities 
In this section we consider an economy consisting of many cities.  The model is 
the same as that in section 4 of the preceding chapter.  The population constraint is 
 cnPP ¢=       (4.1) 
where P, cP , and n are respectively the population of the economy, the population of a 
city, and the number of cities.  The resource constraint is 
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q .   (4.2) 
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The aggregate production function, )( cPF , has increasing returns to scale.  The 
boundary condition for )(xT  at 0=x  is 
 cPT =)0( .         (4.3) 
The common utility level is maximized under the constraints (1.1), (1.2), (1.11), 
(1.12), (1.13), (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3).  The control variables are )(xLH  and )(xLT , 
and the control parameters are cP , n, y, u, x , and )(xt .  The Hamiltonian for this 
problem is 
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and the Lagrangian is 
[ ])()()()( xLxLxx TH --+F=Y qm ,      (4.5) 
where )(xl , )(xh , and d  are adjoint variables associated with (1.11), (1.1), and 
(4.2) respectively, and )(xm  is a Lagrange multiplier for (1.13). 
After dividing )0()( ll -x , )(xh , and )(xm  by d  and denoting the obtained 
variables by )(xl , )(xh , and )(xm  respectively, the first order conditions become 
(2.19), (2.23), (2.25), (2.26), 
and  
ò ¢¢¢¢-=
x
TT xdxLxTgxx 0 ))(),(()()( hl ,      (4.6) 
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(4.6), (4.7), and (4.8) correspond to (2.6), (2.20), and (2.27).  As before, )(xh-  is the 
social cost of increasing commuting costs of all households passing through x by one 
unit.  Tgx)(h-  is, therefore, the social cost of an increase in congestion caused by a 
unit increase in the traffic at x, and )(xl  is the social congestion costs that a resident 
at x imposes on other travelers by commuting from x to the center. 
Multiplying (4.7) by )()( xNxh  and integrating from 0 to x  yields 
 [ ]ò +++=¢
x
Hcc dxLNNtzPFP 0 )()( ml . 
Comparing this equation with the resource constraint (4.2) and noting that the resource 
constraint holds with equality at the optimum, we obtain 
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 [ ] [ ]ò -+=¢--
x
aHccc dxRLNPFPPF 0)()( qml .  (4.9) 
Thus the operating loss of a producer at the optimum equals the total social congestion 
costs, plus the total social rent of residential land, minus the total payment of the rural 
rent.  This is similar to the result obtained in the previous chapter: the operating loss of 
a firm equals the total congestion tolls, plus the total rent of residential land, minus the 
total payment of the rural rent.  The difference is that there are no tolls capturing the 
social congestion costs in this chapter and the social rent does not equal the market rent.  
It is quite natural that the same relationship holds for social values instead of market 
values. 
As shown in subsection 2.1, if we assume constant returns to scale in 
transportation technology, the social congestion costs equal the total shadow rent of 
roads at each radius: 
 )()()()( xLxxTx Tml =¢ ,               xx<<0 . 
Then by integration by parts, (4.9) becomes 
 [ ] [ ]ò -=¢--
x
accc dxxRxPFPPF 0 )()()()( qm .   (4.10) 
This is again similar to the relationship obtained in Chapter IV.  The operating loss of 
a producer equals the difference between the total social rent and the total payment of 
the rural rent, where the total social rent includes the rent on the road.  Note that this 
relationship does not in general hold for the market rent, since (2.26) requires that the 
sums of the market and social rents be equal when they are weighted by eN/R which 
equals )(xq  only by chance. 
It is easy to see that the social benefit and cost can be calculated exactly in the 
same way as in the closed city.  The relationships among the social rent, the market 
rent, and the market benefit are also the same as in the closed city. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The analysis in this and the preceding chapters are centered on the interaction 
between pricing of traffic congestion and the investment decision of roads.  If 
congestion is optimally priced, the investment decision is quite straightforward.  The 
allocation of land between roads and residence must be determined in such a way that 
the marginal social benefits of widening the road equals the marginal social cost at each 
radius.  The marginal social benefit at a radius is simply the marginal direct saving in 
transportation costs with the volume of traffic there fixed; the marginal social cost is the 
market rent of the residential land. 
This simplicity in the benefit-cost criterion is the general property of the first best 
world where all goods are priced properly.  Since all prices reflect the true social 
marginal values of the goods, prices may stand in for social values in the calculation of 
benefits and costs.  Thus the marginal social cost of widening the road is given by the 
market rent in our model. 
The fact that all prices reflect the social marginal values has another important 
implication.  When the road is widened, commuting costs decrease and hence the land 
Traffic Congestion: Second Best 
 118
rent rises.  This induces a change in the allocation of the entire city through a change 
in the consumption bundles of households.  The change however, can be ignored in the 
calculation of the marginal benefit and cost.  The reason is that the social values of the 
induced change is zero, since the market value of the induced change is zero due to the 
envelope property, and the market value equals the social value when all prices equal 
the social marginal values.  This is the reason why the marginal social benefit equals 
the marginal direct saving in transportation costs with the fixed traffic volume. 
The simplicity disappears if traffic congestion is not properly priced.  Prices no 
longer reflect the marginal social values of goods accurately, and in particular, the 
market rent does not equal the social marginal value of residential land.  Accordingly, 
the cost side of the benefit-cost criterion must be changed.  The benefit side also 
becomes more complicated since the induced change in the consumption decisions has a 
nonzero social value or loss.  The naive benefit-cost analysis usually adopted by policy 
makers, therefore, gives rise to an inefficient land use. 
Unfortunately, the correct benefit-cost criterion is difficult to calculate.  
Furthermore, boundary conditions that must be used to calculate the benefit-cost 
criterion are different between closed and open cities.  The correct benefit cost 
criterion is, therefore, unlikely to be practical, at least until we know more.  
Meanwhile, it would be useful to know whether the naive benefit-cost analysis leads to 
too wide a road. 
The results in Chapter IV suggest that the road in the city with the naive 
benefit-cost analysis is usually wider than that it in the first best optimum where 
congestion tolls are levied and roads are optimally built.  This comparison, however, 
may not be useful, since it is difficult to levy congestion tolls because of very high 
administrative costs.  The analysis in this chapter is a partial attempt at the comparison 
with the second best optimum in which roads are built optimally under the cons traint 
that congestion tolls are impossible.  We compared the benefit and the cost in the 
erroneous benefit-cost criterion at the second best optimum and showed that the benefit 
exceeds the cost near the center and that the benefit exceeds the cost also near the edge 
in the case of price elastic demand for land and is less than the cost in the price inelastic 
case.  This implies that, if the erroneous benefit-cost criterion is adopted only in a very 
narrow ring near the center, overinvestment in roads will result.  If it is adopted near 
the edge underinvestment will result in the inelastic case and overinvestment in the 
elastic case. 
Unfortunately, the analysis is not conclusive if the erroneous benefit-cost criterion 
is adopted everywhere in the city.  It seems, however, more likely that the naive 
benefit-cost criterion leads to overinvestment in roads.  The major reason is that the 
market rent is higher than the rural rent at the second best optimum and the market city 
with the benefit-cost criterion tends to be bigger, which is made possible only by 
building wider roads and lowering commuting costs.  The results obtained in 
somewhat different models by Wheaton (1978), Pines and Sadka (1979), and Wan 
(1979) also support this conjecture. 
Notes 
The analysis in this chapter originates in Solow and Vickrey (1971).  They 
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formulated a transportation cost minimization problem in a long narrow city framework 
and asked the question whether or not the cost-benefit analysis based on the market rent 
yields too wide a road.  To see this, they compared the benefit from widening the road 
with the market rent at the optimum configuration. 
They, in effect, made the following three assumptions.  First, the city was 
assumed to be closed in the sense that the total production (or the total population when 
interpreted as a residential model) in the city was fixed.  Second, they assumed that 
only production required land, that production required only land, and that the price 
elasticity of demand for land was zero so that demand for space was not affected by the 
level of land rent.  Third, the market rent was constrained to be equal to the rural rent 
(in their case, zero rent) at the boundary of the city.  Their model, therefore, 
corresponds to the case of subsection 2.3 in this chapter.  Naturally, they obtained 
exactly the same conclusion as in Proposition 2 - that the benefit is greater than the 
market rent everywhere in the city - and concluded that the cost-benefit analysis based 
on market rent has a tendency to overinvest in roads. 
Kanemoto (1975) introduced an open city facing a given export price, and 
compared it with a closed city.  The model is essentially the same as the 
completely-price- inelastic case of the open city in this chapter.  The relationship 
between the market benefit and the market rent at the optimum allocation of land is the 
same as that in Proposition 4. 
Since these models assume completely price inelastic demand for land, the first 
best allocation coincides with the second best allocation.  The second best allocation 
differs from the first best allocation if substitution between land and other goods is 
possible.  Solow (1975) first considered this type of a second best problem in a spatial 
equilibrium framework.  He maximized the utility level of households within the class 
of linear road width functions in a closed city.  According to his numerical 
calculations, the market benefit from widening the road is greater than the market rent.  
He explained this result as follows.  Since congestion tolls are not levied, the market 
rent is flatter than the social rent.  But the two rents are equal to the rural rent at the 
edge of the city.  The market rent is therefore lower than the social rent, and the value 
of land is underestimated in the naive cost-benefit calculations. 
Our analysis indicates that this explanation fails to notice the following two 
aspects of the second best allocation.  First, though the social rent is steeper than the 
market rent, the two are not in general equal at the edge of the city.  Our analysis 
shows that the market rent is higher than the social rent at the edge of the city.  
Second, the market benefit from widening the road does not correctly reflect the social 
benefit.  The market benefit is greater than the social benefit because the adjustment of 
consumption caused by a decrease in transportation costs involves social costs when 
congestion tolls are not levied. 
Kanemoto (1976) considered a production city with substitutability between 
labour and land in an open city framework.  The results are parallel to those in section 
3.  The analysis of a closed city is based on Kanemoto (1977a). 
Wheaton (1978) considered a similar problem in a nonspatial framework with 
more than one type of roads.  He also analyzed the problem of finding the optimal 
uniform congestion tax which is constrained to have the same tax rate on all roads 
regardless of different degrees of congestion. 
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Arnott (1979) extended our analysis to the case where the road is of arbitrary 
width.  Arnott and MacKinnon (1978) obtained the numerical solution of using the 
fixed point algorithm.  Wan (1979) applied the perturbation method to the second best 
problem and also obtained numerical solutions. 
Pines and Sadka (1979) considered a discrete model in which a city is divided into 
two rings.  Assuming that the areas of the two rings are fixed, they showed that there is 
more investment in roads in the market city with the naive benefit-cost analysis than in 
the second best city. 
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CHAPTER VI 
NEIGHBOURHOOD EXTERNALITIES AND A 
CUMULATIVE DECAY PROCESS 
 
Whether we like it or not, people often believe they suffer external costs from the 
presence of some other type of people in their neighbourhood: the rich may fear heavier 
taxes if poorer households live in the same municipality; whites may not like to live 
close to blacks; Greeks may believe that their daughters are not safe if there are too 
many scots in a neighbourhood; and so on.  Whether real or imaginary, such 
externalities raise many issues, some of which are more political or moral than 
economic.  One of the fundamental issues that arise in the context of externalities 
between different races is whether we approve preferences of individuals who are 
racially prejudiced: some societies do not, and force individuals to act against their 
preferences.  A typical example is the "busing" regulation in American cities, where 
school children in a racially segregated area are "bused" to a school at a distant location 
in order to have racially mixed schools. 
Although these issues are extremely important, we concentrate on the economic 
consequences of the externalities and avoid moral or political judgements.  We also 
restrict ourselves to what might be termed passive discrimination: the well being of 
discriminators is affected by the locational decisions of others, but discriminators are 
unable to influence the decisions  of others.  The reader must be aware that the 
problem analyzed in this chapter has other important aspects. 
We first examine the stability of spatial residential patterns.  We find that 
externalities introduce a tendency toward segregation by type: individuals who suffer an 
externality from the presence of individuals of another group tend to cluster together to 
avoid the externality. 
We next consider a special kind of a dynamic problem which arises in a city with 
externalities between different types of households.  This analysis is motivated by the 
experience of American cities in 1960's and 70's.  American cities have experienced 
extensive migration of the middle class households from central cities to the suburbs.  
Explanations of this phenomenon can be roughly classified into the following two types.  
The first type sees the migration as an equilibrium process.  As the income level rises 
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and commuting costs fall due to technological progress in transportation, the population 
density gradient becomes flatter in equilibrium.  The population in the suburbs, 
therefore, increases relative to that in central cities.  The population increase in the 
suburbs consists of wealthier families because, for a variety of reasons, richer families 
have a tendency to live farther from the center.1 
The second type focuses on the deterioration of central cities that accompanied the 
out-migration of the middle class.  This type explains the process as one of cumulative 
decay: the deterioration of central cities drives out wealthier residents and so lowers per 
capita income, and the reduction of per capita income leads to further deterioration.  
The central city deteriorates cumulatively until it eventually reaches a new equilibrium 
state.  The process of middle class out-migration is thus viewed as a disequilibrium 
rather than equilibrium process. 
In our treatment the decay process appears as a problem of the stability of the 
boundary between rings of different types of households.  When the previously stable 
boundary becomes unstable as a result of a change in some exogenous factor, a rapid 
movement of the boundary occurs.  The shift to a new stable equilibrium can be 
interpreted as the cumulative decay process: an increase of one type of households 
increases the external costs for the other type, causing them to move away and inducing 
a further increase of the first type. 
In section 1 we formulate a model with two types of households, one of which 
receives a higher income than the other, and also suffer an external cost from the 
presence of the other.  Set up this way, the model can be used to explore the spatial 
behaviour of 'rich' and 'poor'.  Stability of different spatial patterns is examined in 
section 2.  In section 3 we analyze stability of the boundary between the two types, 
allowing for migration into and out of the city.  The possibility of a cumulative process 
is considered in section 4 and several examples are examined in section 5. 
1.  The Model 
Consider a single-centered city whose residents consist of two types of 
households that we can call discriminators and nondiscriminators.  Discriminators 
suffer external diseconomy if they live close to nondiscriminators. 
                                                 
1 For example, since there are more newer houses in the suburbs, the quality of housing is better in the 
suburbs.  A trade-off between commuting costs and housing also works in favour of the suburban 
locations of richer households, as seen in Chapter I . 
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In contrast to our method in previous chapters, we assume that the city stands 
ready built: houses with certain qualities and lot sizes are already built in the city and 
the characteristics of houses do not change during the time interval relevant to our 
analysis. 
It is not difficult to relax this assumption and consider the case of malleable 
housing capital: although the analysis becomes quite tedious, the results are basically 
the same.  The present formulation is preferable because housing capital is in fact quite 
durable and we are concerned with short-run phenomena.  The only serious problem 
arises at the boundary of the city, where new houses must be built when the city 
expands.  Since we assume that houses are readily available even outside the current 
boundary of the residential zone, the expansion of the boundary occurs instantaneously 
in our model.  In reality, however, new construction takes time and our results should 
not be taken too literally.  We discuss the problem in the end of section 4. 
)(xh  denotes the services provided by a house and lot at distance x from the 
center.  Since houses are usually larger farther from the center, 
  .0)( >¢ xh         (1.1) 
Note that in this chapter )(xh  denotes the services from both land and buildings, rather 
than the lot size as in previous chapters.   
There are )(xN dx houses in the ring between x and dxx + , where we assume 
that )(xN  does not decrease as distance from the center increases: 
  .0)( >¢ xN     (1.2) 
This assumption requires that the width of the residential zone, )(xLH , increases faster 
than the lot size with distance from the center.  It precludes the case of a linear city 
when the lot size increases with distance. 
The opportunity cost of a unit of housing services is assumed to be a constant aR .  
In equilibrium the rent at the edge of the city must equal aR : 
  aRxR =)( .    (1.3) 
Since we assumed that ready-built houses are standing outside the edge of the city, we 
may take aR  equal to zero.  In order to include other possibilities, however, we do 
not specify the value of aR  in the following analysis. 
We want to know how the two groups of households distribute themselves over 
the ready-built houses when there is externality between the two groups.  For the sake 
of simplicity, we analyze an externality that operates in only one direction.  
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Discrimination may in fact be extremely complex, but this assumption leads to useful 
insights about the effect of discrimination on city form.  The discriminators, denoted 
by superscript d, suffers external diseconomies from the presence of nondiscriminators, 
denoted by superscript n: the nondiscriminators do not experience any externality.  
Thus the utility function of a discriminator at x is 
  ))(),(),(( xAxhxzu dd ,  (1.4) 
where )(xA  denotes the external diseconomy suffered by the discriminator as a result 
of living near nondiscriminators, and )(xz d  is the consumption of the consumer good.  
A nondiscriminator at x has a utility function with no externality term: 
  ))(),(( xhxzu nn .    (1.5) 
We assume positive marginal utilities of the consumer good and housing for both, and a 
negative marginal utility of the externality for the discriminator: 
  0),,( >Ahzu ddz ,  0),,( >Ahzu
dd
h ,        (1.6) 
  0),( >hzu nnz ,    ,0),( >hzu
nn
h        (1.7) 
  0),,( <Ahzu ddA ,                     (1.8) 
where the subscripts z, h, and A denote partial derivatives. 
The externality given by a nondiscriminator living at x' to a discriminator at x is 
)( xxa ¢- .  The function a ( ) is nonnegative and nonincreasing, 
  0)( ³¢- xxa ,      (1.9) 
  0)( £¢-¢ xxa ,     (1.10) 
and xx ¢- is the absolute value of xx ¢- .  The total external diseconomies received 
by a discriminator at x is the sum of diseconomies generated by all nondiscriminators: 
  ò
¥
¢¢¢-=
0
)()()( xdxNxxaxA n ,       (1.11) 
where xdxN n ¢¢)(  is the population of nondiscriminators between x¢  and xdx ¢+¢ .  If 
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we imagine that the residential zone is circular, (1.11) implies that a nondiscriminator at 
the same radius, but on the opposite side of the city, induces a larger externality than 
one very near by but at a slightly different radius.  Although this oddity disappears in a 
linear city, it may affect the generality of the results that follow. 
We can now analyze the city forms arising from discrimination if we specify the 
budget constraints of discriminators and  nondiscriminators.  Choosing the case which 
is most common, and probably therefore most interesting, we assume that 
discriminators are richer than nondiscriminators.  A rich discriminator earns an income 
dy  and pays the commuting costs )(xt d .  The budget constraint is 
  )()()()( xtxhxRxzy ddd ++= ,       (1.12) 
where )(xR  is the rent of a unit amount of housing services at x.  A poorer 
nondiscriminator earns a lower income ny  and pays lower commuting costs )(xt n : 
  nd yy >       (1.13) 
  )(')(' xtxt nd > ,   xx ££0 , (1.14) 
  0)0()0( == nd tt .         (1.15) 
Lower commuting costs for a nondiscriminator may be considered as representing lower 
time costs.  Introducing different transportation costs complicates the analysis slightly, 
as the discussion of the assumption expressed by equation (1.30) below shows.  There 
are, however, gains in realism and in generality which compensate for the additional 
complexity.  The budget constraint for a nondiscriminator is 
  )()()()( xtxhxRxzy nnn ++= .         (1.16) 
We assume that neither a discriminator nor a nondiscriminator owns a house in 
the city.  Our model, therefore, corresponds to the absentee- landlord case in Chapter I, 
with landlords that do not discriminate. 
By spatial arbitrage, all households in each group receive equal utility levels in 
equilibrium: 
  ))(),(),(( xAxhxzuu ddd = ,     (1.17) 
  ))(),(( xhxzuu nnn = .  (l.18) 
By the assumption of positive marginal utilities, (1.6) and (1.7), these equations can be 
uniquely solved for dz  and dz  to obtain demand functions for the consumer good, 
  ))(,),(()( xAuxhzxz ddd = ,                 (1.19) 
  )),(()( nnn uxhzxz = ,      (1.20) 
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where 
  0/))(,),(( <-= dz
d
h
dd
h zuxAuxhz ,        (1.21) 
  0/1))(,),(( >= dz
dd
u uxAuxhz ,            (1.22) 
  0/))(,),(( >-= dz
d
A
dd
A uuxAuxhz ,          (1.23) 
and 
  0/)),(( <-= nz
n
h
nn
h uuuxhz ,      (1.24) 
  0/1)),(( >= nz
nn
n uuxhz .  (1.25) 
Substituting (1.19) and (1.20) into (1.12) and (1.16) respectively, we obtain the 
bid rent functions: 
  )]())(,),(([
)(
1)( xtxAuxhzy
xh
xR ddddd --=  
  )](),(,),([ xAxhuxIR dddº ,       (1.26) 
  )]()),(([
)(
1)( xtuxhzy
xh
xR nnnnn --=  
  )](,),([ xhuxIR nnnº ,   (1.27) 
where 
  )()( xtyxI ddd -º ,   (1.28) 
  )()( xtyxI nnn -º . (1.29) 
The bid rent functions in this chapter are slightly different from those in other chapters, 
since )(xh  appears in the bid rent functions.  A household must take the amount of 
housing services as given and the only va riable a household can choose is the location 
of a house.  It is important to notice that this implies the marginal rate of substitution 
between housing and the consumer good need not equal the bid rent. 
Since the externality )(xA  depends on how the nondiscriminators are distributed 
over space, we must know the locational patterns of the nondiscriminators to obtain the 
bid rent of the discriminator.  The bid rent function of the discriminators, however, 
influences the spatial distribution of the nondiscriminators.  This spatial 
interrelationship is the only complication in our model. 
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The following assumption plays a crucial role in determining the stable residential 
pattern:  
  )()),(()(')()(' xhuxhzxtxhRxIR nnh
nn
h
nn
I ¢+=¢+  
  )('))(,),(()(' xhxAuxhzxt ddh
d +<  
  )()(' xhRxIR dh
dd
I ¢+= ,        (1.30) 
for any relevant range of x, A, du , and nu .  This assumption is made to ensure that, if 
the rich did not discriminate, they would have a flatter bid rent curve and live farther 
from the center than the poor, as in Chapter I. 
From (1.21) and (1.24), we can rewrite (1.30) as 
  
))(),((
))(),((
))(),(),((
))(),(),((
xhxzu
xhxzu
xAxhxzu
xAxhxzu
nn
z
nn
h
dd
z
dd
h -  
  0)](')('[
)(
1
>-
¢
> xtxt
xh
nd ,    (1.31) 
where the last inequality is obtained from (1.14).  The condition can now be 
interpreted in terms of two opposing forces.  First, since discriminators have higher 
transportation costs, they tend to live closer to the center.  Second, if they have a 
higher marginal rate of substitution between housing and the consumer good than 
nondiscriminators - if they are willing to give up more of the consumer good for a 
marginal increase in housing services -, then there is an opposing tendency for 
discriminators to live in larger houses farther from the center of the city.  Our 
assumption requires that the latter tendency overwhelm the former. 
The difference between the marginal rates of substitution between housing and the 
consumer good is closely related to the normality of housing.  Roughly speaking, 
condition (1.31) is satisfied if housing is a normal good and the normality is strong 
enough to offset the greater transportation costs of discriminators.2 
                                                 
2 This statement is precisely true if we assume a utility function which is separable and can be written 
).),,((),,( AhzuUAhzu dndd =  
Given the above functional form, a discriminator has exactly the same preferences over housing and the 
consumer good as a nondiscriminator, and the preferences are not affected by the externality.  Consider 
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2.  Stability of Spatial Patterns 
In the absence of externalities, assumption (1.30) assures that the bid rent of the 
rich will be flatter than that of the poor, and the poor therefore live closer to the center 
of the city.  It can be shown that when the rich suffer external diseconomies, the 
pattern is unaffected if the number of housesper unit distance is constant.  This 
qualification is required because our externality function (1.11) employs only radial 
distances.  If the number of houses per unit distance increases with distance, the 
assumption (1.30) must be strengthened. 
When the number of houses per unit distance is constant, 
  0)( =¢ xN  ,                     xx<<0 .    (2.1) 
We assume there is no active discrimination in the housing market: neither 
discriminators nor landlords try to influence where nondiscriminators live. 
To see that only the central location of nondiscriminators is stable, we examine 
each of the possible configurations.  The pattern where both the rich discriminators 
and the poor discriminators live at a same distance from the center is unstable.  
                                                                                                                                               
a hypothetical problem of choosing both h and z under the budget constraint, RhzI += .  Because of the 
separability, the choice of a discriminator is the same for any level of externality.  Moreover, both types 
behave in exactly the same way, and have the same uncompensated demand function for housing, 
),(ˆ RIh . As in (I.2.7), the uncompensated demand functions satisfy 
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and if the normality is strong enough, (1.31) is satisfied. 
Neighbourhood Externalities 
129 
Consider a zone at radius x where both the rich and the poor locate.  Under the 
assumption that there is no active discrimination in the housing market, both must pay 
the same rent at x, and therefore their bid rents must be equal there.  Since, by 
assumption (1.11), the strength of the externality depends only on the radial distance 
between a discriminator and all nondiscriminators, any increase in the number of 
nondiscriminators at x drives down the bid rent of the discriminators by increasing the 
externality.  This induces a further increase of the number of nondiscriminators 
because the bid rent of the nondiscriminators remains the same, and the 
nondiscriminators outbid the  discriminators.  The process continues until the zone is 
filled with nondiscriminators.3 
It is convenient to introduce a formula which will tell us the relative levels of bid 
rents of discriminators and nondiscriminators at x" if we know their relative positions at 
x'.  Since it is simpler to work with the bid rent on a house and lot, ),()()( xhxRxE =  
than with the bid rent per unit amount of housing services, )(xR , we rewrite (1.26) and 
(1.27) as 
  )())(,),(()()()( xtxAuxhzyxhxRxE dddddd --=º ,  
and 
  )()),(()()()( xtuxhzyxhxRxE nnnnnn --=º . 
In order to isolate the effect of the externality, we consider the difference between the 
slopes of )(xE d  and )(xE n  at x between x¢  and x ¢¢ , fixing the level of the 
externality at )(xA ¢¢ : 
  )(')()),(();( xtxhuxhzxxH nnnh +¢º¢¢  
  )](')())(,),(([ xtxhxAuxhz dddh +¢¢¢-  
  0> ,    (2.2) 
where the inequality follows from assumption (1.30).  We then obtain 
  )]()([)]()([ xExExExE ndnd ¢-¢-¢¢-¢¢  
  )]()()[()]()()[( xRxRxhxRxRxh ndnd ¢-¢¢-¢¢-¢¢¢¢=  
                                                 
3 Note that this result crucially depends on our assumption (1.11) that the strength of the externality 
depends only on the radial distance.  It is still an open question whether the result carries over to the case 
where the externality depends also on circumferential distance from a nondiscriminator. 
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  ò
¢¢
¢
¢¢¢+¢¢=
x
x
xxJdxxxH ),,();(        (2.3) 
where ),( xxJ ¢¢¢  captures the effect of the difference in the externality between x' and 
x": 
  )](,),([)](,),([),( xAuxhzxAuxhzxxJ dddd ¢¢¢-¢¢=¢¢¢ .  (2.4) 
From (1.23), ),( xxJ ¢¢¢  satisfies 
  0),(
<
=
>
¢¢¢ xxJ        as      )()( xAxA ¢¢
<
=
>
¢ .      (2.5) 
Now consider the case illustrated in Fig.1 where the zone of nondiscriminators 
extends from x* to x**, between two zones of rich discriminators.  In equilibrium the 
bid rent of the two groups must be equal at the two borders, since there is no price 
discrimination in the housing market.  Suppose that two bid rents are equal at the inner 
boundary, x*,  as in Fig.1.  From (2.1) the external diseconomy is the same at two 
boundaries: 
 *).*(*)( xAxA =  
 
 
 Figure 1 
 The intermediate location of nondiscriminators 
 
If we set *xx =¢  and **xx =¢¢ , (2.3) becomes 
  [ ] ò >=- *** ******** 0);()()()(
x
x
nd dxxxHxRxRxh , 
which implies that the bid rent of discriminators is higher than that of nondiscriminators 
at the boundary.  Therefore, discriminators outbid nondiscriminators in the 
neighbourhood of the outer boundary and the boundary moves closer to the center.  
Neighbourhood Externalities 
131 
Thus the intermediate location of nondiscriminators cannot be an equilibrium. 
The same reasoning can also be applied to a city which has only two zones, 
nondiscriminators living in the outer zone and discriminators living in the inner zone. 
When nondiscriminators live in more than one zone, denote the borders of 
nondiscriminators' zone farthest from the center by x* and x**.  Suppose the two bid 
rents are equal at x*.  The externality is stronger at the inner boundary than at the outer 
boundary, since the inner boundary is closer to other zones of nondiscriminators.  
Hence, *)**,( xxJ  is positive and 
  
[ ]
.0),();(
)()()(
**
*
*****
******
ò >+=
-
x
x
nd
xxJdxxxH
xRxRxh
 
This case is not an equilibrium, either. 
Finally, consider the case of the central location of nondiscriminators.  Let x* be 
the boundary between the zones of nondiscriminators and rich discriminators as in 
Fig.2.  In equilibrium, the bid rents are the same at the boundary: 
  )()( ** xRxR nd = .     
For any *xx <¢ , we have 
  )()( *xAxA >¢ . 
 
 
Substituting x* for x" in (2.3), we obtain 
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  [ ] ò ¢ >¢+=¢-¢¢-
*
0),();()()()( **
x
x
nd xxJdxxxHxRxRxh . 
Hence, )()( xRxR nd ¢<¢ for any *xx <¢   and nondiscriminators outbid discriminators 
inside the boundary. 
At any point, x', outside the boundary, discriminators have a higher bid rent: 
  [ ] ò ¢ >¢¢¢+¢=¢-¢¢ xxnd xxJdxxxHxRxRxh * 0),();()()()( , 
since )()( *xAxA <¢ . 
Thus the central location of nondiscriminators is an equilibrium.  Since the cases 
considered here exhaust all the possibilities, the central location of nondiscriminators is 
the only stable market equilibrium under the assumption (1.30) and (2.1).  This result 
shows that the existence of externalities does not alter the spatial pattern when (1.30) 
and (2.1) hold.  No discrimination is, therefore, necessary to confine nondiscriminators 
in the central part of the city.  Moreover, the external diseconomy makes the 
segregated pattern more stable since the bid rent curve of discriminators becomes 
flatter.  Note that it is not the strength of the externality that makes the bid rent curve 
of discriminators flatter, but the fact that externality diminishes with distance.  It is 
easy to see that if externality is uniform in the city, no change in the slope of the bid 
rent curve occurs. 
We have shown that passive discrimination of the sort we have modeled can 
explain the spatial distribution of racial groups, blacks in American cities for example, 
when the group discriminated against is uniformly poorer than the discriminators.  
This result does not suggest tha t active discrimination does not exist.  Recent studies 
support the view that there is in fact active discrimination in the housing market of 
American cities. 
If the number of houses per unit distance increases with distance from the center, 
,0)( >¢ xN  the above result must be modified.  In order for the central location of 
nondiscriminators to be a unique stable configuration, the inequality (1.30) must be 
strengthened to 
  e++¢>+¢ )(')()(')( xtxhzxtxhz nnh
dd
h ,     (2.6) 
for some large enough 0>e .  The problem arises because our externality function 
(1.11) employs only radial distance.  If there are more households per unit distance at 
larger radii, the externality will be higher at the outer boundary than at the inner 
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boundary, which causes an additional tendency to lower the bid rent of discriminators at 
the outer boundary.  The inequality (1.30), therefore, must be strong enough to offset 
this effect.  In the rest of the chapter, (2.6) is assumed to hold for a sufficiently large 
e  so that the only stable configuration is the central location of nondiscriminators. 
3.  The Boundary Bid Rent Curves 
In section 2 we established the existence of a single boundary between two types 
of households, with the rich discriminators living farthest from the center.  In section 4 
we will examine the stability of the boundary between the two zones, but in order to do 
so we develop an additional concept, the boundary bid rent curve.  The boundary bid 
rent curve is the bid rent at x when the boundary is at x. 
Assume that the city is open: migration into and out of the city is free and 
costless.  The utility levels of rich discriminators and poor nondiscriminators in the 
city, du  and nu , then equal the corresponding utility levels in the rest of the world, 
dV  and nV , respectively.  The utility levels, however, are not necessarily fixed.  An 
increase in the population of the city is accompanied by a decrease in the population of 
the outside world, which causes a rise in the utility level in the outside world because of 
diminishing returns.  We assume that the general utility level of discriminators is a 
nondecreasing function of the population of discriminators in the city, and, that the 
same is true for nondiscriminators.4 
  )( ddd PVu = ,         
 (3.1) 
  )( nnn PVu = ,      (3.2) 
where 
  0)(' ³dd PV ,     (3.3) 
  0)(' ³nn PV ,     (3.4) 
and dP  and nP  are respectively the populations of discriminators and 
                                                 
4 In general, the utility level of discriminators (and also nondiscriminators) depends on the populations of 
both discriminators and nondiscriminators.  For simplicity, we assume that the population of one type 
has no effect on the utility level of the other type.  We make a similar assumption for income levels in 
(3.5) and (3.6) below. 
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nondiscriminators in the city.  )(' dd PV  and )(' nn PV  are almost zero if there are so 
many people of each type in the outside world that an additional individual does not 
cause any significant change in allocation there.  Since our formulation implicitly 
assumes that the population of the city is small enough for an additional individual to 
matter within the city, this in effect requires that the city is small compared with the rest 
of the world.  Roughly speaking, therefore, )(' dd PV  and )(' nn PV  are zero if the 
city is small, and increase for cities which are larger relative to the rest of the world. 
The income of a city resident also depends on the population of the city.  This 
reflects two factors.  First, if prices of products are constant, the wage rate falls due to 
diminishing returns as the population increases.  Second, when the population 
increases, production expands, which reduces prices of products in the world market.  
This also causes a decrease in wage rate.  We therefore assume that the income of each 
type of household is a nonincreasing function of the population of that type in the city, 
  )( ddd Pyy = ,    (3.5) 
  )( nnn Pyy = .     (3.6) 
where 
  0)(' <dd Py ,    (3.7) 
  0)(' <nn Py .   (3.8) 
)(' dd Py  and )(' nn Py  are smaller in absolute value in a smaller city, since the effects 
on the world prices are smaller by the same argument as we applied to the case of 
)(' dd PV  and )(' nn PV . 
Let x* denote the boundary between the zones of discriminators and 
nondiscriminators.  Then 
  ò=
*
0
* )()(
xn dxxNxP ,   (3.9) 
  ò=
xd
x dxxNxP * )()(
* ,      (3.10) 
where x  is determined so that the highest bid rent equals the rural rent, aR , at the 
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edge of the city. 
Now, we express bid rent functions as functions of x* using (3.9) and (3.10).  
The bid rent, );( *xxRn , of a nondiscriminator at x when the boundary is at x* is 
  [ ]{ })())((),())((
)(
1);( *** xtxPVxhzxPy
xh
xxR nnnnnnn --= . (3.11) 
The slope of the bid rent curve is 
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 (3.12) 
The location of the boundary enters this formulation, not because nondiscriminators 
discriminate, but because the location of the boundary determines nP , which affects 
income and utility levels. 
The bid rent of discriminators depends in addition on the externality that they 
suffer from nondiscriminators.  The externality received by a discriminator at x is 
  ò ¢¢¢-=
*
0
* )()();(
x
xdxNxxaxxA .   (3.13) 
The bid rent of discriminators is then 
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 (3.14) 
Its slope is 
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xA  is defined as 
  ò ¢¢¢-¢¢-=¶
¶
º
*
0
* ,)()()sgn();(
x
x xdxNxxaxxxxAx
A    (3.16) 
where 
 
.0
,0
if
if
1
1
)sgn(
<¢-
³¢-
î
í
ì
-
+
=¢-
xx
xx
xx  
xA  is nonpositive at least when x is greater than or equal to x*.  The externality, 
therefore, tends to make the bid rent curve of discriminators flatter.  It follows from 
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assumption (1.30) that the bid rent curve of discriminators is flatter than that of 
nondiscriminators at the boundary: 
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 (3.17) 
This confirms the result in the preceding section that nondiscriminators live closer to the 
center. 
At the edge of the city, the bid rent of discriminators must equal the rural rent: 
  ad RxxR =);( * ,  (3.18) 
which determines x  as a function of x* and hence )( *xPd  in (3.10). 
Next, we introduce the concept of the boundary bid rent curve, which is the bid 
rent at x when the boundary is at x.  The boundary bid rent curves will play a crucial 
role in the analysis of a cumulative process.  For nondiscriminators it is 
  );()(ˆ xxRxR nn = ,   (3.19) 
and from (3.11) its slope is 
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 (3.20) 
where 
  *** /);();(* xxxRxxR nnx ¶¶º . 
Thus the boundary bid rent curve is steeper than the bid rent curve.  An expansion of 
the boundary is possible only if the population of nondiscriminators increases in the 
city.  This raises the utility level in the outside world and lowers the income level in 
the city, causing a fall in the bid rent curve.  The relationship between the bid rent 
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curve and the boundary bid rent curve is illustrated in Figure3. 
 
The boundary bid rent of discriminators is 
  );()(ˆ xxRxR dd = ,     (3.21) 
with a slope 
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where 
  );();( **
*
* xxA
x
xxA
x ¶
¶
º    (3.23) 
and hence 
  0)()0();(* >= xNaxxAx .       (3.24) 
Whether the slope of the boundary bid rent curve of the discriminators is steeper 
than that of the bid rent curve is not clear.  An outward movement of the boundary acts 
on the bid rent curve of discriminators in two opposing ways.  The increased 
population of nondiscriminators drives up the externality causing the bid rent to fall.  
As will be shown, however, )(' xPd  is usually negative: the population of 
discriminators decreases as the boundary moves outward, lowering the utility for 
discriminators in the outside world, increasing their income in the city and tending to 
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cause their bid rent to rise.  The boundary bid rent curve of discriminators is therefore 
either flatter or steeper than the bid rent curve depending on which tendency is stronger. 
The first term in the square bracket of (3.22), );(* xxAz x
d
A , is positive from 
(3.24), since dAz  is positive from (1.23).  The second term is more complicated.  
)(' xPd  can be obtained by differentiating (3.10) and (3.18). 
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The first square bracket on the numerator is positive under the assumption that 
0)( >¢ xN , since 
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The first term in the  second square bracket of the numerator of (3.25) is positive but the 
second term may be negative.  The second term is zero if the marginal rate of 
substitution between housing and the consumer good equals the bid rent, which is the 
case if )(xh  can be freely chosen.  If houses are newly constructed at the edge of the 
city, )(xh  may be optimize It is, therefore, plausible to assume that the magnitude of 
the second term is small.  Thus, the numerator tends to be positive. 
The first two terms of the denominator are positive.  The third term is 
nonpositive but the magnitude is small since the externality is weak at the edge of the 
city.  The fourth term is also small since dha zR +  is small as argued above.  
Therefore, the denominator also tends to be positive and )(' xPd  is likely to be 
negative. 
The reason for this result is roughly as follows.  If the zone of nondiscriminators 
expands, the city must expand to accommodate the same population of discriminators.  
Consider the effects on a discriminator at the edge of the city.  There are three major 
effects: commuting costs increase, the strength of the externality increases since there 
are more nondiscriminators in the city, and the boundary shifts outward to where houses 
are larger, by the assumption that .0)( >¢ xh  The first two effects tend to lower the 
utility level of the discriminator, but the direction of the third effect depends on whether 
houses are larger or smaller than the optimum at the edge of the city.  If houses are 
smaller than the optimum, the third effect tends to raise the utility level.  Since the 
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third effect disappears when )(xh  is optimized, the first two effects are likely to be 
dominant, and the utility level declines as x* increases.  This induces emigration of 
discriminators, resulting in a decrease in the population of discriminators in the city. 
4.  Stability of the Boundary and a Cumulative Process 
Next, we examine stability of the boundary between the zones of rich 
discriminators and poor nondiscriminators.  It is easy to show that, if the boundary bid 
rent of discriminators is less steep than that of nondiscriminators, the boundary is stable, 
and if steeper, the boundary is unstable.  Consider the situation represented by Fig.4b.  
The boundary is at x*, and beyond x* the discriminators outbid the nondiscriminators.  
The boundary bid rent of the discriminators is steeper, however, as illustrated in Fig.4a.  
Notice that, if the boundary x* is to be an equilibrium, the boundary bid rents must be 
equal there as well as the bid rents.   
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Now imagine that the boundary shifts outward to x*' because of some random 
disturbances.  The bid rent of discriminators falls farther than the bid rent of 
nondiscriminators, as in Fig.4b.  Nondiscriminators outbid discriminators at the new 
boundary and the boundary moves farther outward.  The process continues until the 
boundary reaches x**.   
If the boundary had shifted inward, discriminators would have outbid 
nondiscriminators, causing the boundary to move inward until it reached the center, x* 
is therefore unstable.  The same argument applied at x** will show that the boundary 
is stable at that point.   
We have seen that the bid rent curve of discriminators is flatter than that of 
nondiscriminators at the boundary.  As shown in the preceding section, the boundary 
bid rent curve of nondiscriminators is steeper than their bid rent curve, and the boundary 
bid rent curve of discriminators is flatter than their bid rent curve if the externality is 
weak.  In order to have an unstable equilibrium, therefore, the externality must be 
strong. 
We next examine the condition for an unstable equilibrium more carefully.  The 
difference between the slopes of the two boundary bid rent curves is    
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The first and third terms in the brace of (4.1) are negative, and the second term positive.  
Therefore, if the second term is greater than the absolute value of the sum of the first 
and third terms, the boundary bid rent curve of discriminators is steeper than that of 
nondiscriminators, and the boundary is unstable.  This is more likely to occur if 
(a) );( xxH  is smaller: the tendency of the poor to live closer to the center in the 
absence of the externality is smaller;  
(b) )()''()(')''( xNyVzxPyVz nnnu
dddd
u ---  is smaller: the city is smaller in 
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comparison with the rest of the world;  
(c) dAz  is bigger: the marginal disutility of the external diseconomy is larger;  
(d) )(xa  is bigger, which is true if x is smaller, that is, the boundary is closer to the 
center, or if the externality diminishes less rapidly with distance.5 
Now consider a historical process in which bid rent shift up due to some 
exogenous factors such as technological progress.  We assume that the bid rent of 
nondiscriminators rises more rapidly than that of discriminators.  This assumption does 
not necessarily mean that the income of nondiscriminators rises more rapidly than that 
of discriminators.  Even if the income of discriminators were to rise faster than that of 
nondiscriminators, the bid rent of nondiscriminators might rise faster if the utility level 
of nondiscriminators attainable in the rest of the world was increasing more slowly.  
To make our analysis easier, we fix the boundary bid rent of discriminators and allow 
the boundary bid rent of nondiscriminators to rise over time. 
Since the boundary bid rent curve depends on the choice of utility and 
transportation cost functions and on other parameters of the model, we cannot say 
much, a priori, about its shape.  Instead, we illustrate a few examples.  If the 
boundary bid rent curve of nondiscriminators is steeper than 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that of discriminators everywhere in the city, we obtain Fig.5.  In this case, 
)(*),(* 21 txtx  and )(* 3tx  are all stable and the boundary gradually shifts outward 
as the bid rent of nondiscriminators rises. 
                                                 
5 The integral in (4.2) is greater when )(xN ¢  is greater.   However, if )(xN ¢  is large, H must be large 
enough to insure the central location of nondiscriminators, and the net effect is uncertain. 
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Figure 6 depicts the case where the boundary bid rent curve of discriminators is 
steeper at the center.  At time 1t , )(* 1tx  is an unstable equilibrium and )*(* 1tx  is 
a stable equilibrium.  If the boundary were to the right of )(* 1tx , it would move to a 
stable equilibrium at )*(* 1tx .  With the boundary initially at 0=x , however, no 
nondiscriminator would enter the city until time 2t , when the boundary bid rent at 
0=x  of nondiscriminators rose as high as that of discriminators.  Then any small 
perturbation would induce a sudden outward shift of the boundary to )*(* 2tx .  Thus 
a very rapid movement of discriminators to the suburbs occurs after the first 
nondiscriminator enters the city. 
 
 
Finally, consider the case where the boundary bid rent  curve of discriminators is 
flatter than that of nondiscriminators near the center but becomes steeper at some point 
as in Figure 7.  In this case, the boundary gradually moves outward until the bid rent of 
nondiscriminators becomes tangent to that of discriminators, and then jumps to **x . 
Figure 7b illustrates the corresponding bid rent curves.  The rapid shift of the 
boundary is accompanied by a downward shift of both bid rent curves.  The bid rent of 
nondiscriminators must fall because the population of nondiscriminators in the city 
rises, resulting in an increase in the external utility level by (3.4).  Since )( nnn pvu = , 
the utility level of nondiscriminators in the city must also rise, and for utility levels to 
rise rents must fall.  Similarly, since the shifting boundary would usually drive out 
some discriminators, the utility level of discriminators falls, and rents are likely to rise.  
Paradoxically, then, the so-called deterioration of the city center may be desirable in 
terms of income distribution. 
In the inner part of the zone of discriminators, the increased externality leads to a 
fall in the bid rent.  In the outer part, however, the rent will usually rise. 
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The cumulative decay process analyzed by Baumol (1972a, b) and by Oates, 
Howrey, and Baumol (1971) can be viewed as a rapid movement of the boundary of the 
sort described in this chapter.  If a small increase in the number of nondiscriminators 
lowers the utility level of discriminators, the discriminators move out to the suburbs, 
leading to a further deterioration of central cities.  This process occurs only if the rent 
does not fall sufficiently to compensate discriminators for the increase in the external 
diseconomy, or in our model only if the boundary bid rent curve of nondiscriminators is 
flatter than that of discriminators. 
As discussed in section 1, the fact that the cumulative process is instantaneous in 
our model depends on the assumption that houses are readily available even outside the 
current boundary of the city.  In reality, however, houses cannot be constructed 
immediately, and the cumulative process may take 
 
quite a long time.  It is not the rate of change that characterizes a cumulative decay 
process, however.  The process is cumulative if it can be seen as a disequilibrium 
process moving towards a new equilibrium, like the boundary shift from x* to x** in 
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Figure 7, rather than an equilibrium process. 
Notes 
Baumol formalized a process of cumulative urban deterioration in section 7 of his 
paper (1972a).  Policy implications of his model were further analyzed by Baumol 
(1972b) and Oates, Howrey and Baumol (1971).  The process of decay is described by 
two difference equations.  One equation embodies the mechanism through which an 
increase in deterioration leads to a reduction in income per capita in the subsequent 
period as a consequence of induced emigration to the suburbs, while the other equation 
describes how the fall in income induces further deterioration.  For a suitable set of 
parameters, these equations obviously have a solution which converges to an 
equilibrium point and the process toward an equilibrium can be viewed as a cumulative 
process of urban deterioration. 
The weakness of this argument is that individual behaviour and market 
adjustments are not explicitly considered.  For example, we immediately face the 
following question.  Why does the land rent in the central city not fall to keep the 
wealthier people in the center?  If the land rent falls sufficiently, wealthier people will 
remain even in the deteriorated central city.  For a cumulative deterioration process to 
occur, therefore, something must prevent the land rent from falling enough. 
Obviously the rent cannot fall below zero.  If it reaches zero, therefore, a 
cumulative process occurs.  In this case deterioration results in vacant houses.  
Alternatively, poorer households might support the rent.  This case can occur in two 
ways.  One is through an increase in per capita housing demand by the poorer 
households and the other is through migration of the poorer households from other 
areas.  Our model in this chapter formalizes the latter case. 
Kanemoto (1978) considered the same problem in a simpler model with three 
discrete regions: the city center, the suburbs, and the rest of the world.  The paper 
explores the case of fiscal burden and the case where one type receives an external 
economy from the other type while generating an external diseconomy.  The model in 
this chapter can easily be extended to include these cases. 
We chose not to formulate an explicit dynamic adjustment model because 
exposition would become tedious, and because the basic results can be explained 
heuristically, as done in this chapter.  Schelling was the first to formulate dynamic 
models of segregation in the housing market in his papers (1971) and (1972), following 
his earlier work (1969).  Miyao (1978a) extended his analysis, explicitly including the 
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individual choice of space and location within a city.  Kanemoto (1978) also 
considered a model of dynamic adjustment.  Miyao (1978b) considered the same 
problem in the framework of a probabilistic model of locational choice.  These 
analyses correspond to that in section 2. 
Yellin (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1975), (1977), Yinger (1976a, b), and Courant 
and Yinger (1977) provide static analyses of an externality between different types of 
households.  Yellin has the most general formulation of the externality which we 
adopted in this chapter. 
Although we did not use any results from mathematical theory of catastrophe, our 
analysis may be cast in that framework.  In section 4 we examined how the phase 
portrait changes as various parameters change.  A cumulative process occurs at what is 
called in catastrophe theory a bifurcation point, where a basic change in the phase 
portrait occurs: a stable equilibrium becomes an unstable equilibrium. 
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CHAPTER VII 
OPTIMAL GROWTH OF CITIES 
There have been very few works on the mathematical theory of urban growth.  
Recently, however, this area has begun to attract the attention of theorists.  Miyao 
(1977a,b) analyzed capital accumulation in urban transportation.  Rabenau (1976) 
considered the optimal growth of a small and open factory town with durable housing 
stock.  Fujita (1976a,b) studied accumulation of more than one kind of durable 
housing capital.  These works, however, are concerned only with growth of a certain 
city, despite the fact that in a modern economy the migration of households and firms is 
not difficult.  Limiting the analysis to a single city prevents us from examining the 
interaction among cities.  Isard and Kanemoto (1976) made an attempt to consider the 
optimal growth of an economy consisting of many cities and their hinterlands, though 
the model there is too complicated to go beyond the derivation and interpretation of first 
order conditions.  This motivates the drastic simplifying assumptions of the model in 
this chapter. 
For the first time, productive capital appears in our economy.  Like capital in 
simple neoclassical growth models, it has a number of convenient features: it does not 
depreciate; it can be applied to any task; and if it is not needed for production, it can be 
eaten.  In addition, because we are considering an economy with many cities, we also 
require capital that can be moved between and within cities costlessly. 
The time dimension must be added to analyze capital accumulation.  Since we 
already have the spatial dimension, the model becomes quite complicated.  To keep 
the model manageable, we make the following drastic simplifying assumptions. 
a. The economy consists of cities only: there is no rural sector (except possibly for the 
constant rural rent). 
b. Capital accumulation occurs only in the urban production sector and there is no 
capital accumulation in the transportation sector.  
c. Capital is perfectly mobile: capital can be moved between an within cities 
instantaneously and without cost. 
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d. Households are perfectly mobile. 
e. All cities are identical.  This assumption can be made only when capital is 
perfectly mobile: otherwise, a new city has zero capital stock initially, and cannot 
be identical with older cities.  Under the assumption of mobility, capital stock in 
other cities can be instantaneously moved to the new city, and all cities can be 
made identical. 
We assume that there is a Marshallian externality of the sort discussed in Chapter 
II.  At the optimal city size declining production costs, which result from increasing 
city size, exactly match increasing transportation costs. 
The utility level that households achieve in our economy has been determined by 
the amounts of land and of the consumer good they received.  Now that the economy 
contains capital, some part of output can be invested in physical capital. 
The problem of determining the optimal path of our economy may be solved in 
two stages.  At each instant of time, all cities must maintain the optimal spatial 
allocation, as in Chapter I.  The key difference is that when there is capital, the 
optimization is performed using the part of the product allocated to current 
consumption, rather than the entire product.  The maximum utility level achievable in 
each city is then obtained as a function, ),( PcU , of current consumption, c, and the 
population of the city, P.  In section 1, the model from Chapter I is reformulated with 
capital, and in section 2 the static spatial optimum is derived given the level of 
consumption. 
At this point the inhabitants of each city know how to allocate their 
consumption, but not how much of their total product to consume.  We assume 
that they choose to maximize the undiscounted sum of utilities over an infinite time 
horizon.  That is, they are exactly as concerned about the welfare of their most 
remote descendants as they are about their own.  We chose this assumption mainly 
for the sake of simplicity, but also because we see no moral justification for 
discounting the welfare of future generations.  At any rate, it is quite easy to 
extend our analysis to the discounted case. 
In maximizing the undiscounted sum over an infinite time horizon, we encounter 
a well-known difficulty: the undiscounted sum of future utilities is infinite, and we are 
left attempting to compare infinities.  Economists have, of course, found several ways 
of avoiding this problem.  In this chapter, we adopt a version of the Ramsey device 
used by Koopmans  (1965).  This approach changes the origin of the instantaneous 
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utility function, taking the utility level of the optimal steady state as zero, where the 
optimal steady state, or the Golden Rule, is the balanced growth path which maximizes 
the utility level among all feasible balanced growth paths.  If )(xu  denotes the utility 
level at time t, and u* that at the optimal steady state, the sum of the difference over 
infinite time horizon, 
 ò
¥
-
0
,*])([ dtutu  
is maximized.  The new objective function turns out to be bounded from above, and 
the difficulty of comparing infinities disappears.  In section 3, the objective function is 
maximized with respect to the paths of consumption and population of a city. 
In optimal growth theory, it is usually assumed that the utility function is concave.  
In our model, however, the maximum utility function, ),( PcU , may not be concave, 
although the original utility function over the consumer good and land is assumed to be 
concave.  As it turns out, the maximum utility function is not even quasi-concave in 
most cases.  This does not create serious difficulties for our analysis, if we assume that 
the concavity of the per capita production function is strong enough. 
In section 4, a phase diagram analysis is carried out to determine whether a city 
grows during the process of capital accumulation.  Section 5 contains remarks on the 
limitations of the model, and speculations on how the results might be modified if the 
model is extended. 
1.  The Model 
Consider the growth of an economy consisting of cities.  Let capital 
accumulation occur in the urban production sector and the number of cities change in 
the process of growth.  Assume there is no non-urban sector and the total population of 
the whole economy is partitioned into cities.  This assumption is clearly unrealistic and 
precludes the analysis of the evolution of an economy through different stages, for 
example, from the rural stage to the urban stage, as analyzed by Isard and Kanemoto 
(1976).  Considering the complexity of the problem and the dominance of the urban 
sector in a modern economy, however it seems worthwhile to start with this simple 
formulation. 
As discussed in Chapter II, economic factors which cause cities can be classified 
into three categories: concentration of immobile factors, increasing returns to scale, and 
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externalities.  In this chapter we consider cities based on a Marshallian externality of 
the kind analyzed in section 5 of Chapter II.  Instead of starting from the production 
function of an individual firm, we simply assume that the aggregate production function 
of a city can be written as 
 ),,,( PKPF    (1.1) 
where P and K are respectively the population and the aggregate capital stock of the 
city.  The production function is homogeneous of degree one with respect to the first 
two terms and the derivative with respect to the third term is positive.  The production 
function, therefore, exhibits increasing returns to scale if the third term is taken into 
account.1 
Because it is easier to work with the capital- labour ratio and consumption per 
capita, PKk /=  and c, than with the absolute quantities, we want a per capita 
production function ),( Pkf .  By the homogeneity assumption, the per capita 
production function is 
 ),,/,1(),,1(),( PPKFPkFPkf ==   (1.2) 
where 
 .0>Pf      (1.3) 
We assume that the per capita production function is strictly concave and 
 .0>kf     (1.4) 
As in previous chapters, we assume that all cities are identical.  If at time t the 
population of the whole economy is )(tP , the capital stock for the whole economy is 
)()()( tktPtK = , and per capita consumption of the produced good is )(tc , then the 
output available for capital accumulation after consumption is 
 ).()())(),(()()( tctPtPtkftPtk -=         (1.5) 
                                                 
1 It is not difficult to show that if an individual firm has a production function ),,(~ Pkf l  where l  and 
k  are respectively labour and capital inputs, the aggregate production function can be written as (1.1) 
when the number of firms is optimal. 
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If we assume that the population growth rate is a constant 
 ),(/)( tPtP=l      (1.6) 
then (1.5) can be rewritten as 
 ).()())(),(()( tctktPtkftk --= l&  (1.7) 
The spatial structure of a city is the same as in the previous chapters.  dxx)(q  of 
land is available in the ring between x and dxx + , where x is the distance from the 
center of a city.  A household living at x at time t has a lot size ),( txh .  Then there 
are dxtxhx )),(/)((q  households between x and dxx +  at time t.  A household at x at 
time t consumes ),( txz  of the produced good and spends )(xT  on commuting costs 
expressed in terms of the produced good.  For simplicity, we assume that there is no 
capital accumulation or no technological progress in the transportation sector.  Note 
that we have changed the notation for commuting costs and that t now denotes time.  A 
city uses )()( tPtc  of the produced good for consumption, which includes direct 
consumption, commuting costs, and the payment of the rural rent aR .  The resource 
constraint for a city is then 
 ò ++=
)(
0
,)(}),(/)](),({[)()(
tx
a dxxRtxhxTtxztPtc q     (1.8) 
where )(tx  is the edge of the city at time t. 
The population constraints are 
 [ ]ò=
)(
0
,),(/)()(
tx
dxtxhxtP q        (1.9) 
and 
 ),()()( tPtntP =     (1.10) 
where )(tn  is the number of cities at time t.  We shall ignore the constraint that )(tn  
be an integer and take )(tn  as a continuous variable. 
The utility function is ),( hzu , and we impose the constraint that the utility level 
be equal everywhere at each instant of time.  The utility level may vary over time.  
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The equal-utility constraint can be written 
 [ ].),(),,()( txhtxzutu =    (1.11) 
Having set up the model, our problem is to maximize the undiscounted sum 
over an infinite time horizon: 
 [ ]ò
¥
-
0
,*)( dtutu    (1.12) 
subject to the constraints (1.7) through (1.11), and the initial condition, 
 0)0( kk = ,    (1.13) 
where u* is the utility level in the optimal steady state.  The problem is solved in 
two stages. 
2.  Optimal Spatial Structure 
In this section the first stage optimization is carried out for given )(tc  and )(tP , 
and the properties of the maximum utility function ))(),(( tPtcU  are examined.  This 
problem is exactly the same as the one in subsection 2.1 of Chapter I if we substitute 
)(tc , )(tP , and )(xT  for w, P, and )(xt .  The utility level is maximized under the 
resource constraint, the population constraint, and the equal-utility constraint, which are 
in this case, (1.8), (1.9), and (1.11) respectively.  Control variables are )(xz  and 
)(xh , and control parameters are x  and u.  The time variable t is suppressed in this 
section, since it plays no role in the optimization. 
The first order conditions can be rewritten 
 ),())(),((/))(),(( xRxhxzuxhxzu zh =    (2.la) 
 ),()()()( xTxhxRxzy ++=   (2.1b) 
 ,)( aRxR =     (2.1c) 
after simple manipulations.  As in Chapter I, the optimal solution can be achieved as a 
competitive equilibrium if all households receive the same income y.  The solution, 
therefore, can be described by using the bid rent function )),(()),(( uxTyRuxIR -=  
defined in Equation (1.12) of Chapter I: 
 scy += ,    (2.2a) 
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 [ ]ò --=
x
a dxxRuxTyRsP 0 ,)()),(( q      (2.2b) 
 ò -=
x
I dxxuxTyRP 0 ,)()),(( q      (2.2c) 
 .)),(( aRuxtyR =-    (2.2d) 
s is the social dividend each household receives and is equal to the total differential rent 
divided by the population of the city.  (2.2a) and (2.2b) correspond to (1.28) in Chapter 
I.  (2.2c) is a restatement of the population constraint using the property of the bid rent 
function: hRI /1= . 
If c and P are given, the four equations, (2.2a)-(2.2d), determine the four 
variables, y, s, x , and u.  The utility level which is obtained can then be written as a 
function ),( PcU  Total differentiation of (2.2) yields the partial derivatives of the 
maximum utility function: 
 ò <=
x
uP dxxRsPcU 0 ,0)(/),( q          (2.3) 
 ò >-=
x
uc dxxRPPcU 0 ,0)(/),( q           (2.4) 
where subscripts P and c denote partial derivatives with respect to P and c respectively.  
Thus an increase in the population of a city, given the consumption of resources per 
capita, lowers the utility level which can be attained in the city.  An increase in per 
capita consumption given the population raises the utility level.  The marginal rate of 
substitution between P and c is equal to the negative of the social dividend divided by 
the population: 
 ./),(/),(),( PsPcUPcUPcS cP -=º       (2.5) 
Further properties of the maximum utility function are difficult to derive in the 
general case.  The following results for four cases have been obtained by tedious 
calculations.  The cases are 
(i) the Leontief utility function [ ] 1,),/min(),( /1 >= ga ghzhzu , in a linear city, 
qq =)(x ;  
(ii) the Leontief utility function in a pie-slice city, xx qq =)( ;  
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(iii) the Cobb-Douglas utility function gaa /11 )(),( -= hzhzu , 1>g , in a linear 
city; and 
(iv) the Cobb-Douglas utility function in a pie-slice city. 
 
In all cases, linear commuting costs are assumed: .)( TxxT =  The results are 
(1) ccU  is negative in the linear city cases (i) and (iii). 
In circular cities (ii) and (iv), ccU  is positive if g  is close to 1 and is negative 
for a large enough g  (in case (iv) we have proven this only in the case 0=aR ). 
(2) PPU  is positive in all cases (in the Cobb-Douglas cases we have proven this only 
in the case of 0=aR ).  This shows that ),( PcU  is not concave. 
(3) ),( PcU  is not usually quasi-concave.  In order for U to be quasi-concave, 
222 cPPPccPccP UUUUUUU --=D  must be nonnegative.  In the case of the 
Leontief utility function, D  equals zero in a linear city, and D  is negative if 
xTc >  in a circular city.  In the Cobb-Douglas case, D  is negative in a linear 
city and in the case of 0=aR  in a circular city. 
(4) ),( PcSc  is negative in all cases.  This implies that -P would be a normal good 
if ),( PcU  were quasi-concave.  (Note that P is a 'bad' and hence P-  is a 
good.) 
(5) ),( PcSP  is positive in all cases (in case (iv) we have proven this only in the case 
of 0=aR ).  This implies that c would be an inferior good if ),( PcU  were 
quasi-concave. 
 
These results show that even if the original utility function ),( hzu  is concave, 
the maximum utility function ),( PcU  is not usually well behaved: ),( PcU  is usually 
neither concave nor quasi-concave.  As it turns out, however, this does not cause a 
serious difficulty in the second stage optimization if the concavity of the production 
function (1.2) is strong enough. 
3.  Optimal Growth of Cities 
In the second stage of our optimization procedure, the undiscounted sum over 
an infinite time horizon, 
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 [ ] ,*))(),((
0
dtutPtcUò
¥
-     (3.1) 
is maximized subject to (1.7), (1.10), and (1.13).  ),( PcU  is the maximized utility 
level from section 2 and u* is the utility level at the optimal steady state.  Since 
)(tn  appears only in the constraint (1.10) and is taken as a continuous variable, the 
problem is equivalent to the one of maximizing (3.1) under the constraints (1.7) and 
(1.13) with respect to )(tc  and )(tP .  Although the population of a city )(tP  
must be greater than one, we ignore this constraint, assuming that it is always satisfied 
along the optimal path. 
Before solving this problem, we first examine the optimal steady state, at which 
the utility level is maximized among all feasible steady states.  The optimal steady 
state is therefore the solution to the problem of maximizing 
 ),( PcU  
subject to 
 ,0),( =-- ckPkf l        (3.2) 
with respect to c, P, and k. 
First order conditions for an interior optimum are 
 ,),( l=Pkf k       (3.3a) 
 0),(
),(
),(
=+ Pkf
PcU
PcU
P
c
P .  (3.3b) 
The first equation is the usual condition that the system operate at the biological rate of 
interest: the marginal productivity of capital must equal the population growth rate.  
The second equation requires that the population of a city be determined so that the per 
capita marginal external benefit on the production side equals the marginal rate of 
substitution between population and resource consumption per capita.  From (2.5) and 
(2.2b), this is equivalent to 
 [ ] [ ]ò -=
x
aP dxxRxRPkPfP 0 ,)()(),( q  (3.4) 
which may be interpreted as the condition obtained in Chapter II that the total 
differential rent equals the total Pigouvian subsidy.  An additional worker in a city 
produces ),( Pkf  of the product himself, but at the same time increases the population 
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of the city and raises the production of other workers by PPf .  The latter is the 
marginal external benefit, and the Pigouvian subsidy must equal PPf  to achieve an 
efficient allocation.  The left side of (3.4) is, therefore, the total amount of the 
Pigouvian subsidy in the city, which must equal the total differential rent when the 
number of cities is optimal. 
The second order conditions are as follows. 
 ,0£kkf        (3.5a) 
 ,0/)( 2 £-+- kkkPPPcP fffSSS ･           (3.5b) 
where ),( PcS  is the marginal rate of substitution between P and c and is defined in 
(2.5).  The first two terms are 
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UUUUUUU
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---=- ･
 
Since ),( PcU  is not usually quasi-concave as seen in section 2, cP SSS ･-  is usually 
positive.  kkkPPP fff /)(
2-  is, however, negative if ),( Pkf  is concave.  (3.5b) 
can, therefore, be satisfied if the concavity of the production function is strong enough.  
(3.5a) is satisfied because we assumed that the production function is concave.  We 
henceforth assume that (3.5a) and (3.5b) are satisfied with strict inequalities.  We also 
assume that the optimal steady state is unique. 
The following two observations can be immediately obtained from the first order 
conditions (3.3).  First, unlike usual one sector growth models, the optimal steady state 
depends on the shape of the utility function.  The population of a city serves as a link 
between the consumption side and the production side, and the capital- labour ratio at 
the optimal steady state is affected by the shape of the utility function.  Second, at the 
optimal steady state, the configuration of a city remains exactly the same, and the 
number of cities increases at the same rate as the population growth. 
Now, let us go back to the original problem of maximizing (3.1) with respect to 
)(tc  and )(tP  subject to (1.7) and (1.14).  As shown in section 2 of the appendix on 
optimal control, the Hamiltonian for this problem is 
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 [ ],)()())(),(()())(),(( tctktPtkftqtPtcU --+=F l      (3.6) 
where )(tq  is an adjoint variable associated with the constraint (1.7).  )(tq  satisfies 
the adjoint equation: 
 [ ],))(),(()()( l-=- tPtkftqtq k&      (3.7) 
and the Hamiltonian must be maximized with respect to )(tc  and )(tP .  The first 
order conditions for the maximization are 
 ),())(),(( tqtPtcUc =    (3.8a) 
 ,0))(),(()())(),(( =+ tPtkftqtPtcU PP   (3.8b) 
and the second order conditions are 
 ,0£ccU       (3.9a) 
 ,0£+ PPPP qfU     (3.9b) 
 .0)( 2 ³+- PPcccPPPcc fqUUUU       (3.9c) 
As seen in section 2, (3.9a) is satisfied if the concavity of the original utility 
function ),( hzu  is strong enough.  For (3.9b) to be satisfied, PPf  must be negative 
and its absolute value must be greater than qUPP / , since PPU  is usually positive, and 
by (3.8a), q is also positive.  In (3.9c) the sum of the first two terms is usually 
negative.  Again, PPf  must be negative with a large absolute value. 
Combining (3.7) and (3.8a) yields the differential equation: 
 [ ],)()( kccPcc fUtPUtcU -=+ l&&       (3.10) 
and from (3.8a) and (3.8b) we obtain 
 .0))(),(())(),(( =+ tPtkftPtcS P        (3.11) 
Using (2.5), (3.11) becomes 
 )).(),(()()( tPtkftPts P=        (3.12) 
Thus the social dividend equals the Pigouvian subsidy at each point of time along the 
optimal path.  In other words, the total amount of the Pigouvian subsidy for residents 
of the city must always equal the total differential rent. 
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Since there is no constraint on )(tk  at terminal time ¥=t , the transversality 
condition must be obtained to determine the value of )(tk  at ¥=t .  If we can show 
that the optimal path converges to the optimal steady state, the transversality condition 
must be 
 **)()(lim kqtktq
t
=
¥®
,      (3.13) 
where *),*,(* PcUq c=  and asterisks deno te the optimal steady 
state values of the variables. 
We prove that the optimal path converges to the optimal steady state in two 
steps.2  In the rest of this section, we show that the optimal path visits any 
arbitrarily small 
neighbourhood of the optimal steady state.  This result still allows the possibility that 
the optimal path enters a neighbourhood of the optimal steady state but leaves there 
eventually.  In the next section, we examine the behaviour of the optimal path near the 
steady state, and show that the steady state is a saddle point.  Since this means that all 
paths except the one which converges to the saddle point diverge, the only path that 
visits an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of the optimal steady state is the convergent 
one.  Thus the optimal path must converge to the optimal steady state, and (3.13) is in 
fact the required transversality condition. 
To establish that the optimal path must visit an arbitrary neighbourhood of the 
steady state, we observe that the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem shows that when the constraint 
qualification is satisfied3, there exists a multiplier q* such that the optimal steady state 
maximizes the Lagrangian 
 [ ].),(*),( ckPkfqPcU --+ l  
Thus the optimal steady state *)*,*,( Pck  satisfies 
                                                 
2 This approach is similar to the one used by Scheinkman (1976) in the discounted case with many 
stocks. 
3 See, for example, Mangasarian (1969).  See also section 3 in the appendix on optimal control theory 
for the explanation of constraint qualification. 
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[ ]
[ ] . and , ,any for ,),(*),(
***)*,(**)*,(
PckckPkfqPcU
ckPkfqPcU
--+³
--+
l
l
 (3.14) 
It is not difficult to show that under some regularity conditions this inequality can be 
strengthened to the following: if e>- *kk  for any positive  e , then there exists 
0>r  such that 
 
[ ]
[ ] . and any  for ,),(*),(
***)*,(**)*,(*
PcckPkfqPcU
ckPkfqPcUu
rl
l
+--+>
--+=
 (3.15) 
If a path does not visit an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of the optimal steady state, 
there exists some 0>e  such that e>- *)( ktk  for any t.  Inequality (3.15) then 
holds for any t and we can integrate it from  0  to ¥  to obtain 
 [ ] [ ]ò ò
¥ ¥
--¥-<-
0 00
.)(**),( dtkkqdtuPcU r        (3.16) 
Since ,0)( ³¥k  the right side of the inequality is minus infinity.  Thus the value of 
the criterion function of any path that does not visit an arbitrarily small neighbourhood 
of the optimal steady state is minus infinity. 
Now it is easy to construct feasible paths which have values of the criterion 
greater than ¥- .  For example, consider a path which approaches the optimal steady 
state with a constant )0(¹k&  and stops there.  Such a path always exists if the initial 
capital- labour ratio, 0k , is larger than k*, since we can determine )(tc  in such a way 
that )(tk&  is negative and constant until )(tk  reaches k*.  Even if the initial 
capital- labour ratio is smaller than k*, such a path exists as long as kPkf l-- )(  is 
positive for any k between 0k  and k*. 
Since k&  is constant and is not equa l to zero, k* will be reached within a finite 
length of time.  The value of the criterion up to that time is then finite, and after that 
time the value can be made equal to zero by setting *)( ctc =  and *)( PtP = .  Thus 
there exists a feasible path with a finite value of the criterion, and any path that does not 
visit an arbitrarily small neighbourhood of the optimal steady state cannot be optimal. 
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4.  Phase Diagram Analysis 
Now we examine the local behaviour of the optimal path near the optimal steady 
state.  The optimal path satisfies differential equations (1.7) and (3.10), and equation 
(3.11) which must hold at each instant of time.  The dynamic system contains three 
variables: k, c, and P.  In order to work with a two-dimensional phase diagram, we use 
(3.11) to express c as a function, ),( Pkc , of k and P, and obtain differential equations 
of k and P.  Then implicit differentiation of (3.11) yields derivatives of ),( Pkc : 
 ,/),( cPkk SfPkc -=            (4.1) 
 ./)(),( cPPPPP SfSPkc +-=           (4.2) 
Observing 
 ,)( Pckctc Pk &&& +=  
we can rewrite (3.10) as follows using (4.1), (4.2) and (1.7): 
 [ ] [ ]{ },),(),(),(),(),(
),(
1)( PkckPkfPkPkfPk
PkD
tP k --+-= ljlf&  (4.3) 
where 
 ,)(),( ccPPPPcc SUfSUPkD -+=     (4.4a) 
 ,),( ccSUPk -=f       (4.4b) 
 .),( Pkcc fUPk -=j     (4.4c) 
The differential equation (1.7) can also be rewritten using )),(),(()( tPtkctc =  
 ).,(),()( PkckPkftk --= l&           (4.5) 
(4.3) and (4.5) describe the paths that )(tk  and )(tP  must follow.  The optimal 
steady state is the rest point of (4.3) and (4.5) since (3.2), (3.3a), and (3.3b) hold at the 
rest point. 
To construct the phase diagram, we must know the signs of D, f  and j .  
By simple manipulations, D becomes as follows. 
 
[ ]
,0
/)(),( 2
³
-+= ccPPPccPPcc UUUUfUPkD  
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      (4.6) 
where the inequality is obtained from (3.8a) and (3.9c).  In order to determine the 
signs of f  and j , we assume 
 ,0³Pkf          (4.7) 
 .0£cS         (4.8) 
The first inequality implies that capital and population are complementary in production.   
As mentioned in section 2, the second inequality is satisfied in all the examples we have 
calculated.  Since 0£ccU  from the second order condition (3.9a), f  and j  are 
both nonnegative under these assumptions: 
 ,0),( ³Pkf        (4.9) 
 .0),( ³Pkj       (4.10) 
These assumptions also imply that 
 .0),( >Pkck        (4.11) 
We now construct the phase diagram of (4.3) and (4.5).  Following the usual 
procedure, we first examine the loci of 0=P&  and 0=k& .  The locus of 0=k&  is 
 ,0),(),( =-- PkckPkf l     (4.12) 
and the slope of the locus is 
 .0
kk
PP
k fc
cf
dP
dk
-+
-
== l
&      (4.13) 
Since by (3.3a) we have l=kf  at the optimal steady state, the slope there is 
 .0
k
PP
k c
cf
dP
dk -
=
=&
  (4.14) 
 
The denominator is positive by (4.11).  By (4.2) the numerator is   
 [ ],1 cPPP
c
PP SSSfS
cf ×-+=-  
which is also positive from (4.6), (3.5b) and the strict concavity of ),( Pkf .  Thus the 
0=k&  locus is upward sloping at the Golden Rule: 
 00 >=kdP
dk
&                at   .l=kf       (4.15) 
Since we have 
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 [ ] ,0),(),( >-=--
¶
¶
PP cfPkckPkfP
l     (4.16) 
ckfk --= l&  is negative above the 0=k&  locus and positive below the locus as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Next, consider the locus of 0=P& .  From (4.3) it is a combination of the 0=k&  
locus and the locus of 
 .0),( =- Pkf kl      (4.17) 
 
The slope of the locus of (4.17) is 
 ,0/ >-== kkkPkf ffdP
dk
l      (4.18) 
where the inequality is the result of concavity and complementarity.  The locus of 
(4.17) is, therefore, upward sloping.  Since 
 
[ ]
,0
),(
>
-=-
¶
¶
kkk fPkfk
l
 
kf-l  is positive above the locus of kf=l  and negative below the locus.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
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The locus of kf=l  intersects with the 0=k&  locus at the Golden Rule.  The 
0=k&  locus is steeper than the locus of kf=l  at the intersection point since the 
following inequality holds there: 
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-+-
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- ==
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kkkPPPcP
kk
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PP
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fffSSS
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f
c
cf
dP
dk
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kl&
   
    (4.20) 
where we used (3.5b) and (4.7).  Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the two 
loci.  Since D, f  and j  are all nonnegative, the 0=P&  locus passes through 
regions (A) and (C) in Figure 3, and P&  is positive on the side of region (D).  There 
are three possibilities: 
(i) the 0=P&  locus is downward sloping, 
(ii) the 0=P&  locus is upward sloping but flatter than the kf=l  locus, and 
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(iii) the 0=P&  locus is upward sloping and steeper than the 0=k&  locus. 
The slope of the 0=P&  locus is, at the Golden Rule, 
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  (4.21) 
and 
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  (4.22) 
These relationships imply that 
 
00 == > kP dP
dk
dP
dk
&&     if     22 ))(/())(/1( ccccPkkk SUUff ->-   (4.23) 
Optimal Growth 
165 
 00 <=PdP
dk
&          if   22 ))(/())(/1( ccccPkkk SUUff -<-   (4.24) 
Thus case (i) is obtained if ,))(/())(/1( 22 ccccPkkk SUUff -<-  and case (iii) otherwise, 
but case (ii) never occurs. 
In case (i), we obtain a phase diagram depicted in Figure 4.  The optimal steady 
state is a saddle point and all paths except for the two stable branches diverge.  Since it 
was shown in the preceding section that the optimal path must visit any arbitrarily small 
neighbourhood of the optimal steady state, the optimal path must be one of the stable 
branches.  The diagram also shows that at least in the neighbourhood of the steady 
state the optimal path is either in the region where 0>k&  and 0<P&  or in the region 
where 0<k&  and 0<P& .  The population of a city therefore declines as capital 
accumulates.  Notice,  
 
 
however, that this conclusion may not hold globally as Figure 5 illustrates. 
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In case (iii), we obtain a phase diagram like Figure 6.  The optimal steady state is 
a saddle point in this case as well and the optimal solution is either of the stable 
branches.  It can be seen from the diagram that the population of a city rises as capital 
accumulates in the neighbourhood of the Golden Rule. 
 
 
 
These results are summarized in the following theorem:  
 
Theorem 1: Suppose 0£cS and 0³Pkf .  If
22 ))(/())(/1( ccccPkkk SUUff -<- , then 
the population of a city falls as capital accumulates in the neighbourhood of the optimal 
Optimal Growth 
167 
steady state ; and if 22 ))(/())(/1( ccccPkkk SUUff ->- , then the population rises. 
 
The assumption of complementarity, 0³Pkf , is rather arbitrary although the 
assumption is satisfied in most widely used production functions such as the 
Cobb-Douglas and CES functions.  If capital and population are anticomplementary, 
the following result is obtained. 
 
Theorem 2: Suppose 0£cS and 0£Pkf .  Then the population of a city falls as 
capital accumulates in the neighbourhood of the optimal steady state. 
 
Labour augmenting technical progress, or Harrod neutral technical progress, can 
be incorporated in this analysis quite easily although other types of technical progress 
are not easy to handle.  When the rate of labour augmenting technical progress is s , 
the same result as in the case without the technical progress is obtained if l  is 
replaced by sl +  and P by the population in terms of efficiency labour, tPeQ s= .  
Since P and Q have the relationship: 
 ,s-=
Q
Q
P
P &&       (4.25) 
the rate of increase of the population of a city is smaller by the technical progress rate 
than the case without the technical progress.  Thus labour augmenting technical 
progress introduces a tendency for city size to decline over time. 
The reason why the sign and the magnitude of Pkf , are crucial in Theorems 1 
and 2 must be obvious.  The population size is determined in such a way that 
0=+ PfS , i.e., the marginal cost of having a bigger population on the consumption 
side balances the marginal externality benefit on the production side.  If Pkf , is 
positive, an increase in the capital- labour ratio increases the marginal benefit and tends 
to increase the population of a city.  This tendency would be offset if the marginal cost 
on the consumption side rises.  As capital- labour ratio rises, per capita consumption 
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usually increases.  If cS  is nonpositive as assumed in the Theorems, the marginal cost 
2 also rises.  Theorem 1 states that when 2))(/( cccc SUU-  is greater than 
2))(/1( Pkkk ff- , this effect overwhelms the effect of the rise in the marginal benefit.  
If Pkf , is negative, both effects work in the same direction and the population of a city 
always declines in the process of capital accumulation as in Theorem 2. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
We have characterized the condition required for capital accumulation to be 
accompanied by an increase in the population of a city.  It was shown that the 
population growth tends to occur if capital and the external economy are 
complementary in production and that the population tends to decline if the marginal 
rate of substitution between the population and consumption becomes greater in 
absolute value as the consumption increases.  It is believed that ordinary factors of 
production 
are usually complementary, although it is not clear whether this is true if there are 
externalities.  In examples that we have calculated, the marginal rate of substitution 
between the population of a city and consumption rises in absolute value as the 
consumption increases.  Empirical studies are therefore necessary to determine 
whether capital accumulation favours bigger cities. 
It is quite obvious that our model is too simple to capture the complexity of 
modern cities.  It does not deal with the following important aspects of real cities. 
First, we do not have a hierarchy of cities.  Rather, our cities are identical.  
More than one kind of good has to be introduced to obtain a hierarchy of cities. 
Second, the production function is assumed to remain the same over time (except 
for the possibility of labour augmenting technical change).  It might have been shifting 
to increase the benefits of bigger cities. 
Third, perfect mobility and malleability of capital is not a realistic assumption, 
and there are costs involved in building a new city, which tends to reduce the number of 
cities and hence to increase the size of a city. 
Fourth, there is a good reason to believe that a market economy has a very 
different growth path from the optimal one.  As shown in Chapter II, the market 
equilibrium is not unique and a city size greater than the optimum may well be an 
equilibrium. 
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Fifth, technical progress and capital accumulation in transportation sector has 
worked to reduce the cost of bigger cities. 
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APPENDIX I 
EQUALITY AND THE BENTHAMITE SOCIAL 
WELFARE FUNCTION 
In this appendix we explain the reason why utility levels differ between different 
locations at the Benthamite optimum.  The basic reason is that the utility possibility 
frontier is skewed in favour of households living farther from the center.  This can be 
illustrated by considering a rectangular city consisting only of two households.  For 
notational simplicity, the width of the city is assumed to be 1, i.e., 1)( =xq .  
Household i consumes iz  of the consumer good and ih  of space.  Both households 
are assumed to commute to the center of the city from the center of their properties, i.e., 
commuting costs of household 1 and 2 are respectively )
2
1( 1ht  and )2
1( 21 hht + , 
where household 1 lives closer to the center.  This city is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
The resource constraint for the city is given by 
 .)()
2
1()
2
1( 2121121 YhhRhhthtzz a =++++++           (1) 
Given the resource constraint, we can obtain the set of feasible utility levels of the 
two households. The frontier of the set is called the utility possibility frontier and 
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depicted by the curve LL' in Figure 2.  The utility possibility frontier expresses the 
maximum utility that household 1 can achieve at every possible utility level for 
household 2.  It is obtained by maximizing 1u , subject to the resource constraint and 
to 
 .),( 222 uhzu ³    (2) 
The Lagrangian is therefore 
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The first order conditions can be summarized as 
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Now it can be shown that the utility possibility frontier; is skewed as in Figure 2, 
so that its slope is flatter than minus 1 when the two households obtain the same utility 
level. 
By the Envelope Theorem in Appendix III, the slope of the utility possibility 
frontier is 
 .
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1
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Since the last term on the RHS of (4) is negative, we have 
 .
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h
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h >          (6) 
Thus the slope of an indifference curve is steeper at ),( 11 hz  than at ),( 22 hz .  Due to 
the convexity of indifference curves, this implies, as shown in Figure 3, that 21 zz >  
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and 21 hh >  if 21 uu = . But if land is a normal good, the following inequality is 
obtained from (I.2.7) and (I.2.8):  
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Hence, zu  decreases as z increases along an indifference curve and we finally 
obtain 
 .1
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uu  
As the simple sum of utilities is maximized in the Benthamite case, the Benthamite 
optimum is point A in Figure 2 at which the 45° line 1I  is tangent to the utility 
possibility frontier.  Since the utility possibility frontier is flatter than 45° when 
Appendix I 
173 
utility levels are equal, the optimum must lie below the equal-utility line 00’.1  Thus 
household 2 receives a higher utility level than household 1. 
 
This result generalizes to any smooth symmetric quasiconcave social welfare 
function, ),( 21 uuW , represented by indifference curves like 2I  since all indifference 
curves of a smooth symmetric social welfare function must have slope -1 along the 
equal-utility line 00'.  A symmetric quasi-concave social welfare function yields equal 
utility levels only if indifference curves have kinks along the 45° line, as 3I  does. 
One example is the Rawlsian case represented by 4I . 
The skewed utility possibility frontier is a result of the so-called concealed 
nonconvexity.  In our model, it is assumed that a household must choose only one 
location and cannot live at more than one location at a time.  This assumption can be 
interpreted in two ways.  First, it may be considered as a restriction on the 
consumption set.  For example, in Figure 4, which describes housing consumptions at 
two locations x and x', the consumption set is limited to the two axes, and any point 
within the first quadrangle cannot be chosen. In this case, the consumption set is not 
obviously convex.  Second, the assumption may be a consequence of nonconvex 
preferences.  If indifference curves are concave to the  origin as in the Figure 4, a 
household, given a linear budget constraint, always chooses one of the corners. 
                                                 
1 It is implicitly assumed that the utility possibility set is convex.  This is true if the transportation cost 
function is convex and the utility function is concave. 
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Figure 4.  Concealed Nonconvexity 
In our model, this nonconvexity is not harmful for the existence and efficiency of 
competitive equilibrium, since enough smoothness is obtained by introducing a 
population density function.  The crucial assumption is that the population density at 
each distance can be any real number.  This is not true in a model with several regions 
in which the population in each region must be an integer.  In such a case demand for 
land in one region is discontinuous at the price level where an individual moves in or 
out of the region.  Hence, there may never be a price vector that equilibriate the market 
for land.  If, however, the population in a region can be any real number, such 
discontinuity will not occur and the existence of competitive equilibrium will be 
guaranteed.  Schweizer, Varaiya and Hartwick (1976) proved that competitive 
equilibrium exists in a model with the concealed nonconvexity if a population density 
can be any real number. 
This result is analogous to the well-known result in general equilibrium theory 
(due to Star (1969) and others) that nonexistence of equilibrium caused by 
nonconvexities of individual units disappears as the economy becomes larger relative to 
individual economic units.  In particular, it is parallel to the work of Aumann (1966) 
which shows that in a model with a continuum of households, each of infinitesimal 
endowment, the existence of competitive equilibrium can be proven without making 
any assumption about convexity. 
Although the nonconvexity does not introduce any difficulty concerning the 
existence and efficiency of competitive equilibrium, it causes inequality in utility levels. 
The asymmetry in the utility possibility frontier arises since housed holds living near 
the center, for example, are not allowed an access to land in the suburbs.  In such a 
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case, households living at different locations face different opportunity sets.  If, 
however, households can live at more than one location, they all face exactly the same 
budget constraint and there is no difference between households.  The utility 
possibility frontier is then symmetric and all households receive the same utility level at 
the Benthamite optimum. 
Some economists prefer the Benthamite case on the grounds that the Rawlsian 
social welfare function must be assumed to obtain the equal-utility optimum.  As can 
be seen from Fig. 2 however, this claim is not true.  Utility leve ls are equal at the 
optimum if the social welfare indifference curves have sufficiently strong kinks along 
the equal-utility line. 
Any symmetric indifference curve with no kinks has a slope -1 along the equal 
utility line.  This implies that in the neighborhood of the equal utility line the social 
welfare function behaves in the same way as the Benthamite social welfare function.  
Thus at least locally the aggregate utility is maximized and the social welfare function 
exhibits no preference for equality of utility levels.  If local preference for equality is 
assumed at the point where utility levels are equal, indifference curves will have kinks 
and utility levels may be equal at the optimum. 
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APPENDIX II 
LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS IN A MORE 
GENERAL MODEL 
 
In this appendix the analysis in Chapter III is extended to the case of two factors 
of production.  It is assumed that there is more than one kind of consumer goods and 
that land as well as labour is used in producing the consumer goods.  The production 
function of the i-th consumer good is written as 
  kiHLF ii
i ,,1),( K=  (1) 
where iL  and iH  are respectively labour and land inputs.  Assuming that the 
production function is homogeneous of degree one, we obtain the per-unit- land 
production function, )( i
i lf : 
  )()1,(),( i
i
i
i
ii
iii
i lfH
H
L
FHHLF ==               (2) 
where il  is the labour- land ratio, ii HL / . 
The utility function of city residents is 
 ),),(),(( Xxhxzu  (3) 
where )),(,),(,),(()( 1 xzxzxzxz ki KK=  is the vector of consumer goods. 
In contrast to our procedure in Chapter III, we assume a vector of transportation 
costs )),(,),(,),(()( 1 xtxtxtxt ki KK=  for consumer goods within a city.  Each city 
now has a port, or perhaps a railroad station at the center, where goods are bought at 
prices ),,,,( 1 ki pppp KK=  for distribution throughout the economy.  Cities are 
small, so that prices are effectively parametric, and producers at x face the net price 
vector 
  ).()( xtpxp -=  (4) 
If good i is produced at x, we obtain the following equations by profit 
maximization: 
  )())((')( xwxlfxP i
i
i =         (5) 
  )())]((')()[( xRxlfxlfxP i
i
i
i
i =-        (6) 
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where )(xw  and )(xR  are respectively wage rate and land rent at x. 
We assume that there is also a retail market at the center of the city.  In buying 
the consumer goods, residents in the city are assumed to incur transportation costs from 
the market to the place of residence.  Therefore, households living at x face the price 
vector of the consumer good: 
  ).()( xtpxq +=  (7) 
In each city one developer collects land rent and pays the rural rent and the costs 
of the public good.  The profit is distributed equally among all households in the 
economy.  If we assume that there are many identical cities, a household receives 
dividends from many developers and a change in one city does not significantly affect 
the total dividend, s, that a household receives.  A household working at x' receives the 
wage, ),(xw ¢  and the dividend. If the household lives at x, the budget constraint is 
  [ ] )()()()()()()( xhxRxtxtxzxqsxw hh +¢-+×=+¢     (8) 
where )(xth  is the commuting costs from x to 0 and hence )()( xtxt hh ¢-  is the 
commuting costs from x to x'. 
We assume that all households have the same skill and the same utility function. 
Then all households receive the same utility level in equilibrium.  This implies that all 
households living at the same location must receive the same net income after 
commuting costs wherever they work.  Therefore, we obtain 
  ),()( xtwxw h ¢-=¢  (9) 
where )0(ww º . 
A household's utility maximization yields 
  .,,1
)(
)(
kI
xq
xR
u
u
iz
h
i
K==       (10) 
Using (9), we can rewrite (5) and (8) as 
  )())((')( xtwxlfxp hi
i
i -=              (11) 
  )()()()()( xhxRxtxzxqsw h ++×=+    (12) 
Totally differentiating (11) and (6), we obtain 
  )())((")( xdlxlfxpdw ii
i
i=               (13) 
  )()())((")()( xdRxdlxlfxlxp ii
i
ii =- .        (14) 
Combining these two equations, the following simple relationship can be obtained:  
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  dwxlxdR i )()( -=    (15) 
Totally differentiating (3) and (12), and noting the small city assumption that the 
utility level is given, we obtain 
  dXuxdhuxdzu xhz ++= )()(0  
  ).()()()()()( xdRxhxdhxRxdzxqdw ++×=  
From these two equations we have 
  .)()( dwdx
u
u
xdRxh
z
x +=         (16) 
From (15) and (16) , the change of the total rent in the city due to an increase of 
the public good is equal to the social benefit of the public good: 
  
.)(
)()()(
)()()()(
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dw
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dw
dxxxl
dx
dw
dxx
dx
xdR
q
q
 (17) 
The last equality is obtained using the fact that the total labour force must be 
equal to the population of the city.  Thus, even if there are more than one factor of 
production and more than one consumer good, the benefit of the public good is reflected 
in the increase of land rent in a small city.   
We can also see that the profit maximization of a city developer leads to an 
efficient supply of the public good. A city developer maximizes 
  [ ]ò --
x
a xCdxxRxR0 ),()()( q  
where )(XC  is the cost of producing the public good.  Then 
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ò
ò
ò
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u
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As in section 3 of Chapter III it can be seen that the last equality is the condition 
for an efficient supply of the public good. 
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Notice that this result does not depend on the number of commodities produced in 
the city, or on whether different goods are produced in different zones.  We used only 
the conditions for a small city: given utility level; given price vector of consumer goods; 
and constant returns to scale in production.  Although in general the wage rate changes 
as the supply of the public good changes, it does not affect the conclusion, since the 
effects on the production side and the consumption side cancel out each other. 
This result can be interpreted in the same way as in section 1 of Chapter III.  The 
benefits of the public good must accrue to somebody or become a deadweight loss.  
But there is no deadweight loss if there are no distortions in the rest of the economy.  
Therefore, all the benefit must be received by somebody.  By the assumption of a 
small city, the residents cannot benefit from the public good.  Because of constant 
returns to scale there is no profit in equilibrium.  Thus the land rent is the only place 
the benefit appears. 
This argument suggests that if returns to scale are constant, the sum of land rent 
and the profits (or losses) of producers reflects the benefit of the public good.  It is not 
difficult to show that this is indeed true. 
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APPENDIX III 
THE ENVELOPE PROPERTY 
 
Optimization imposes a very strong structure on the problem considered.  This is 
the reason why neoclassical economics, which assumes optimizing behaviour, has been 
the most successful of social sciences.  One of its important aspects is the envelope 
property discussed in this Appendix. 
The envelope property is concerned with the rate of change of the maximum (or 
minimum) value of a criterion function caused by a change in some parameter; for 
example, a change in the maximum utility level of a household caused by a change in 
income, a change in the minimum cost of production caused by a change in the output 
level, and so on.  A change in a parameter in general induces a change in the optimum 
levels of choice variables.  According to the envelope property, however, the induced 
change in the choice variables may be ignored in calculating the effect of a change in a 
parameter on the maximum value if the change is very small.  In other words, a change 
in the maximum value caused by a marginal change in a parameter, which also induces 
a change in the choice variables, is equal to a change in criterion function with choice 
variables fixed. 
In section 1, the envelope property is explained in the simplest possible case.  
The Envelope Theorem is stated and proved in section 2.  In section 3 properties of the 
indirect utility function and the expenditure function are derived as applications of the 
Envelope Theorem. 
 
1.  The Simplest Case 
The essence of the envelope property may be explained using the following 
simple maximization problem.  Consider the problem of maximizing the criterion 
function, ),( bxV , with respect to x for a given parameter b.  An interior maximum is 
obtained at the point where the derivative of the criterion function with respect to x is 
zero, 
 .0),( =
¶
¶
x
bxV  
The maximizing value of x changes as the parameter b changes: from x* to x*' as 
b moves to b'.  The envelope property states that the total effect of an infinitesimal 
change in the parameter on the maximized value of the criterion function (including the 
effect of an induced change in the optimum value of x) equals the partial effect on the 
criterion function with the level of x fixed.  In Figure 1 the former is the movement 
from V to V’; and the latter from V to V~ .  Since the criterion function is 
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approximately flat near the optimum point, the difference between the two, VV ¢~ , is 
very small compared with VV ~ .  As the change in the parameter approaches zero, the 
difference becomes negligible and the envelope property can be invoked. 
 
 
 
The envelope property can be derived by mechanically differentiating the 
criterion function at the maximum.  Since the optimum value of x depends on b, it 
can be described as a function, )(* bx , of b.  Then the total effect including a 
change in x* is 
 
b
V
db
dx
x
V
db
bbxdV
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
=
*)),(*(  
and the partial effect is 
 .)*,(
b
bxV
¶
¶  
The two are equal since 0/ =¶¶ xV  at the optimum. 
Figure 2 illustrates why this property is called the envelope property.  The heavy 
curve represents the maximum value, )),(*()(* bbxVbV = , of the criterion function 
corresponding to different values of the parameter.  The lighter curves describe the 
value of the criterion achieved with fixed values, x  (and x¢ ) of x, as b is varied.  
The values and the slopes of the two types of curves, )),(*( bbxV  and ),( bxV , are 
equal at the value of b for which x is optimal, that is, where )(* bxx = .  The two 
curves are tangent at that point, and ),( bxV  is below )(* bV  everywhere else, since 
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)(* bV  is the maximum: ),()(* bxVbV >  if )(* bxx = .  This holds for any x  and 
the curve )(* bV  is the envelope of the curves ),( bxV . 
 
 
 
Figure 2 suggests another way of proving the envelope property.  Since )(* bV  
is maximum, ),()(* bxVbV ³  for any b and ),()(* bxVbV =  if )(* bxx = .  This 
implies that ),( bxV  lies below )(* bV  everywhere and the two coincide at the value 
of b for which x  is optimal.  If the two curves are smooth, this is possible only when 
the two curves are tangent at this point, which proves the envelope property: 
bbxVdbbdv ¶¶= /),(/)(*  if )(* bxx = . 
The envelope property appears in many areas of economics.  Probably the most 
famous application is the relationship between the long-run cost curve and the short-run 
cost curve.  The short-run cost curve is obtained when only a subset of factors are 
optimally chosen, and the long-run cost curve when all factors are chosen optimally.  
In the short run some factor inputs are fixed whereas in the long run they become 
variable and can be chosen optimally.  Cost curves describe the minimized cost as 
functions of the output.  The argument in the last proof of the envelope property can be 
applied to show that the long-run cost curve is an envelope of short-run cost curves. 1 
Another important example is concerned with benefits of a public good.  
Consider a household with the utility function, ),,( Xhzu , where z is the composite 
consumer good and the numeraire, h is the lot size, and X is the supply of a public good.  
For a given consumption bundle the marginal benefit of the public good is 
XXhzu ¶¶ /),,( .  When the consumption bundle is optimally chosen, the maximum 
utility level depends on the income, I, the land rent, R, and the level of the public good, 
                                                 
1 See Dixit (1976). 
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X, and it can be described by the indirect utility function, ),,( XIRv .  For the 
optimum consumption bundle the marginal benefit of the public good is 
XXIRv ¶¶ /),,( .  The envelope property implies that 
XXIRvXXhzu ¶¶=¶¶ /),,(/),,(  if z and h are optimal given R, I, and X.  This result 
is used in Chapter III. 
2.  The Envelope Theorem 
Consider the problem of maximizing the criterion function ),( bxf  subject to the 
constraints ,,,2,1,0),( mjbxg j K==  with respect to the vector ),,,( 21 nxxxx K=  for 
a fixed vector of parameters ),,,( 21 qbbbb K= .  Let )(* bx  be the optimal choice for 
this problem.  Then granted a certain regularity condition2 there exists the vector of 
Lagrange multipliers ),,,( 21 mllll K=  such that )(* bx  maximizes the Lagrangian 
  ),(),(),,( bxgbxfbx ×+=F ll  (2.1) 
without any constraint, where )),,(,),,(),,((),( 21 bxgbxgbxgbxg mK=  and the dot 
between λ and ),( bxg  denote the inner product so that 
  ).,(),(
1
bxgbxg jj
h
j
ll
=
å=×  
If ),( bxf  and ),( bxg  are differentiable with respect to x, the optimal choice, 
)(* bxx = , satisfies the first order necessary conditions, 
  .,,2,1,0/),(/),( nixbxxbxf igi K==¶¶×+¶¶ l  (2.2) 
The Envelope Theorem describes a relationship between the maximum value function 
)),(*()(* bbxfbf =  and the Lagrangian ),,( bx lF . 
 
                                                 
2 The condition is called the Jacobian condition, and requires that the Jacobian matrix of first order 
partial derivatives of constraint functions, 
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be of full row rank m at the optimum.  In nonlinear programming which deals with the more general 
case which includes inequality constraints, a similar condition, called the constraint qualification, must 
be satisfied. 
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The Envelope Theorem : Assume that )(* bf  and ),,( bx lF  are continuously 
differentiable in b.  Then at )(* bxx = , 
 .,,2,1,/),,(/)(* qkbbxbbf kk K=¶¶=¶¶ lf    (2.3) 
Proof：  
Since )(* bx  satisfies the constraint 0)),(*( =bbxg  for any b, we have 
 .,,2,1,0/)/)()(/(
1
*
1 qkbgbbxxg
n
i
kki K==¶¶+¶¶¶¶å
=
  (2.4) 
By the definition of the maximum value function and the first order condition (2.2), we 
obtain 
 
å
å
=
=
¶¶+¶¶¶¶×-=
¶¶+¶¶¶¶=¶¶
n
i
kki
n
i
kkik
bfbxxg
bfbxxfbbf
1
*
1
1
*
1
/)/)(/(
/)/)(/(/)(*
l
    (2.5) 
 (2.4) now yields the desired result: 
 
./),,(
///)(*
k
kkk
bbx
bfbgbbf
¶¶=
¶¶+¶¶×=¶¶
lf
l
 
            Q.E.D. 
 
3.  Applications: Properties of Indirect Utility Function and the 
Expenditure Function 
Consider a consumer with a utility function, )(xu , where x is the consumption 
vector, ),...,,( 21 nxxxx º .  The consumer maximizes the utility function subject to the 
budget constraint, 
  ,Ixp =×   (3.1) 
where p is the price vector, ),...,,( 21 npppp º , I the money income, and 
  .
1
å
=
=×
n
i
iixpxp  
The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is 
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  ],[)( xpIxu ×-+=Y d   (3.2) 
where δ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (3.1).  The 
first order conditions are 
  nipxu ii ,,2,1,/ K==¶¶ d  (3.3) 
The optimal consumption depends on income and prices, and can be written as 
),( Ipx .  Substituting ),( Ipxx =  into the utility function )(xu  yields the maximum 
utility level, )),,((),( IpxuIpv º  which can be achieved at the given values of income 
and prices.  ),( Ipv  is called the indirect utility function.  The Envelope Theorem,  
(2.3), may then be applied to examine the effect of a change in prices and the income on 
the maximized utility level: 
  ,,,2,1,/ nixpv ii K=-=¶¶ d  (3.4) 
  d=¶¶ Iv / .   (3.5) 
The latter equality shows that the Lagrange multiplier equals the marginal 
contribution to the maximum utility level made by an increase in income, or the 
marginal utility of income.  The multiplier is, therefore, interpreted as the shadow 
value of the monetary income in utility terms. 
If a dollar increase in income is all spent on good i, the increase in utility is given 
by 
  ./
i
i
P
xu ¶¶  
This is equal to the marginal utility of income which is obtained when the increase in 
income can be optimally distributed among all goods, since by (3.3) a marginal increase 
in expenditures increases the utility by the same amount, whichever good is purchased.  
Thus 
  .,,2,1// niIv
P
xu
i
i K=¶¶=
¶¶  
(3.4) has the following interpretation.  If the price of the i-th good is raised by a 
dollar per unit and consumption of the i-th good is fixed, expenditure on that good must 
increase by ix  dollars, and expenditure on other goods must decrease by the same 
amount.  The utility level would therefore decline by ix  times the marginal utility of 
income.  By (3.3) it does not matter if substitution occurs: at the optimum all goods 
have the same marginal utility per dollar expenditure. 
Combining (3.4) and (3.5) yields Roy's Identity: 
  
,,,2,1),,(ˆ
)/),(/()/),((
niIpx
IIpvpIpvx
i
ii
K=º
¶¶¶¶-=
 (3.6) 
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which is derived in Chapter I without using the Envelope Theorem.  ),(ˆ Ipxi  is the 
uncompensated (or Marshallian) demand function.  This result is quite useful: demand 
functions can be obtained simply by differentiating the indirect utility function. 
Next, consider the problem of minimizing the expenditure necessary to achieve a 
given utility level.  In this problem, xp ×  is minimized under the constraint, 
  ,)( uxu =  (3.7) 
for a given u.  The minimum expenditure level is a function of prices and the utility 
level, ),,( upE  which is called the expenditure function. 
If l  is the Lagrange multiplier, the Lagrangian is 
  )],([ xuuxp -+×=F l       (3.8) 
and 
  .,,2,1),/( nixup ii K=¶¶= l  (3.9) 
By the Envelope Theorem, (2.3), 
  ,/),( uupE ¶¶=l  (3.10) 
  ).,(/),( upxpupEx iii º¶¶=                (3.11) 
The latter equation is usually called Shephard's Lemma and gives the compensated 
demand function ),( upxi . 
It can be easily shown that the expenditure function is concave as a function of 
prices for any fixed utility level.  Let p and p' be two arbitrary price vectors and x* and 
x*' be corresponding optimal consumption vectors.  Then 
  *= xpupE ・),(  
and 
  '),( *xpupE ・¢=¢ . 
Consider a new price vector pttpp ¢-+= )1(ˆ  for an arbitrary t between 0 and 1, and 
the corresponding consumption vector *xˆ .  The following inequalities hold: 
  ,ˆ ** xpxp ・・ £  
and 
  .ˆ ** xpxp ・・ ¢£¢  
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Multiplying the first inequality by t and the second by t-1  and adding them 
yields 
  
).,()1(),(
')1(
ˆ))1((),)1((
**
*
upEtuptE
xptxtp
xpttpupttpE
¢-+=
¢-+³
¢-+=¢-+
・・
・
 
Thus ),( upE  is concave with respect to p.  If E is twice differentiable, the concavity 
implies 
  .0/),(/),( 22 £¶¶=¶¶ iii pupxpupE      (3.12) 
This shows that price increase for any good does not increase the uncompensated 
demand for that good, i.e., the own substitution effect is nonpositive.  This is used in 
Equation (I.1.20) of Chapter 1. 
Now, we derive the Slutsky equation, describing the relationship between the 
uncompensated and compensated demand functions.  For given prices and income, 
utility maximization yields the indirect utility function ),( Ipv  and the uncompensated 
demand function ),,(ˆ Ipxi  ni ,,2,1 K= .  Consider the expenditure minimization given 
the maximum utility level ),( Ipvu = .  Unless some prices are zero, in which case 
some technical difficulty appears, the optimal choices coincide and ),( upEI = .  The 
uncompensated demand function therefore satisfies 
  .,,2,1)),,(,(ˆ),( niupEpxupx ii K==  (3.13) 
Differentiation of this equation with respect to jP  yields 
  
),,(]/),(ˆ[/),(ˆ
]/),(][/),(ˆ[/),(ˆ/),(
upxIIpxpIpx
pupEIIpxpIpxpupx
jiji
jijiji
¶¶+¶¶=
¶¶¶¶+¶¶=¶¶
 (3.14) 
where the last term results from substituting according to (3.10).  This is the Slutsky 
equation, 
  ,
..
I
x
x
jP
ix
jP
ix i
j
constIconstu
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
=
¶
¶
==
  (3.15) 
used in deriving (V.2.27) 
Compensated and uncompensated demand functions satisfy another relationship 
which is also used in deriving (V.2.27).  Following an argument similar to that which 
led to (3.13), we obtain 
  .,,1),,(ˆ)),(,( niIpxIpvpx ii K==  
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Taking a partial derivative with respect to I, we obtain  
  
.,...,1,/),(ˆ
]/),(][/),([
niIIpx
IIpvuupx
i
i
=¶¶=
¶¶¶¶
   (3.16) 
 
 
Notes 
 
Discussions in this Appendix owe very much to Dixit (1976).  The Envelope 
Theorem in section 2 was proved by Afriat (1971) and can also be found in Takayama 
(1974). 
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APPENDIX IV 
OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY 
 
This appendix provides a concise review of optimal control theory.  Many 
economic problems require the use of optimal control theory.  For example, 
optimization over time such as maximizations of utility over an individual's life time 
and of profit and social welfare of a country over time and optimization over space such 
as the ones analyzed in this book fit in its framework. 
Although these problems may be solved by the conventional techniques such as 
Lagrange's method and nonlinear programming if we formulate the problems in 
discrete form by dividing time (or distance) into a finite number of intervals, continuous 
time (or space) models are usually more convenient and yield results which are more 
transparent.  Optimization over continuous time, however, introduces some technical 
difficulties.  In the continuous time model, the number of choice variables is no longer 
finite: since decisions may be taken at each instant of time, there is a continuously 
infinite number of choice variables.  The rigorous treatment of optimization in an 
infinite-dimensional space requires the use of very advanced mathematics.  
Fortunately, once proven, the major results are quite simple, and analogous to those in 
the optimization in a finite-dimensional space. 
There are three approaches in the optimal control theory: calculus of variations, 
the maximum principle and dynamic programming.  Calculus of variations is the oldest 
among the three and treats only the interior solution.  In applications, as it turned out, 
choice variables are often bounded, and may jump from one bound to the other in the 
interval considered.  The maximum principle was developed to include such cases.  
Roughly speaking, calculus of variations and the maximum principle are derived by 
using some appropriate forms of differentiation in an infinite-dimensional space.  
Dynamic programming however, exploits the recursive nature of the problem.  Many 
problems including those treated by calculus of variations and the maximum principle 
have the property that the optimal policy from any arbitrary time on depends only on 
the state of the system at that time and does not depend on the paths that the choice 
variables have taken up to that time.  In such cases the maximum value of the 
objective function beyond time t can be considered as a function of the state of the 
system at time t.  This function is called the value function.  The value function yields 
the value which the best possible performance from t to the end of the interval achieves.  
The dynamic programming approach solves the optimization problem by first obtaining 
the value function.  Although the maximum principle and dynamic programming yield 
the same results, where they can both be applied, dynamic programming is less general 
than the approach based on the maximum principle, since it requires differentiability of 
the value function. 
We first try to facilitate an intuitive understanding of control theory in section 1.  
In order to do so, a very simple control problem is formulated and the necessary 
conditions for the optimum are derived heuristically.  Following the dynamic 
programming approach, Pontryagin's maximum principle is derived from the partial 
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differential equation of dynamic programming.  As mentioned above, this approach is 
not the most general one, but it facilitates economic interpretation of the necessary 
conditions.  In section 2 the results in section 1 are applied to an example taken from 
Chapter VII.  Section 3 considers a more general form of the control problem (due to 
Bolza and Hestenes) and Hestenes' theorem, giving the necessary conditions for the 
optimum, is stated without proof.  This theorem is general enough to include most 
problems that appear in this book.  Finally, in section 4, Hestenes' theorem is used to 
solve the control problems in Chapter I. 
1.  A Simple Control Problem 
Consider a dynamic process which starts at inital time 0t  and ends at terminal 
time 1t .  Both 0t  and 1t   are taken as given in this section.  For simplicity, the 
state of the system is described by only one variable, )(tx , called the state variable.   
In most economic problems the state variable is usually a stock, such as the amounts of 
capital equipments and inventories available at time t.  In Chapters IV and V of our 
book the volume of traffic at a radius is a state variable. 
The state of the system is influenced by the choice of control variables, 
),(,),(),( 21 tututu rK  which are summarized as the control vector, 
  )).(,),(),(()( 21 tutututu rK=           (1.1) 
The control vector must lie inside a given subset of a Euclidean r-dimensional space, U : 
  ,,)( 10 tttUtu ££Î  (1.2) 
where U is assumed to be closed and unchanging.  Note that control variables are 
chosen at each point of time.  The rate of investment in capital equipment is one of the 
control variables in most models of capital accumulation; the rate of inventory 
investment is a variable in inventory adjustment models; and the population per unit 
distance is a control variable for the models in this book.  An entire path of the control 
vector, )(tu , ,10 ttt ££  is a vector-valued function )(tu  from the interval [ ]10 , tt  
into the r-dimensional space and is simply called a control.  A control is admissible if 
it satisfies the constraint (1.2) and some other regularity conditions which will be 
specified in section 3. 
The state variable moves according to the differential equation 
  ),),(),(()( 1 ttutxftxdt
dx
== &      (1.3) 
where 1f  is assumed to be continuously differentiable.  Notice that the function 1f , 
is not the same as 0f .  In this section the initial state, )( 0tx , is given, 
  ,)( 00 xtx =       (1.4) 
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where 0x  is some constant, but the terminal state, )( 1tx , is unrestricted.  For 
example, the capital stock at initial time is fixed; the rate of change of the capital stock 
equals the rate of investment minus depreciation; and the capital stock at terminal time 
is not restricted. 
The problem to be solved is that of maximizing the objective functional 
  ò += 10 )),(()),(),(( 1100
t
t
ttxSdtttutxfJ     (1.5) 
with respect to the control vector, )(tu , ,10 ttt ££  subject to the constraints (1.2), 
(1.3), and (1.4), where 0f  and 0S , the functions which make up the objective 
functional are continuously differentiable.  A functional is defined as a function of a 
function or functions, that is, a mapping from a space of functions to a space of 
numbers.  In the investment decision problem for a firm, for example, 
dtttutxf )),(),((0  is the amount of profit earned in the time interval [ ]dttt +,  and 
)),(( 110 ttxS  is the scrap value of the amount of capital )( 1tx  at terminal time 1t . 
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The problem is illustrated in Figure 1.  In Fig.la, a possible trajectory of the state 
variable with the initial value 0x  is depicted.  If the trajectory of the control vector is 
specified for the entire time horizon [ ]10 , tt , the trajectory of the state variable is 
completely characterized.  The value of the state variable at time t and the choice of 
the control vector then jointly determine )),(),((0 ttutxf . 
In Fig.1b we graph the part of the value of the objective functional which has 
been realized at any time t for the particular trajectory of the control vector 0f , 
therefore, appears as the slope in Fig.1b, while the value of the objective functional is 
the sum of the integral from 0t  to 1t , of 0f , and 0S , the scrap value at terminal time.  
Our problem is to obtain the trajectory of the control vector that maximizes the 
objective functional. 
The major difficulty of this problem lies in the fact that an entire time path of the 
control vector must be chosen.  This amounts to a continuously infinite number of 
control variables.  In other words, what must be found is not just the optimal numbers 
but the optimal functions.  The basic idea of control theory is to transform the problem 
of choosing the entire optimal path of control variables into the problem of finding the 
optimal values of control variables at each instant of time.  In this way the problem of 
choosing an infinite number of variables is decomposed into an infinite number of more 
elementary problems each of which involves determining a finite number of variables. 
The objective functional can be broken into three pieces for any time t - a past, a 
present and a future - : 
  
ò
ò
ò
D+
D+
+¢¢¢¢+
¢¢¢¢+
¢¢¢¢=
1
0
).),((),)(,)((
),)(,)((
),)(,)((
1100
0
0
t
tt
tt
t
t
t
ttxStdttutxf
tdttutxf
tdttutxfJ
 
The decisions taken at any time have two effects.  They directly affect the present 
term, 
  ò
D+
¢¢¢¢
tt
t
tdttutxf ),)(,)((0 , 
by changing 0f .  They also change x& , and hence the future path of )(tx , through 
)),(),((1 ttutxfx =& .  The new path of )(tx  changes the future part of the functional.  
For example, if a firm increases investment at time t, the rate at which profits are earned 
at that time falls because the firm must pay for the investment.  The investment, 
however, increases the amount of capital available in the future and therefore profits 
earned in the future.  The firm must make investment decisions weighing these two 
effects.  In general, the choice of the control variables at any instant of time must take 
into account both the instantaneous effect on the current earnings tf D0  and the 
indirect effect on the future earnings ò D+ +¢
1
00
t
tt
Stdf  through a change in the state 
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variable.  The transformation of the problem is accomplished if a simple way to 
represent these two effects is found. 
This leads us to the concept of the value function, which might be used by a 
planner who wanted to recalculate the optimal policy at time t after the dynamic process 
began.  Consider the problem of maximizing 
  ò +¢¢¢¢
1 )),(()),(),(( 1100
t
t
ttxStdttutxf  (1.6) 
when the state variable at time t is x ; xtx =)( .  The maximized value is then a 
function of x and t : 
  ),,(* txJ      (1.7) 
which is called the value function.  The optimal value of the objective functional for 
the original problem (1.2)-(1.5) is 
  ).,(*)),(*(* 0
0 txJttxJ =       (1.8) 
The usefulness of the value function must be obvious by now: it facilitates the 
characterization of the indirect effect through a change in the state variable by 
summarizing the maximum possible value of the objective functional from time t on as 
a function of the state variable at time t (and t). 
The next step in the derivation of the necessary conditions for the optimum 
involves the celebrated Principle of Optimality due to Bellman.  The principle exploits 
the fact that the value of the state variable at time t captures all the necessary 
information for the decision making from time t on: the paths of the control vector and 
the state variable up to time t do not make any difference as long as the state variable at 
time t is the same.  This implies that if a planner recalculates the optimal policy at time 
t given the optimal value of the state variable at that time, the new optimal policy 
coincides with the original optimal policy.  Thus if ,),(* 10 ttttu ££  is the optimal 
control for the original problem and ,),(* 10 ttttx ££  the corresponding trajectory of 
the state variable, the value function satisfies  
  .)),(*()),(*),(*(* 1 1100ò +¢¢¢¢=
t
t
ttxStdttutxfJ          (1.9) 
Applying the principle of optimality again, we can rewrite (1.9) as 
 
),),(*(*)),(*),(*(
)),(*(
)),(*),(*()),(*),(*()),(*(*
0
110
00
1
ttttxJtdttutxf
ttxS
tdttutxftdttutxfttxJ
tt
t
t
tt
tt
t
D+D++¢¢¢¢=
+
¢¢¢¢+¢¢¢¢=
ò
òò
D+
D+
D+
 (1.10) 
for any t and tt D+  such that 10 ttttt £D+££ .  This construction allows us to 
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concentrate on the decisions in the short interval from t to tt D+  by summarizing the 
outcome in the remaining period in the value func tion, )),(*(* ttttxJ D+D+ . 
By the definition of the value function, any admissible control cannot do better 
than the value function if the initial state is the same.  Consider the following special 
type of control, 1),( ttttu £¢£¢ : the control is arbitrary between time t and time tt D+  
and optimal in the remaining period given the state reached at time tt D+ .  Then the 
corresponding value of the objective functional satisfies 
)),((*)),(),(()),(*(* 0 ttttxJtdttutxfttxJ
tt
t
D+D++¢¢¢¢> ò
D+
    (1.11) 
where )(tx ¢ , 1ttt £¢£ , is the state variable corresponding to the control )(tu ¢  with 
the initial state )(*)( txtx = . 
Combining (1.10) and (1.11) yields 
 
)),(()),(),((
)),(()),(),(()),((
0
0
ttttxJtdttutxf
ttttxJtdttutxfttxJ
tt
t
tt
t
D+D+*+¢¢¢¢³
D+D+**+¢¢¢*¢*=**
ò
ò
D+
D+
 
                              for any ttttUtu D+£¢£Î¢ ,)( . (1.12) 
This shows that the optimal control in the interval [ ]ttt D+,  maximizes the sum of the 
objective functional in the interval and the maximum possible value of the functional in 
the rest of the period [ ]1, ttt D+ .  If both sides of the inequality are differentiable, 
Taylor's expansion around t yields1 
                                                 
1 The details of Taylor's expansion here are as follows. Taylor's theorem states that if )(tF  is 
differentiable at at = , then 
 )()()()()( atoaFataFtF -+-+= , 
where 0)(lim
0
=
-
-
®- at
ato
at
．Noting that  
 ò
D+
¢¢ºD+
tt
t
tdtfttF )()( 00  
satisfies 
 ),()( 00 tftF =
¢  
we obtain 
 
),(])),(*(*)(*))),(*(*[(
)),(*(*)),(*),(*(
)),(*(*')'),'(*),(*(
0
0
tottttxJtxxttxJ
ttxJtttutxf
ttttxJdtttutxf
tt
t
D+D¶¶+¶¶+
+D=
D+D++¢ò
D+
&
 
and 
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,)),(),(*()/)),(*(*()),(),(*(
)),(*),(*()/)),(*(*()),(*),(*(
)/)),(*(*(
10
10
K
K
+D¶¶+D³
+D¶¶+D=
D¶¶-
tttutxfxttxJtttutxf
tttutxfxttxJtttutxf
ttttxJ
 
                                 for any Utu Î)( , (1.13) 
where ... represents higher order terms which become negligible as tD  tends to zero, 
since they approach zero faster than tD . Note that we used )(*)( txtx = , 
)),(),(()( 1 ttutxftx =& and ).),(*),(*()(* 1 ttutxftx =&  
Inequality (1.13) has a natural economic interpretation.  For example, if a firm is 
contemplating the optimal capital accumulation policy, tttutxf D)),(),(*(0 , is 
approximately the amount of profits earned in the period [ ]ttt D+, .  
xttxJ ¶¶ /)),(*(*  is the marginal value of capital, or the contribution of an additional 
unit of capital at time t; and ttxtttutxf D=D )()),(),(*(1 &  is approximately the amount 
of capital accumulated in period [ ]ttt D+, .  Thus tfxJ D¶¶ 1)/*(  represents the value 
of capital accumulated during the period.  (1.13), therefore, shows that the optimal 
control vector maximizes the sum of the current profits and the value of increased 
capital. 
Dividing (1.13) by At and taking limits as At approaches zero, we obtain 
 
)),(),(*()/)),(*(*()),(),(*(
)),(*),(*()/)),(*(*()),(*),(*(
/)),(*(*
10
10
ttutxfxttxJttutxf
ttutxfxttxJttutxf
tttxJ
¶¶+³
¶¶+=
¶¶-
 
                                        for any Utu Î)( . (1.14) 
Thus the optimal control vector )(* tu  maximizes 
 ),),(*()/)),(*(*(),),(*( 10 tutxfxttxJtutxf ¶¶+       (1.15) 
at each instant of time, and we have finally transformed the problem of finding the 
optimal path to that of finding optimal numbers at each point in time.  From the above 
discussion, it must be clear that (1.15) summarizes both the instantaneous effect and the 
indirect effect through a change in the state variable. 
(1.14) can be rewritten as 
                                                                                                                                               
 
),(])),(*(*)())),(*(*([
)),(*(*)),(),(*(
)(])),((*)())),((*[(
)),((*)),(),((
)),((*')'),'(),'((
0
0
0
tottttxJtxxttxJ
ttxJtttutxf
tottttxJtxxttxJ
ttxJtttutxf
ttttxJdtttutxf
tt
t
D+D¶¶+¶¶+
+D=
D+D¶¶+¶¶+
+D=
D+D++ò
D+
&
&  
where we used )(*)( txtx = .  Substituting these two equations into (1.12) yields (1.13). 
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{ }[ ].),),(*()/*(),),(*(max/* 10 tutxfxJtutxftJ Uu ¶¶+=¶¶- e  (1.14') 
This equation holds for any x, not just )(* tx , and can be considered a partial 
differential equation of ),(* txJ .  It is called the partial differential equation of 
dynamic programming or Bellman's equation. 
In the dynamic programming approach, the right side of (1.14') is maximized with 
respect to u, yielding the partial differential equation.  The partial differential equation 
is then solved with the boundary conditions.  At the initial time ,)(, 000 xtxt =  while 
at the terminal time 1t , the value function satisfies 
  )),(()),((* 11011 ttxSttxJ =  (1.16) 
for any )( 1tx .  This equation is the terminal boundary condition associated with 
Bellman's equation.  Since (1.16) holds for any )( 1tx , we have 
  ,/)),((/)),((* 11011 xttxSxttxJ ¶¶=¶¶     (1.17) 
which is called the transversality condition at time 1t . 
One of the disadvantages of the dynamic programming approach is that the partial 
differential equation is usually hard to solve.  Pontryagin's maximum principle, which 
can be immediately derived from the partial differential equation of dynamic 
programming, is often more useful for economic applications.  Furthermore, the 
method of dynamic programming employs the Taylor expansion in (1.13), which 
requires that the value function be differentiable.  There are many problems for which 
the value function is not differentiable everywhere.  The maximum principle, however, 
can be proven using a different and more general method.  In this section we derive the 
maximum principle from Bellman's equation, and in Section 3 we state a more general 
version of the maximum principle without proof. 
To derive Pontryagin's maximum principle, we define the adjoint, or costate, or 
auxiliary, variable, 
  ,/)),(*(*)( xttxJtp ¶¶=   (1.18) 
and rewrite (1.15) as the Hamiltonian, 
  [ ] ).),(),(()()),(),(()(,),(),( 10 ttutxftpttutxftpttutxH +=  (1.19) 
(1.14') now reads: if )(* tu  is the optimal control and )(* tx  the associated path of 
the state variable, then there exists a )(tp  such that for any t 
  [ ] { } [ ].)(,,),(*max)(,),(*),(* tptutxHtpttutxH Uue=  (1.20) 
Since )(tp  equals xJ ¶¶ /* , the adjoint variable )(tp  is the marginal value of 
the state variable (if, for example, )(tx  is capital, )(tp  is the marginal value of 
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capital) and has the interpretation of the shadow price of )(tx . 
(1.14') also contains information about the adjoint variable.  We can rewrite 
(1.14') as the Hamilton-Jacobi equation: 
  )./*,*,*,(/* xJtuxHtJ ¶¶=¶¶-  (1.21) 
If the value function is twice differentiable, the derivative of (1.21) with respect to x can 
be taken: 
  ./*)/(//* 222 xJpHxHtxJ ¶¶¶¶+¶¶=¶¶¶-   (1.22) 
Differentiating (1.18) with respect to t, however, yields 
  ./**)/*( 222 xtJxxJp ¶¶+¶¶¶= &&  (1.23) 
If we further assume twice continuous differentiability, the second order mixed partial 
derivatives are equal whatever the order of differentiation: ./*/* 22 xtJtxJ ¶¶¶=¶¶¶  
Since from (1.19) and (1.3) we have 
  ),,*,*,()/(* ptuxHpx ¶¶=&   (1.24) 
we can substitute (1.22) and (1.24) into (1.23) to get 
  ).,*,*,()/( ptuxHxp ¶¶=- &   (1.25) 
Equation (1.25) is often called the adjoint equation and the pair, (1.24) and (1.25), is 
called the canonical equations of the maximum principle. 
The transversality condition (1.17) gives the value of the adjoint variable at time 
1t : 
  ./)),(*()( 1101 xttxStp ¶¶=  (1.26) 
Finally, the time derivative of the Hamiltonian along the optimal path is 
  .**
t
H
u
u
H
p
p
H
x
x
H
dt
dH
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
= &&&  
From (1.24) and (1.25), the sum of the first two terms on the RHS is zero.  The third 
term vanishes because either 0/ =¶¶ uH  for an interior solution or 0=u&  for a 
boundary solution. 
Thus we have 
  
t
H
dt
dH
¶
¶
=   (1.27) 
except when the control vector has a jump. 
The maximum principle approach solves the ordinary differential equations (1.24) 
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and (1.25) with the boundary conditions 00 )( xtx =  and (1.26).  Since boundary 
conditions are given at two points, i.e., at initial time 0t  and terminal time 1t , this 
problem is called a two-point boundary value problem.  The pair of ordinary 
differential equations are usually easier to solve than the partial differential equation of 
dynamic programming. 
2.  An Example: Optimal Growth of Cities 
Consider the problem which was formulated in section 3 of Chapter VII: 
maximize 
  [ ]ò
¥
-
0
*))(),(( dtutPtcU   (2.1) 
subject to the differential equation, 
  ),()())(),(()( tctktPtkftk --= l&     (2.2) 
and the initial condition, 
  ,)0( 0kk =   (2.3) 
where control variables are the per capita consumption of resources, )(tc , and the 
population of a city, )(tP ; the state variable is the capital stock, )(tk ; λ is the 
growth rate of the whole population; and u* is the utility level at the optimal steady 
state. 
The fact that the terminal time is infinite causes some complications.  We first 
solve the finite-horizon problem of maximizing 
  [ ] )),((*)(),(( 1100
1 ttkSdtutPtcU
t
+-ò        (2.4) 
subject to the same constraints. 
The Hamiltonian for this problem is 
 )]()()(),(()[(*))(),(())(,),(),(),(( tctktPtkftqutPtcUtqttPtctkH --+-= l , (2.5) 
where )(tq  is the adjoint variable associated with the differential equation (2.2).  
Discussions in the previous section show that )(tq  can be interpreted as the marginal 
value of capital. 
According to (1.20), the Hamiltonian must be maximized with respect to the 
control variables, )(tc  and )(tP .  Assuming an interior solution, we obtain 
  ),()(),(( tqtPtcU c =              (2.5) 
  )),(),(()()(),(( tPtkftqtPtcU Pp =        (2.6) 
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which are equations (VII.3.8a) and (VII.3.8b) in Chapter VII. 
)(tq  satisfies the adjoint equation, 
  [ ],))(),(()(/)( l-=¶¶=- tPtkftqkHtq k&        (2.7) 
which is (VII.3.7). 
The transversality condition at 1tt =  is 
  ./)),(()( 1101 kttkStq ¶¶=                 (2.8) 
In the case where the terminal time is infinite, a straightforward application of the 
transversality condition (1.26) would yield 
  .0)(lim =
¥®
tq
t
 
It can be shown, however, that this is not the correct transversality condition.  As 
shown in Chapter VII, the optimal path converges to the optimal steady state at which 
  *),( uPcU -  
is maximized subject to the constraint, 
  0),( =-- ckPkf l . 
Denoting the values of variables at the optimal steady state by asterisks, we can write 
the transversality condition as 
  *,*)()(lim kqtktq
t
=
¥®
      (2.9) 
where *)*,(* PcUq c= . 
3.  The Maximum Principle: The Problem of Hestenes and Bolza 
In this section the problem in section 1 is generalized in a number of respects.  
Differences from the problem in section 1 are as follows. 
(i) The number of state variables is arbitrary.  
(ii) Control parameters are added.  Control parameters are choice variables which are 
restricted to be constant for any t. 
(iii) The constraints on the control vector may depend on the state vector, control 
parameters, and time. 
(iv) Isoperimetric constraints, or constraints involving integrals, are added. 
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(v) The initial time 0t  and the terminal time t, may be chosen by the choice of control 
parameters. 
(vi) The initial state )( 0tx  and the terminal state )( 1tx  can also be chosen by the 
choice of control parameters. 
The problem to be solved is that of maximizing the objective functional, 
  ò +=
1
0
),(),),(),(( 00
t
t
bSdttbtutxfJ         (3.1) 
subject to the constraints,  
 ),,),(),(( tbtutxfx ii =&          ni ,...2,1= ; (3.2a) 
 ,0),),(),(( >tbtutxg j          mj ¢= ,...2,1 ; (3.2b) 
 ,0),),(),(( =tbtutxg j           mmmj ,...2,1 +¢+¢= ; (3.2c) 
 ò ³+
1
0
,0)(),),(),((
t
t kk
bSdttbtutxh  l¢= ,...,2,1k ; (3.2d) 
 ò =+
1
0
,0)(),),(),((
t
t kk
bSdttbtutxh  lll ,...,2,1 +¢+¢=k ;  (3.2e) 
 );(00 btt =   (3.2f) 
 );(11 btt =   (3.2g) 
 ),()( 00 bxtx ii =           ni ,...2,1= ; (3.2h) 
 ),()( 11 bxtx ii =           ni ,...2,1= . (3.2i) 
))(),...,(),(()( 21 txtxtxtx n=  is the state vector; ))(),...,(),(()( 21 tutututu r=  is the 
control vector; ),...,,( 21 qbbbb =  is the vector of control parameters; )),(),(( ttutx  lies 
in a set 0R  in ),,( tux  space; and b lies in an open set B.  The maximization is 
carried out with respect to the control vector and control parameters.  0S , kS , 0f , 
if , jg , kh , 
0
ix , 
1
ix , 0t , and 1t , are all assumed to be continuously differentiable. 
Now, define a set A as the subset of BR ´0  satisfying 
  0 )( ³x,u,b,tg j ,   mj ¢= ,...2,1  
  0 = ),,,( tbuxg j ,   mmmj ,...2,1 +¢+¢=  
The set A is called the set of admissible elements. 
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The constraints are assumed to satisfy the condition that the matrix G, defined as 
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 (3.3) 
has rank m.  This condition is called the constraint qualification. 
The necessary conditions for the maximization problem can be stated as the 
following Theorem, which is due to Hestenes (1965). 
 
Theorem:  Suppose the trajectory }:*)),(*),(*{( 10 tttbtutx ££  maximizes (3.1) 
subject to the constraint (3.2) among the trajectories whose )(tx  is continuous, )(tu  
piecewise continuous, (continuous except possibly for a finite number of discrete 
jumps), 0)),(),(( Rttutx Î , and Bb Î .  Assume the constraint qualification (3.3) holds 
for any ),,,( tbux  in the set of admissible elements, A.  Then there exist multipliers; 
 ),...,,( 10 nPPPP = , 
 ),...,,( 21 mllll = , 
 ),...,,( 21 lmmmm = , 
not vanishing simultaneously on 10 ttt ££ , and functions H and L where 
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such that the following relations hold; 
(a) The multipliers ,,...,2,1,,0 l=kp km are constant, ,00 >p and ,',...,2,1,0 l=> kkm  
with 
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 ,0*)()*,),(*),(*(1
0
=
þ
ýü
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íì +ò
t
t kkk
bSdttbtutxhm  l,...,2,1=k . 
(b) The multipliers ,,...,2,1),( mjti =l  are piecewise continuous and are continuous 
over each interval of continuity of )(* tu .  Moreover, for each ',...,2,1 mj = , we have 
 .0)*,),(*),(*()(,0)( =³ tbtutxgtt jjj ll  
(c) The multipliers nitp i ,...,2,1),( = , are continuous and have piecewise continuous 
derivatives.  They satisfy the adjoint equations; 
 ),),(,*,),(*),(*()/()( mtptbtutxHxtp ii ¶¶=- &     ni ,...,2,1= . 
(d) The maximum principle expressed in the inequality 
 )),(,*,,),(*()),(,*,),(*),(*( mm tptbutxHtptbtutxH ³  
 holds for all Atbutx Î],*,,),(*[ , which implies that  
 0))(,),(,*,),(*),(*()/( =¶¶ ttptbtutxLu lm . 
(e) The following transversality condition holds: 
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where ))(,),(,*,),(*),(*()(* ttptbtutxLtL lm= . 
(f) The function )(* tL  is continuous on 10 ttt ££ , and 
 ))(,),(,*,),(*),(*()/()(*)/( ttptbtutxLttLdtd lm¶¶=  
on each interval of continuity of )(* tu . 
 
The reason why these conditions are necessary for the optimum can be understood 
by considering the following Lagrangian in the integral form: 
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Observing that integration by parts yields 
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we can rewrite the Lagrangian as 
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By analogy to the usual method of Lagrange, this Lagrangian must be maximized, 
without constraints, with respect to )(),(,),( 0txtxbtu  and )( 1tx .  Maximization of 
the Lagrangian with respect to )(tu  between t and tt D+  is equivalent to 
maximization of 
  tttptbtutxL D))(,),(,,),(),(( lm  
with respect to )(tu .  This yields condition (d). 
In the same way, maximization with respect to )(tx  yields the adjoint equations 
in (c).  Maximization with respect to )(),( 10 txtx ii  and jb  yields   
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Condition (e) can be obtained by combining these equations. 
Condition (f) is a generalization of (1.27) to allow for time dependent constraints 
(3.2b,c). 
The multiplier 0p  is added to include the so-called abnormal case in which 
00 =p .  If 00 =p , the same control is optimal for problems with any objective 
functionals so long as all the constraints are the same.  Thus for abnormal problems the 
necessary conditions do not involve the objective functional, but are already specified 
by constraints.  This happens, for example, when there is only one control trajectory 
that satisfies all the constraints.  If constraints are 
 ,)( 2tux =  
 ,1)(1 ££- tu    ,10 ttt ££  
 ,0)( 0 =tx  
 ,0)( 1 =tx  
then the only possible control trajectory is  
 ,0)( =tu     10 ttt ££ , 
and the optimal solution does not depend on the objective functional. 
The reason why 0p  is zero in such a case can be seen by going back to the 
dynamic programming approach in section 1.  Since the control cannot be changed, it 
is also impossible to change the state trajectory.  This means that it is prohibitively 
costly to change the state trajectory: xJ ¶¶ * in (1.14') and hence )(tp  in (1.19) are 
infinite.  Since 0p  was taken to be 1 in section 1, this is equivalent to 00 =p  with 
,,...,1, nip i =  finite in this section. 
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In this book, we assume that all the problems are normal, and normalize 0p  to 
be 1. 
The constraint qualification is assumed because the proof of the maximum 
principle considers perturbation of the control vector )(tu  such as 
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for a small e , and derives the necessary conditions from the property that at the 
optimum no perturbation can make the objective functional greater.  If the constraint 
qualification is not satisfied, there exist no nontrivial perturbations that satisfy the 
constraints (3.2b) and (3.2c).  For example, if there are two equality constraints: 
 ,0),( 211 =uug   
 ,0),( 212 =uug  
which are tangent only at a single point *)*,(* 21 uuu = as in Figure 2, only one control 
vector satisfies the constraints and no perturbation is possib le. 
 
 
 
In this case, the gradient vectors, 
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are linearly dependent and the rank of the matrix, 
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is less than 2=m . 
 
4.  Examples: Optimum Cities 
Two optimum control problems formulated in Chapter 1 are solved in this section.  
Consider first the problem of maximizing the Benthamite social welfare function, 
 ò
x
dxxNxhxzu
0
,)())(),((   (4.1) 
subject to the resource constraint, 
 ò =++-
x
a dxxRxNxtxzPw 0
0)}()()]()({[ q      (4.2) 
the population constraint, 
 ò =-
x
pdxxN
0
,0)(        (4.3) 
and the land constraint, 
 ),()()( xhxNx =q      .0 xx ££          (4.4) 
Control variables are the consumption of the consumer good, )(xz , the consumption of 
land for housing, )(xh , and the population density, )(xN .  The edge of the city,  x , 
is a control parameter.  There is no state variable in this problem because there is no 
constraint in the form of a differential equation. 
The function H in the previous section now reads 
 
)()}()()]()({[)())(),((
),,,),(),(),((
xNxRxNxtxzxNxhxzu
xxNxhxzH
a gqdl
gdl
+++-=
 
The function L is 
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-+= qm
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and the Lagrangian L  is 
 ò=L
x
Ldx
0
.  
Assuming ,0>l  we normalize l .  With 1=l , condition (d) yields 
 0)(][)( =-¶¶=¶¶ xNzuxzL d  
 0)(][)( =-¶¶=¶¶ xNhuxhL m  
 ,0)()()]()([)()( =-+-=¶¶ xhxxtxzxuxNL md  
which corresponds to (I.2.5a), (I.2.5b), and (I.2.5c). 
From condition (e), we obtain the transversality condition, 
 ,0)()}()()]()({[)())(),(()(* =+++-= xNxRxNxtxzxNxhxzuxL a gqd  
which corresponds to (I.2.5d). 
Condition (f) implies 
 )()()(* xxdxxdL qm ¢= ． 
Next, we impose the constraint that households receive equal utility: 
 )),(),(( xhxzuu =         ,0 xx ££  
and maximize the sum of utilities, 
 ò
x
dxxuN
0
.)(  
Constraints, (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4), remain the same.  In this case, u is an additional 
control parameter.  Define 
 
)()}()()]()({[)(
),,,,),(),(),((
xNxRxNxtxzxuN
xuxNxhxzH
a gqdl
gdl
+++-=
 
 
)]()()()[(]))(),(()[(
))(),(,,,,,),(),(),((
xhxNxxuxhxzuxH
xxxuxNxhxzL
-+-+= qmu
mugdl
 
 .
0ò=L
x
Ldx  
Again, we normalize l .  Condition (d) becomes  
0)()()( =¶¶+-=¶¶ zuxxNxzL ud  
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0)()()()( =-¶¶=¶¶ xNxhuxxhL mu  
0)()()]()([)( =-+-=¶¶ xhxxtxzuxNL md ， 
which correspond to (I.2.22a), (I.2.22b), and (I.2.22c), respectively.  
Condition (e) yields  
 0)}()()]()({[)()(* =++-= xRxNxtxzxuNxL aqd  
 ò ò =-
x x
dxxdxxN
0 0
,0)()( u  
which correspond to (I.2.22d) and (I.2.22e) respectively.  
Finally, condition (f) yields 
 ).()()(* xxdxxdL qm ¢=  
 
 
NOTES 
Discussions in section 1 are greatly influenced by Dixit (1976), Dorfman (1969) 
and Intriligator (1971).  For rigorous proofs of the maximum principle, see, for 
example, Fleming and Rishel (1975) and Lee and Markus (1967). 
The Theorem in section 3 is taken from Hestenes (1965) Hestenes (1966) contains 
the theorem and its extensions. 
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